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FOREWARD 
 
 
This Ph.D. dissertation, entitled “The Direct and Indirect Interactions between Ideology 
and Economic Growth”, brings together five essays in the field of macroeconomics of growth. 
The links between those different essays and the underlying logic of the whole dissertation is 
explained in the General Introduction in which we also define the questions of research we 
address. Nevertheless, since each essay corresponds to an independent paper, essays can be 
read separately. This implies the presence of redundant information across essays. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This Ph.D. dissertation seeks to investigate the links between the individuals’ political 
ideology and economic growth. First, because individuals’ social norms are supposed to 
influence the long-term economic growth, we are interested in how the political dimension of 
these norms affects a country’s economic performance. In this context, we ask whether 
political ideology directly influences economic growth or indirectly, through transmission 
channels embodied in the policies for which the individuals vote. As a country’s ideology can 
be defined as the society’s choice regarding the appropriate level of the government 
intervention in the economy, we also ask whether the government intervention works as a 
transmission mechanism in the ideology-economic growth relationship. Second, to the extent 
that individuals’ electoral behaviors reveal their political ideology, we study the impact of 
economic growth on the voters’ ideology. More precisely, we aim to investigate how 
economic growth affects electoral behaviors. Therefore our goal is two-fold. We want to 
improve the understandings of the role played by the individuals’ ideology in the process of 
economic growth and to enrich the economic growth literature. We also want to participate in 
the research on the determinants of the change in the individuals’ ideology and beliefs. For 
that, we use a novel and comprehensive database covering all the French democratic 
experience since 1870. We also construct similar historical data for the U.S. and the U.K. but 
this dissertation is mainly applied to the French case. Studying individual countries over long 
periods of time, we use time-series analyses with annual data. Our results identify a causal 
effect from political ideology to economic growth all over the French democratic experience. 
We find that a move of the voters’ ideology to the right impacts the long run economic growth 
positively. We also find that the growth effect of ideology is mediated by the size of 
government in the post-second-world-war period but not in the pre-war period. Therefore, our 
results suggest a direct effect of political ideology on economic growth in the pre-war period 
but an indirect effect in the post-war period. We find that the contrasting role of government 
size as a transmission mechanism before and after the Second World War can be explained by 
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changing relationships between ideology and government intervention on the one hand and 
between government size and economic growth on the other hand. Our results also identify 
that the economic growth does not shift the country’s ideology towards the left or the right. 
Nevertheless, we also find that economic growth influences the voters’ ideological instability 
in the sense of a general change in the voting patterns. 
 
Keywords: Ideology, Economic Growth, Government Size, Nonlinearity Hypothesis, 
Baumol Cost Disease, Electoral volatility, Economic Voting, Time-series, France.
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RÉSUMÉ 
 
 
Cette thèse cherche à étudier les liens entre l’idéologie politique des individus et la 
croissance économique. Premièrement, étant donné que les normes sociales des individus sont 
supposées influencer la croissance de long-terme, nous nous intéressons à la façon dont la 
dimension politique de ces normes joue sur les performances économiques d’un pays. Dans ce 
contexte, nous nous demandons si l’idéologie politique influence directement la croissance ou 
indirectement à travers des canaux politiques représentés par les politiques votées par les 
individus. L’idéologie d’un pays pouvant être définie comme le choix d’une société 
concernant le niveau approprié d’intervention du gouvernement dans l’économie, nous 
étudions également si l’intervention du gouvernement peut jouer le rôle de mécanisme de 
transmission dans la relation idéologie-croissance. Deuxièmement, dans la mesure où les 
comportements électoraux reflètent l’idéologie politique des individus, nous étudions l’impact 
de la croissance économique sur l’idéologie des électeurs. Plus précisément, nous avons pour 
but d’étudier la manière dont la croissance économique affecte les comportements électoraux. 
Par conséquent, nous objectif est double. Nous souhaitons améliorer la compréhension du rôle 
joué par l’idéologie et plus généralement les croyances des individus dans le processus de 
croissance économique et ainsi contribuer à la littérature sur la croissance économique. Nous 
participons aussi à la recherche sur les déterminants des croyances des individus et de leur 
évolution. Pour cela, nous utilisons une nouvelle base de données couvrant l’ensemble de 
l’expérience démocratique française depuis 1870. Nous avons également construit des bases 
de données similaires pour les Etats-Unis et le Royaume-Uni mais cette thèse est 
principalement appliquée au cas français. L’étude de pays individuels en longue période 
requiert l’emploi d’analyses en série temporelle avec des données annuelles. Nos résultats 
nous permettent d’identifier un effet de l’idéologie politique sur la croissance économique 
tout au long de l’expérience démocratique française. Nous trouvons qu’un déplacement de 
l’idéologie des électeurs vers la droite du spectre politique a un effet de long terme positif sur 
la croissance économique. Nous trouvons également que cet effet de l’idéologie sur la 
croissance passe par la taille du gouvernement pour la période pré-première guerre mondiale 
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mais pas pour la période post-guerre. Cela suppose donc un effet direct de l’idéologie 
politique sur la croissance politique pour la période pré-guerre et un effet indirect pour la 
période post-guerre. Nous trouvons que cette différence s’expliquer par des relations non-
stables entre idéologie et taille du gouvernement d’un côté et entre taille de l’Etat et 
croissance économique de l’autre. Nos résultats nous permettent également d’identifier que la 
croissance économique ne fait pas basculer l’idéologie des électeurs vers la droite ou la 
gauche. Néanmoins, nous trouvons que la croissance économique influence l’instabilité 
idéologique des électeurs qui changent leurs habitudes de vote.  
 
Mots clés : Idéologie, Croissance Economique, Taille du gouvernement, hypothèse de non-
linéarité, Baumol Cost Disease, Volatilité Electorale, Vote Economique, Série-temporelles, 
France. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The endogenous growth theories have emphasized the central role played by governments 
in the process of economic growth. By implementing policies that promote knowledge 
(Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991), innovation (Aghion and Howitt, 1992) and 
public infrastructure (Barro, 1990), governments can work on growth on a long-run basis. 
Indeed, appropriate policies in terms of technology, education and health can foster 
investments in human capital and infrastructure. However, the processes of economic growth 
and of developing growth-enhancing policies are not straightforward and can be decomposed 
into several layers (Williamson, 2000). A first layer is composed of the direct motivations to 
invest and accumulate capital, such as capital investment subsidies and R&D subsidies. The 
second layer corresponds to institutional and structural reforms concerning for instance the 
allocation and protection of property rights, the regulation of markets and exchanges. Such 
institutional features indirectly affect growth through the incentives to innovate. In addition, 
there exists a third growth layer that is considered by Aghion and Howitt (2009) among others 
as the most important: culture and beliefs. This importance comes from the fact that changes 
in this layer determine the changes in the subsequent layers (Williamson, 2000). 
In this literature, culture refers to individual and collective beliefs, social norms and 
different features of individual preferences (Aghion and Howitt, 2009). As opposed to the 
institutions of the second layer called “formal institutions”, the set of beliefs and norms that 
constitute the third layer is qualified as “informal institutions” (North, 1992). Contrary to the 
formal institutions that can be regulated by government and that evolve “quickly” (at the scale 
of decades), informal institutions are not implemented by state and evolve very slowly (at the 
scale of centuries), according to the environment (Williamson, 2000). Among the informal 
institutions, a significant part of the New Institutional Economics initiated by Douglas North 
attributes to ideology a central role in the process of economic development. In this 
perspective, ideologies are the shared mental models that individuals construct to make sense 
of the world around them (Denzau and North, 1994). Therefore, ideologies can influence the 
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evolution of political-economic systems and societies by shaping the interpersonal 
relationships. However, this literature is mainly theorical and suffers from an empirical lack. 
The bourgeoning empirical literature exploring the growth effects of social norms has left 
aside the potential effect of individuals’ political ideologies. Instead, this literature has mainly 
focused on ethnic heterogeneity (Easterly and Levine, 1997), accumulation of human capital 
(Tabellini, 2007), mutual trust (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Guiso et al., 
2005). This literature has also investigated the transmission mechanisms between culture and 
economic growth. Aghion et al. (2011) emphasized the channel of labor market regulation 
through which trust affects economic growth. Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) put the light on the 
parents’ rate of time preference for their children that determines the children’s trade-off 
between current consumption and capital accumulation.  
However, as far as we know, the paper by Bjornskov (2005) is the first one that explicitly 
focuses on the effect of individuals’ political ideology on the long-run economic growth. 
Indeed, Bjornskov (2005) provides a theoretical framework supporting that people with a 
strong merit assumption (thinking that inequality is fair and expecting high returns to their 
effort) are more productive and thus directly foster economic performance. In addition, people 
with such an assumption votes for rightwing parties promising stronger legal systems and less 
government intervention in the economy. In this manner, they indirectly boost economic 
growth. Bjornskov (2005) uses panel data for the period 1970-2000 and provide evidence that 
countries to the right of the average do experience more growth, especially thanks to better 
legal systems and less government intervention. Besides, a very few papers tackle similar 
issues. Using panel data, Bjornskov (2008) provides evidence that the higher the income 
inequalities are, the more a government shift to a right-wing ideology improves growth. 
Osterloh (2012) provides evidence for the absence of growth effect of government’s political 
ideology. However, he shows that some ideological dimensions associated with market 
intervention and welfare state policies impacts negatively on growth. 
The relatively low interest in the literature on the growth effects of political ideology 
compared to the growing literature on other social norms is the main motivation of this 
dissertation. Therefore, the first purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the effects of 
individuals’ political ideology on economic growth. 
We focus in this dissertation on the French democratic experience since the establishment 
of the 3rd Republic in 1871, what presents several interests compared to the pervious 
literature. First, as the few empirical literature on the topic focuses on rather short periods, it 
is interesting to investigate the relationship over long periods of time. In this regard, the 
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French history provides a relevant case with a stable and democratic regime since 1871. 
Second, contrary to other old democracies such as in the U.S. or in the U.K., France has 
experienced a relative persistence in its right-left ideological divide that has consistently 
structured its political landscape. Indeed, as the right-left divide originates in France in the 
wake of the French Revolution, it is already firmly established in 1870 and has had a 
permanent hold on the French political life. Indeed, contrary to other democracies, the social 
issue appears since from the 19th century with socialist parties in the France political spectrum 
and has remained a touchstone in French politics (Goguel, 1946; Candar, 2005). By contrast, 
looking at the U.K. for example, New Labour is nowhere near as left as Labour was a few 
decades ago - and can even be considered more rightwing than the Tories of the 
1930s (Cusack et al, 2010). In this context, the persistence of a clear ideological divide 
illustrated by some historians such as Siegfried (1930) makes France especially adapted to the 
study of the consequences of political ideology. Another interesting specificity of the French 
political ideology is its left position compared to the other countries. In fact, according to the 
World Public Opinion Survey (2005), France has the lowest ratio of citizens expressing 
confidence in the free-market system compared to the state, with 36%, even lower than 
Russia’s 43% and considerably below China’s striking 74%.  
Moreover, the origin and persistence of political ideology are of great interest to 
understand the interactions between ideology and economic growth. The effects of the 
economic environment on citizens’ political ideology are the other major question of this 
dissertation. The existing literature does not provide appropriate frameworks to study this 
relationship. To the extent that electoral behaviors reflect voters’ ideology1, the theory of 
economic voting provides an explanation of voting patterns but irrespective of the voters’ 
ideology. In the wake of Kramer (1971), a large body of literature on economic voting has 
explored the impacts of macroeconomic changes on incumbent support in elections. 
According to the hypothesis on government responsibility for national economic conditions, 
voters punish or reward the incumbent on the basis of their economic performance. However, 
this theory does not provide explanations of the support for opposition parties. The electoral 
fortunes of non-governing parties are most often missing in models (Nannestad and Paldam, 
1994). In brief, this theory only focuses on the voting pattern for the incumbent and not on the 
electoral behaviours in general. As a consequence, this theoretical framework is unable to 
                                                 
 
1
 Individuals’ political ideology might reflect norms and preferences that influence their electoral and economic 
behavior. For example, large-scale experimental studies by Mitchell et al. (1993) and Scott et al. (2001) find that 
the political ideology of experimental subjects affects their behavior and mental models. 
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investigate the possible impacts of the economy on the votes for opposition parties. Besides, a 
marginal literature more systematically studies the consequences of the economy on voters’ 
policy sentiments shift along a right-left axis. This literature argues that individuals’ ideology 
shifts leftwards when the economy is prospering and to the right during recessions (see Durr, 
1993; Stevenson, 2001; Markussen, 2008). Therefore, in addition to slow-moving sociological 
factors developed by the Michigan School (Lazarfeld et al., 1944), political ideology seems to 
be determined by some short-term economic factors. Consequently, we are also interested in 
the effects of economic growth on political ideology in this dissertation.  
This Ph.D. dissertation seeks to study the direct and indirect interactions between voters’ 
political ideology and economic growth throughout the French democratic experience.  
Assuming that electoral behavior reflects voters’ political ideology, our first question is 
whether and how voters’ ideology along a right-left axis can impact economic growth. We 
assume that citizens’ political ideology can affect growth either directly or indirectly. The 
direct effect of political ideology on economic growth refers to the effects of citizens’ 
ideology outside any policy channel, for example regarding their labor and saving behaviours. 
The indirect effect pertains to the growth effect of the policies determined by the voters’ 
preferences. In other words, the indirect effects of voters’ ideology are mediated by certain 
policies. As ideology can be regarded as a society’s preference regarding the appropriate level 
of government intervention in the economy, we investigate the indirect role of government 
intervention as a transmission mechanism between voters’ ideology and economic growth. In 
this regard, we want to understand the role of voters’ ideology in the growing government 
intervention in the economy over the 20th century in France. Moreover, a thorough 
understanding of the transmission mechanism requires to investigate the impact of 
government intervention on the long run evolution of the economic output. As previously 
said, voters’ political ideology can also be affected by the economic environment. Thus, the 
second question of this dissertation is whether and how voters’ ideology can be influenced by 
economic growth.  
The dissertation is composed of five essays. Essay 1 analyses the use of the concept of 
ideology in economics. It is the opportunity to emphasize the main thrust of this dissertation 
with regard to the literature. Essays 2 and 3 focus on the government intervention in the 
economy as a transmission channel from voters’ ideology to economic growth. We 
decompose here the analysis of transmission mechanisms. On the one hand, in essay 2, we 
study the relationship between government interference in the economy and the long run 
economic growth. On the other hand, we investigate in essay 3 the role of political ideology in 
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the growing government intervention. Essays 4 and 5 propose to investigate more directly the 
interactions between political ideology and economic performance. This implies to assess the 
growth effect of voters’ ideology but also to consider the possibility of reverse causality. That 
is the purpose of essay 4 while essay 5 focuses on the consequences of economic fluctuations 
on electoral behaviors. We now discuss in greater detail the organisation of this dissertation 
and the contribution of each essay.  
Essay 1 studies the evolution of the concept of ideology in economics. This is fundamental 
for the investigation of the role of ideology in economy, which we undertake in this 
dissertation. The purpose of this part is to tackle decisive questions for our work, such as: 
what is ideology for economists and how do they define it? How can ideology be transformed 
into an analytical tool compatible with the economic behavioural model(s) and the economic 
method(s)? In which theoretical debates does the study of ideology take place. Such questions 
are fundamental in this dissertation since they allow to position the rest of the study in the 
existing literature and underlying debates. Since Meek (1967) and Samuels (1977), no study 
has taken stock of the treatment of ideology in economics. The recent literature underlying the 
importance for economists of studying ideology systematically reaches the conclusion that 
ideology is under-studied by economists (Denzau and North, 1994; Slembeck, 2004; Leroux, 
2004; Higgs, 2008). Two common features of these studies are the focus on a very specific 
strand of the literature2 and a qualitative methodology based on traditional literature surveys 
to explore the literature on the topic. We argue here that the pessimistic conclusions on the 
little interest of economists for ideology is due to the qualitative methodology used. 
Therefore, essay 1 investigates the issue by means of a quantitative analysis based on 
bibliometrics and a semi-quantitative content analysis. For that, we use a sample of 246 
papers published in 45 top-ranked economics journals in the period 1920-2010 that appear to 
be representative of the whole economic literature. This kind of quantitative analysis is 
supposed to provide a more systematic and objective methodology than a traditional narrative 
literature survey (Stanley, 2001). In this manner, this essay provides evidence of the 
significant and increasing interest of economists for ideology, what contrasts with the 
conclusions of the previous literature. We also show that, by studying this concept, economics 
converged towards different approaches at different times, corresponding to specific 
theoretical debates. The modern approaches of ideology that we emphasize in our analysis 
                                                 
 
2
 Denzau and North (1994) explores the use of the concept of ideology in the New Institutional Economics, 
Hinich and Munger (1996) for the Public Choice literatrure, Slembeck (2004) for the evolutionist theory, Leroux 
(2004) for the history of economic thought.  
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supply us with methods to integrate ideology in the standard rational choice model. They also 
provide operating definitions of ideology in order to empirically study the economic effects of 
ideology. Moreover, the most recent approach of ideology that we identify in our sample 
stresses the importance of studying not only the consequences of ideology but also its causes. 
Understanding the shaping of ideology and more generally of beliefs appears as a central 
challenge for economists. In this regard, we try in this dissertation to take part in some 
essential and recent research related to the shaping of beliefs and preferences. 
Essays 2 and 3 assess the indirect interactions between voters’ ideology and economic 
growth. First, the complexity of this relationship comes from the fact that ideology may 
indirectly influence economic growth through policies voted by voters according to their 
ideology. Thus, these essays thoroughly study a transmission mechanism possibly mediating 
the effect of ideology on economic growth. In line with the existing literature, we focus here 
on the channel of government intervention in the economy. More precisely, we focus on the 
size of government, commonly defined in the literature by the share of total public spending 
in the output. Other policies as labor market regulation for example could admittedly be 
considered as appropriate transmission channels from voters’ ideology to economic 
performance. However, the size of government is proved to be the main channel mediating 
the ideology-growth relationship in the literature (Bjornskov, 2005; Osterloh, 2010). 
Moreover, studying the French case in such a long period (1871-2008), we are constrained by 
the availability of data. Indeed, we have been able to construct a series of public spending for 
our observation period based on André and Delorme (1983). However, this has not been the 
case for other potential transmission mechanisms such as the quality of legal institutions, the 
labor market regulation, for which historical data is not available.  
Second, the complexity of the relationship studied here comes from the fact that the growth 
effect of ideology can have evolved through time, especially over around 130 years. This can 
be explained by changes in the relationships, on the one hand, between ideology and 
government size, and on the other hand, between government size and economic growth. In 
this regard, essays 2 and 3 study of the transmission mechanisms by taking into account these 
possibilities and propose appropriate theoretical and empirical approaches. Among the 
previous studies on the effect of ideology on government size, only Pickering and Rockey 
(2011) provide a dynamic framework allowing the effect of voters’ ideology to change 
according to the voters’ income. As a complement of this theoretical framework, we provide 
here a dynamic analysis of the effect of ideology on government size. Concerning the 
relationship between government size and economic growth, most of the theoretical and 
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empirical literature studies this relationship within a linear model, not allowing a changing 
effect of public expenditure over time (for a comprehensive literature review, see Nijkamp 
and Poot, 2004). However, more recent studies argue for a nonlinear effect of government 
spending on economic performance (see Mueller, 2003 for a brief literature survey). Our 
study of the government size-growth relationship investigates this hypothesis, called the non-
linearity hypothesis, for the French case over more than one century. Naturally, essays 2 and 3 
study each one a step of the transmission mechanism between ideology and growth. 
More precisely, essay 2 analyses the effect of public expenditure on economic output from 
both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. Our purpose is to examine here the validity 
of the non-linearity hypothesis with an original database on France. More precisely, we seek 
to address whether public expenditure can be growth-enhancing only to a certain share in the 
total output and if, beyond this share, the effect is negative in terms of economic performance. 
If this is true, then what is the growth-maximizing size of government? Our focus on the so-
called “nonlinearity” hypothesis is driven by the deadlock reached by the numerous empirical 
studies estimating a linear relationship between government size and economic outcome. 
Indeed, the latest literature reviews on the topic agree on the fact that studies investigating a 
linear relationship have been inconclusive3. However, the literature on the nonlinearity 
hypothesis suffers from some theoretical and empirical inaccuracies. In this essay, we intend 
to cope with these lacks by first providing a framework in order to theoretically justify the 
nonlinear effect of government size on economic outcome. Our theoretical originality is to 
decompose the total effect of government size into the gross benefits stemming from the 
correction of market failures and the costs of government intervention entailed by state 
failures. In this manner, we consider that each euro spent by government has costs and 
benefits. We depart from the literature that justifies the non-linearity hypothesis by the 
distinction between productive and non-productive public expenditure (Barro, 1990; Lee, 
1995; Devarjan et al., 1996; Chen, 2006). From an empirical point of view, we test the 
validity of the nonlinearity hypothesis with annual time-series on France for the period 1896-
2008. As we construct new series that have not been already used in the previous literature, 
we provide a thorough analysis of the time properties of them with a battery of unit-root tests. 
We employ the two-step Engle-Granger (1987) co-integration method to estimate a 
nonmonotonic model in which real GDP is explained by government size and relevant 
                                                 
 
3
 See for instance Nijkamp and Poot (2004), Ciccone and Jarocinski (2010), Bergh and Henrekson (2011), Pitlik 
and Schratzenstaller (2011). 
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controls. As far as we know, no previous empirical studies have provided an empirical 
analysis taking into account both the nonlinearity hypothesis and the long-term, cointegrating 
relationship between government and output. This chapter provides evidence of a co-
integration nonmonotonic relationship between government size and real GDP in France for 
our sample period. This suggests a changing relationship between both variables that needs to 
be taken into account in the rest of the dissertation. Moreover, the use of Granger causality 
tests supports the hypothesis of a one-way causality running from government size to 
economic growth. The estimated coefficients indicate that the output-maximizing government 
size in France is 30% of GDP. Compared with the few comparable studies on the U.S.4 in 
which the growth-maximizing size is around 20%, our result shows a French originality with 
a quite high efficient government size. 
Essay 3 analyses the determinants of government size and especially the role of voters’ 
ideology along with traditional explanations. For comparison purpose, we conduct an 
empirical investigation for France as well as the U.S. and the U.K. that are democratic all over 
the 20th century. Indeed, democractic regimes are essential to investigate the demand-side 
explanations based on the voters’ preferences for public expenditure. For that we construct a 
novel and comprehensive dataset starting in the late 19th century for the three countries. The 
purpose of this essay is to investigate the diversity of the determinants of the growth of 
government, according to the country and the period studied. While a huge literature already 
exists on the topic, only Florio and Colautti (2005) and Pickering and Rockey (2001) provide 
dynamic models showing that the effect of voters’ income on the government size depends on 
the burden of taxation and on the voters’ ideology, respectively. However, the explanation 
that received the strongest empirical support in the literature seems to be the Baumol’s (1967) 
cost disease5. Baumol explains the increasing share of the public expenditure by the 
increasing costs of the public sector, mainly represented by wages. In this perspective, we 
propose in this chapter a theoretical model to renew the current tests of the Baumol’s 
hypothesis, which potentially suffer from some biases developed in the essay. In the 
theoretical model, we show that the Baumol’s theory implies that the size of government is 
increasing in the labor share and that this impact increases as ideology moves left and as 
income rises. Thus we provide a dynamic framework in which the public sector’s cots, the 
voters’ revenue and ideology can have together a dynamic effect on the size of government. 
                                                 
 
4
 See Grossman (1987), Peden (1991), Scully (1994), Vedder and Gallaway (1998). 
5
 For exhaustive literature reviews, see Holsey and Borcherding (1997) and Borcherding et al. (2004).    
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In a previous work, Facchini, Melki and Pickering (2012b)6 provided robust evidence for the 
predictions of this theory with OECD data for the post-1970 period. The main result of essay 
3 is a tremendous diversity of the determinants of government size depending on the country 
and the period studied. Nevertheless, we find robust evidence for the theoretical predictions of 
our model, at least for France and the U.K. for the post-second war period. In addition, we 
show a significant positive effect of leftwing political ideology only for France for the post-
second war period. Regarding the purpose of this dissertation, this result suggests that 
government size can be a transmission channel for France for the post-war period. This also 
suggests that this channel could not be appropriate for the U.S. and the U.K.. Our results also 
confirm the absence of effect of economic output on government size, discarding a potiential 
concern of endogeneity for the purpose of this dissertation. 
Essays 4 and 5 focus more directly on the interactions between political ideology and 
economic growth. Contrary to essays 2 and 3 that studiy separately the transmission 
mechanisms from ideology to government size and from government size to economic output, 
essay 4 directly assesses the effect of ideology on economic growth. Essays 2 and 3 
complement essay 4 in the sense that they provide important information concerning the time-
series properties of the variables and the structural breaks in the relationships between the 
variables. Essays 4 and 5 also intend to study the causality between ideology and growth by 
studying the potential effects of the economic environment of electoral behaviors. Indeed, the 
literature studying the growth effects of political ideology7, either in a political business cycle 
framework or in a long-term perspective, does not take the reverse causality bias seriously. 
However Markussen (2008) among others argues that economic booms can lead voters to vote 
for leftwing parties and economic crises can lead them to vote for the right. Consequently, 
essay 4 provides a thorough analysis of the possible endogeneity bias in the ideology-growth 
relationship. We allow here the economic growth to play a role in the votes for right- and 
leftwing parties. Besides, more originally, essay 5 studies the effects of the economic 
environment on the instability of the electorate’s votes from one election to the other. 
Consideding that voters express their ideologies when voting, a generalized change in voting 
patterns can be considered as a momentum of ideological instability. This last insight 
completes our study of the growth-ideology relationship. 
                                                 
 
6
 Focusing on different area and time period, this paper is in not included in this dissertation. 
7
 See Snowberg et al. (2007), Gerber and Huber (2009) and Potrafke (2012) for the latest studies. 
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More precisely, essay 4 empirically examines the impact of voters’ political ideology on 
economic growth in the French democracy since 1871. By studying the long-term effect of 
voters’ ideology, this essay departs from the rest of the literature that mainly investigates the 
effect of government’s partisanship on the business cycle and not the trend of the output 
growth. This chapter also complements the literature on the growth effect of individuals’ 
social norms, which mainly focuses on social capital and trust. Moreover, our time series-
analysis covering 130 years departs from the existing literature studying the effects of 
political ideology. Indeed, the literature is mainly composed of cross-sectional studies that 
focus on a group of countries or regions (Potrafke, 2012). In this study, we first address the 
property and the reliability of a measure of political ideology over a long period of time. For 
that, we gathered different historical sources to construct an original ideology based on the 
composition of the Lower Chamber of the parliament, the sole political institution elected by 
the universal suffrage throughout our observation period. To identify the political affiliation 
of the different parties, we rely on the right-left divide of the period. This is an originality 
compared to the existing literature that uses time-varying indexes based on the content of the 
parties’ manifesto provided by Beck et al. (2001) or Budge et al. (2001). Second, this essay 
investigates the robustness and the causality of the relationship between political ideology and 
growth. We use here various econometric methods such as Granger causality and 2SLS 
methods to control for the possible reverse causality. Third, we study here the role of 
government intervention as a transmission channel through which political ideology affects 
economic performance. The main conclusion is that, compared with left-wing parties in 
power, right-wing majorities in parliament have experienced higher economic growth rates. 
The long run impact of a switch from a totally leftwing parliament to a totally rightwing one 
is an increase in the GDP growth rate of 1.20%. We also provide evidence for the post-
second-war period that the growth effect of ideology is mediated by the voters’ preferences 
regarding the suitable size of government in the economy.  
The last essay wonders whether economic growth influences the ideological instability 
approximated by the volatility of the votes received by each party from one election to the 
other. A large body of literature on economic voting has explored the impacts of 
macroeconomic changes on incumbent support in elections. However, this literature does not 
explore the issue of the effect of the economy on the votes for non-governing parties. This 
puzzle partially comes from the fact that these studies initially aim at explaining the American 
bi-party political system but is actually unable to predict the votes for non-governing parties 
in political landscapes such as the French one. This lack also owes to the limitations of the 
22 
 
theory of economic voting, which we attempt to remedy by suggesting a more comprehensive 
theoretical framework based on ideological voting. From an empirical point of view, it 
appears more relevant to study the aggregated electoral volatility, for which Pedersen (1979) 
proposed an index. In this essay, we use this index as a main dependant variable to investigate 
the effects of economic factors on the instability of the votes not only for the incumbent but 
also for opposition parties. As a comparison, we investigate the determinants of the votes 
share for the incumbent, to know to what extent the determinants of the votes for the 
opposition parties and those for the incumbent differ. Using time-series data on 46 democratic 
elections held in France from 1889 to 2011, we provide evidence that the total electoral 
volatility has been determined by specific economic determinants that differ from the ones 
influencing the vote share of the incumbent. Focusing on the economic determinants, the 
volatility of the votes for opposition parties and the electoral volatility in general are 
influenced by the economic growth but not by inflation and unemployment. On the contrary, 
we document that the votes for the incumbent is only determined by unemployment among 
the economic factors. While this last finding is consistent with the literature on the voters' 
punishment of the incumbent, the former concerning the economic determinants of the vote 
share for non-governing parties is more original given the existing literature. 
A general conclusion takes stock of our main findings and discusses some limits and 
possible extensions for future research. 
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1. IDEOLOGY IN ECONOMICS1 
 
 
 
“Whether because of its parsimony, its long-established position in popular and academic 
discourse, or because of some set of associated traits which are deemed useful – and not 
sufficiently conveyed by neighbouring concepts – ideology remains a fixture in the work of 
political scientists, social psychologists, political anthropologists, sociologists, and 
historians” (Gerring, 1997, pp. 961-62). 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In one of the most accomplished studies on the treatment of the concept of ideology in 
social sciences, Gerring (1997, pp. 961-62) remarked that ideology is “a fixture in the work of 
political scientists, social psychologists, political anthropologists, sociologists, and 
historians”. Far from disagreeing with him, this present paper merely upholds that he quite 
wrongly forgot to mention economists among this list of social scientists. It must, however, be 
acknowledged that if the concept of ideology has today a rather clear status in the other social 
sciences, the same cannot be said of the economic discipline. Indeed, since Meek (1967) and 
Samuels (1977), no study has taken stock of the treatment of ideology in economics, maybe 
aside from Hinich and Munger (1996), who focused on the specific use of the concept in the 
public choice analysis. This void in the economic literature strongly contrasts with recent 
seminal studies coming from other disciplines like political science (Knight, 2006), sociology 
(Lynch, 1994) and social sciences in general (Gerring, 1997). Furthermore, although some 
economists such as Denzau and North (1994) and Higgs (2008) assert that accounting for 
ideology is fundamental for economists, they most often regret that their call has not been 
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 This essay is based on Melki (2012).  
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heard by their peers, who are suspicious of the whole concept of ideology (Slembeck, 2004; 
Leroux, 2004). 
This attitude of economists towards ideology has different and sometimes opposite 
reasons. Indeed, after having invented the word “ideology” in the wake of the French 
Revolution, the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy (Mémoire sur la faculté de penser, 1796) 
and his followers were contemptuously labelled by Napoleon as “ideologues” for their 
“unrealistic” political stances. Since then, the pejorative connotation of the word has been 
deeply rooted in the popular and sometimes academic discourses. Then the word was really 
introduced around half a century later in social science by Karl Marx, who published with 
Engels in 1845 in The German Ideology, a work that laid the foundations of what would 
become the Marxist approach to ideology and which Marx specified in The Poverty of 
Philosophy in 1847. But the underlying holist and materialist approach that has long prevailed 
in social science would not fit the individualistic and rational assumptions of the homo 
œconomicus model of standard economics. Moreover, the strong Marxist connotation of the 
term “ideology” led major authors to use alternative words in whole social science (Gerring, 
1997, p. 962) and especially in economics. For instance, Pareto (1917) spoke about 
“derivation” and Mises (1949) about “world view”. 
Another reason for economists to be suspicious towards the concept was supplied by the 
sociology of knowledge and especially its founder, Karl Mannheim, who insisted on the 
reflexivity of the term. According to the paradox of Mannheim (1936), it is not possible to 
have a scientific discourse on ideology that would not be itself ideological. Furthermore, the 
complexity of the notion of ideology that Gerring (1997, pp. 961-62) presented as a source of 
interest in other disciplines could be perceived as an obstacle in economics. Indeed, the 
difficulty in building a formal or empirical analytical tool from a fluctuating and polysemous 
notion antagonized the ambition of economics to be a hard science. Finally, it is often said, on 
the contrary, that Schumpeter (1949), one of the first major economists to have been 
interested in ideology, would have reduced the term to a mere “value judgment” (Katouzian 
1980; Leroux, 2004), thus depriving the economic debates on ideology of all the depth of the 
concept. But all these reasons, whether good or bad, should not minimize the diversity of the 
economists’ studies that the topic has given birth to. That led us to think that it is not the 
concept of ideology that has been minimized by economists but rather the economic studies 
on ideology. However, a closer look into these studies is very instructive about the evolution 
of economic science. 
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The fact that economists seem to be unaware of the richness of the study of ideology in 
their own discipline is probably due to the absence of an appropriate analysis of the various 
and scattered economic studies. The present article shows that there exists a flourishing 
literature dealing with ideology in various fields of economics but no connection has been 
established until now. That is probably due to the strong diversity of these studies, maybe too 
far from each other to be mutually aware. As all the scarce analyses of the economic treatment 
of ideology were in the form of literature survey, that led us to think that the pessimistic 
conclusions on the little interest of economists were maybe due to the methodology used. 
Therefore we decided to investigate the issue by means of a quantitative analysis based on 
bibliometrics and content analysis of 246 articles published in 45 top-ranked economics 
journals in the period 1920-2010 that appear to be representative of the whole economic 
literature. This kind of quantitative analysis provides a more systematic and objective 
methodology than a traditional narrative literature survey (Stanley, 2001).  
The bibliometric analysis reveals that economists have indeed studied the concept of 
ideology. Since the publication of the first articles on ideology in the 1920s in the economic 
journals, the concept has appeared as an important topic in a growing number of articles 
published in a growing number of top-ranked journals. It also appears that political economy, 
epitomized by the journal Public Choice in our sample, has significantly contributed to the 
study of the concept, at least during the last decades of our study.  
A further analysis of the content of our sample of articles reveals a high degree of 
convergence among economists towards four main approaches to ideology at different times. 
First, from the 1930s to the 1970s, by opposing ideology with science, economists massively 
took part in a traditional epistemological debate opened by sociology and philosophy on the 
ability of researchers to produce scientific knowledge not affected by ideological biases. This 
approach enabled them to investigate the scientificity of their own discipline. Second, from 
the 1960s and at its peak in the 1980s, political economy, partly driven by the review Public 
Choice, adopted an original approach to ideology to integrate it into the model of rational 
choice, thus epitomizing the extension of the theory of rational choice. Third, for the last two 
decades, the economic literature has predominantly followed the traditional approach to 
ideology in political science in focusing on the political dimension of the concept, making 
ideology a common empirical tool. Fourth, in a looming research agenda, economics has 
started, through a cognitive approach to ideology, to study the formation of individuals’ 
beliefs and preferences to account for the formation and persistence of institutional 
equilibrium and the process of change. 
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The article is structured as follows. The second section presents the bibliometric 
methodology. Then the third section explores to what extent economists have studied the 
concept of ideology. The fourth section proposes identifying and categorizing the main 
economists’ approaches to ideology and the underlying theoretical debates. The fifth section 
concludes. 
 
1.2 BIBLIOMETRIC METHODOLOGY  
 
In order to claim to be more exhaustive and objective than a typical literature survey, we 
chose to adopt a quantitative-type methodology based on the study of a representative sample 
of the literature. However, we cannot resort to a standard meta-analysis used in economics to 
assess an existing body of findings in a sample of empirical studies. The nature of information 
is different in our case because it is not purely quantitative. Indeed, we do not look for a 
quantifiable relationship between economic variables but we rather have to identify some 
articles and examine and categorize their literary content, which is qualitative information. 
For this purpose, bibliometrics is the commonly used methodology. It is very often used, on 
the one hand, through citation analysis, for instance to build the journals’ impact factors, and, 
on the other hand, through content analysis. While the bibliometric method is widespread in 
information sciences and experimental behavioural sciences, it has started to be used in 
economics. It has been most often used through citation analysis to study, for example, the 
impact of economics on other disciplines (Landes and Posner, 1993) or of a specific economic 
field on the whole discipline (Rubin and Chang, 2003) or the influence or, more surprisingly, 
the absence of influence of some authors (Cox and Chung, 1991; Rowley, 2009). But, in this 
study, we resort to content analysis, i.e. a set of techniques “for making inferences by 
objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of [texts]” (Neuendorf, 
2002, p. 10). 
But this method is, of course, not flawless. It raises other difficulties than a traditional 
literature survey and also requires methodological choices. Indeed, this kind of quantitative 
study is possible thanks to the evolution of the data processing that enables us to have easy 
access to numerous scientific studies on various electronic databases. But the abundance of 
unequal information also raises the limits of a bibliometric method. Therefore the first 
difficulty is inherent in the selection of the set of studies among which we will perform our 
content analysis to build our sample of studies dealing with ideology. Should we search in 
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books, in scientific journals? Which ones exactly? In which period? How should we define a 
limited set of studies in which we will apply the content analysis? The most important thing is 
to have a uniform, continuous database, even if this means losing completeness. That would 
limit biases. The second difficulty lies in the building of the sample of studies dealing with 
ideology. How should we define and identify the studies dealing with ideology? The 
underlying trade-off is between coverage and precision, both of which tend to vary inversely 
(White, 1994). We must here reconcile the will to be exhaustive and the difficulty in 
accurately analysing the content of studies selected. A related concern also comes from the 
fact that, with insufficiently strict selection criteria, our sample to analyse would be composed 
of studies that would deal with ideology only in a trivial or anecdotal way. Thirdly, the last 
but not least difficulty is to choose an appropriate technique for the text analysis among all the 
available ones, in order to differentiate and classify the various approaches to ideology. 
Basically our bibliometric methodology is quite close to the one used by Knight (2006). 
Indeed, our first methodological choice is to focus on journals rather than books because only 
the former are quite uniformly available on electronic databases and so they have become the 
principal current research medium (Kuhn, 1970). However, among all the existing journals in 
economics, only a few are available on electronic databases. Thus the issue of the choice of 
journals is decisive. Led by the trade-off between the coverage of the whole literature and the 
precision provided by a limited sample of studies, we chose to focus the analysis on the best-
ranked journals, which are supposed to be the most visible and widely read by economists. 
Thus we selected 45 out of the 56 top-ranked economic journals according to the European 
Reference Index for Humanities in 20092. We sidelined 11 journals3 not available on JSTOR 
or ECONLIT databases. The journals of our sample are presented in the appendix (Table 1.1 – 
Appendix). 
We are aware that such a choice is likely to introduce a bias in our analysis. Indeed, this 
sample of journals inevitably glosses over a number of studies. For instance, the non-ranked 
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 The French Evaluation Agency for Research and Higher Education proposes a ranking of journals in 
economics, based on the European Reference Index for Humanities. 
3
 The journals that we do not take into account in our study are: World Development, Journal of Economic 
Growth, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 
International Journal of Production Economics, Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, Economics and 
Philosophy, European Economic Review, Games and Economic Behavior, Health Economics, and Ecological 
Economics. We take the journal History of Political Economy into account only in the first part of our study but 
not for the content analysis because the full text is not available on the electronic databases used. 
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journals appear to be among the most prolific on the ideology topic.4 This choice also leads us 
to do without innovative and influent articles from new journals.5 And a potential bias could 
stem from the fact that the top-ranked journals mainly published the studies of orthodox 
economists who are said to minimize the ideology topic as compared to the heterodox ones 
(Samuels, 1977, p. 472). Therefore, to make sure of the representativeness of our sample of 
journals, we will, on the one hand, compare some of our main findings with the results 
obtained for all of the economic journals available on JSTOR and, on the other hand, we will 
refer as much as possible to seminal articles from other journals that contributed to the study 
of ideology in economics and that are quoted in the articles in our sample. In spite of these 
flaws, our sample has the advantage of offering a good trade-off between coverage and 
precision and of being time-consistent, because all the 45 top-ranked journals are quite old 
and therefore allow comparison over time. 
To cope with the second difficulty pertaining to the identification of the articles dealing 
with ideology, we chose to pick the articles containing the words “ideology”, “ideologies” or 
“ideological” in their title or in their abstract or keywords. Such a choice would probably lead 
us to underestimate the number of papers on ideology but it prevents us from having articles 
that make trivial use of the term and that would not be workable in the rest of our study. As a 
comparison, in her study, Knight (2006) chose far less restrictive criteria by picking from the 
whole text extra words such as “ideologue” and “ideologues”, but also words that designate a 
particular ideology, such as “communism”, “fascism” and other closely connected words. 
Lastly, to tackle the issue of the different approaches to ideology in our sample, we chose 
to classify our articles according to two criteria. First, which definition of ideology do they 
supply, and second, which research question do they tackle, in other words, which literature 
do they belong to? So as to answer both questions, we need articles that deal with ideology in 
a substantial way. Therefore, at this stage of the analysis, we discard all the articles that refer 
to ideology in an anecdotal way, which we define as having less than two occurrences of 
ideology in the main text. In the remaining articles, we look for the definition of ideology 
thanks to an electronic research of the word ideology in the main text. In numerous articles, an 
explicit definition is supplied. When this is not the case, we pick the recurring words that are 
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 Indeed, The American Journal of Economics and Sociology is one of the first journals to deal with ideology as 
early as the 1920s. Economic and Political Weekly is the most prolific journal with 84 articles with “ideology”, 
“ideologies” and “ideological” in their title, abstract or keywords between 1966 and 2004. 
5
 For instance the Journal of Economic Issues, the European Journal of Political Economics, the Review of 
African Political Economy or the Review of International Political Economy published a significant number of 
interesting articles on ideology. 
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most often associated with ideology. By gathering these words, some lexical convergences 
appear. Based on them, we establish the main categories of definitions. Finally, with regard to 
the research question of each article, this is often most easily identifiable by reading the 
abstract. Another indication is the citation analysis, since authors quote the pioneers of the 
debate in which they participate. That also enables us to identify the authors who launched 
new research programmes. In this way, it is possible to establish a classification of the 
approaches and definitions of ideology and to study the evolution of these categories and the 
underlying debates over the concept of ideology in economics. 
 
1.3 HAS “IDEOLOGY” BEEN STUDIED IN ECONOMICS? 
  
This section quantitatively examines the widespread assumption according to which 
economists are not much interested in the concept of ideology. More precisely, we propose 
identifying the papers on ideology in economic journals and studying the evolution of their 
number. 
Before focusing on our sample articles, it is worth pointing out that the word “ideology” 
appeared in economic journals more than one century after having been invented. Indeed, in 
the 1920s, The American Economic Review (AER), The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
(QJE) and the Journal of Political Economics published about 20 articles that contained the 
word in their main text. That can seem late compared to political science (Knight, 2006, p. 
620) and, more generally, compared to the whole of social sciences. Indeed, as early as the 
1830s, some journals in other disciplines6 published articles that referred to the “ideology” 
topic in their main text (see Figure 1.1). Figure 1.1 presents the evolution of the number of 
articles referring to ideology and connected words in their main text published in all the 
journals available on JSTOR. It appears that the word started to spread in social science as 
early as the second half of the 19th century. Following Knight (2006), in Figure 1.1 and in the 
following figures, the results are presented by decades to smooth out annual fluctuations and 
to control for changes in format and the number of articles published during a given period. 
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 Indeed the word first appeared in a journal of philosophy in 1830. Then it appeared in the 1860s in 
anthropology and ethnology, in the 1870s in philology, in the 1890s in sociology and history and in the 1900s in 
political science. 
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Fig. 1.1 
Evolution of the total number of articles in social science that refer to ideology7 
 
 
If we now focus on the 45 journals of our sample, 30 have published at least one article on 
the topic of ideology. In these 30 journals, we identified 246 articles dealing with ideology 
according to our criteria defined in Section 2. Figure 1.2 presents the evolution of the journals 
of our sample that published articles dealing with ideology, and Figure 1.3 presents the 
evolution of the number of these articles. It appears from both figures that the first articles 
focusing on ideology appeared in the 1930s and 1940s in the same journal, the AER, 
including, in particular, the seminal article of Schumpeter, “Science and Ideology”, in 1949. 
During the 1950s, two other journals, the QJE and Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, addressed the topic with four articles on it. During the following ten years, the topic 
of ideology still stayed relatively marginal with six articles and the participation of The 
Journal of Economic History in the study of ideology. From the 1970s, we can consider that 
the issue began to spread in the literature because nine new journals published articles on 
ideology. We can assume that until then, although the study of ideology by economists 
progressively got under way in journals, this research took place at least as much in books. 
This is, for instance, obvious in Meek (1967) and Samuels (1977). The former studied the 
concept of ideology in the history of economic thought.8 The latter listed more than 30 books 
                                                 
 
7
 Articles available on JSTOR without discipline filter, which refer to the words “ideology”, “ideologies” or 
“ideological” in their main text. 
8
 Especially in the books History of Economic Analysis, 1954 by Schumpeter, Economic Philosophy, 1964 by 
Johan Robinson and Political Economy, 1963 by Oskar Lange. 
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tackling the “ideology” issue in economics, published between 1951 and 1975 (Samuels, 
1977, p.481-484). As, for a long time, the research had been more through books than articles 
(Kuhn, 1970), we probably underestimate the number of studies during the beginning of our 
period. 
 
 
Fig. 1.2 
Evolution of the journals that published articles on ideology9 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.3 
Evolution of the number of articles with ideology as a topic10 
                                                 
 
9
 The journals in our sample that published articles that refer to the words “ideology”, “ideologies” or 
“ideological” in their title, abstract or keywords. 
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At any rate, the 1980s appeared to be a turning point during which ideology became an 
important topic, with more than 30 articles focusing on ideology and stemming from about 30 
different journals. The trend is confirmed in the following decade with 82 articles. This sharp 
increase can partly be explained by the growing interest of the journals of political economy 
epitomized by Public Choice, which published half of the articles of our sample in the 1990s. 
The number of articles kept on increasing during the 2000s to reach at least 100. As the 
electronic databases generally do not supply the latest journals’ issues, we cannot precisely 
estimate the actual number of articles. One could assume that the growing increase in the 
attention of economists to ideology can be attributed to the increasing number of journals in 
our sample. However, that turns out to be false, as Figures 1.4 and 1.5 show. Figure 1.4 shows 
an increase in the number of articles weighted by the number of journals publishing these 
articles. Figure 1.5 also shows an increase in the number of articles weighted by the total 
number of journals in our sample. Indeed, most of the new journals that entered the AERES 
ranking are specialized ones and have not mentioned “ideology”. So the decreasing share of 
the general journals in our sample could be expected to reduce the share of the papers on 
ideology in all papers. But this tendency is compensated for by the inclusion in our sample of 
field journals, especially in political economy, which focused a part of their attention on the 
study of ideology. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
10
 Articles that refer to the words “ideology”, “ideologies” or “ideological” in their title, abstract or keywords. 
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Fig. 1.4 
Evolution of the relative part of the articles with ideology as a topic in the journals publishing 
articles on ideology11 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.5 
Evolution of the relative part of the articles with ideology as an important topic in all the 
journals of our sample12 
                                                 
 
11
 Number of articles in Figure 1.3 divided by the total number of journals publishing these articles available for 
each decade. 
12
 Number of articles in Figure 1.3 divided by the number of journals in our sample available for each decade. 
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One could also object to the assertion according to which ideology has become an 
important topic in economics given that there have only been 100 articles in the top-ranked 
journals during the last decade. But one must keep in mind that we voluntarily adopted very 
restrictive criteria for identifying articles for our sample in order to study them more deeply in 
a second stage. Thus our methodology greatly underestimates the number of economic studies 
on ideology. For instance, with the criteria adopted by Knight (2006),13 we would have found 
around 20,000 articles in total with more than 4,500 articles in the 1990s (see Figure 1.6). 
And as Knight (2006, p. 620) did for political science, we could then notice an increase in 
attention among economists to ideology in the late 1940s-1950s. It is also interesting to notice 
that, with such criteria, since the 1920s, the total number of articles on ideology in economics 
has always represented approximately 10% of the total number of articles on ideology in all 
disciplines available on JSTOR. Indeed, Figure 1.7 shows the numbers of articles that refer to 
ideology in both economic journals and all the journals available on JSTOR. We can deduce 
from this that economists have shown an interest, like other social scientists. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.6 
Evolution of the number of articles referring to ideology in economic journals14 
 
                                                 
 
13
 We performed the research in all the economic journals indexed by JSTOR mentioning ideology and its 
cognates in the whole text over the same period. 
14
 Number of articles that refer to the words “ideology”, “ideologies” or “ideological” in their main text in the 
economic journals available on JSTOR. 
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Fig. 1.7 
Evolution of the number of articles referring to ideology in economic journals and in all social 
science journals15 
 
 
This first stage of our bibliometric analysis allows us to conclude that ideology has been a 
significant and growing concern for economists, in the top-ranked journals as well as in the 
whole literature. It has been the object of more and more articles in a growing number of 
journals. While these papers were concentrated in a small number of journals until the 1960s, 
the topic spread, during the following decade, in a significant number of journals. And most 
of the journals in our sample have already published at least one article focusing on ideology. 
Even if we notice an increase in the attention to ideology as early as the 1950s, the “boom” of 
the number of articles occurred in the 1980s and we listed more than 100 articles with 
ideology as an important topic during the early 2000s. If we adopt less restrictive criteria, we 
realize that the studies in economics about ideology are not marginal compared to the whole 
economic literature and to all the studies on ideology in other disciplines. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
15
 Number of articles that refer to the words “ideology”, “ideologies” or “ideological” in their main text in the 
economic journals and in all the journals available on JSTOR. 
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1.4 THE MAIN ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO IDEOLOGY 
 
 Once we established that ideology has attracted economists’ attention, the most interesting 
point is to know what they have said about it and for what purpose they have resorted to it. 
Thus this section proposes examining the evolution of the approaches to ideology in the 
articles of our sample. To paraphrase Matossian (1958, p. 228), to understand an approach to 
ideology, it is important to determine what problems its initiators are trying to solve. That is 
why, in each article, we look for the definition supplied of ideology and the question treated 
by the author. Out of the 246 articles in our sample, 171 supply explicit or implicit definitions, 
which could be categorized by inference according to the technique described in Section 2. 
Among the other 75 articles that refer to the term only in an anecdotal way, 60 do not refer to 
the main research questions identified in the rest of the sample and are thus not workable. 
They most often focus on the study of a specific ideology such as gender or racist ideologies. 
Once we have identified the definitions through the method detailed in Section 2, four main 
groups of approaches emerge that turn out to refer to four main stages of economics. 
Before presenting these approaches, we can notice a first originality of the economic 
approach(es). The economic literature does not seem to have resorted to the original definition 
provided by Marx, contrary to other social sciences. Among the three main features of the 
Marxist approach that are the social origin of our ideas supposed to come from our material 
conditions (materialism) – (1) the function of ideology to serve the private interests of the 
ruling class (2) and the idea of a fallacy inherent to ideology that distinguishes it from science 
(3) – only the last one was taken up by the authors of our sample. Indeed, out of the 246 
sample articles, only two (Bendix, 1957; Foley, 1975) consider ideology in accordance with 
the first two core concepts of the Marxist approach. In fact, the individualistic approach to the 
rational choice model that has dominated the neoclassical tradition in economics is obviously 
not compatible with the holist approach to the Marxist definition. On the other hand, a 
significant part of economic research has progressively questioned the assumption of self-
interest in the rational choice model, thus leaving room for behaviours not led by the strict 
private interests and therefore opposing the second core element of the Marxist approach. 
That is rather the third element, the fallacy inherent to ideology, which gave birth to a 
plethoric literature in economics. 
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1.4.1 THE FIRST APPROACH: IDEOLOGY VERSUS SCIENCE 
 
By proceeding to the content analysis of the sample articles, we identified a first set of 
definitions of ideology based on words belonging to the lexical field of science (such as 
theory, knowledge, scientific, research, researcher, reason, finding, doctrine, assumption, 
economists and sociologists), systematically associated with the idea of mistake (with words 
such as erroneous, irrelevance, preconception, bias, prejudices, distortion, enslave, lie, 
perversion, unquestioned and anomalies.). In short, they bring ideology into conflict with 
objectivity and assimilate it with a bias in the scientific knowledge. They appeared in our 
sample with the oldest article, by Homan (1932), who speaks about “a negation of systematic 
theory by reason of its erroneous ideology and of its irrelevance to problems of control” 
(Homan, 1932, p. 12). They are present with some variations in all the sample articles coming 
from the QJE and the AER during the first two decades, especially in Gruchy (1939), 
Schumpeter (1949) and Streeten (1954). The evolution of this category of definitions is 
presented in Figure 1.8, which shows the evolution of the various groups of definitions of our 
sample. It appears that the majority of our sample articles used this kind of definition during 
the first decades of our study until the late 1950s and then this approach progressively 
disappeared from the literature. This decrease can be explained not only by the emergence of 
new journals that supplied other definitions but also because the traditional journals that 
initially proposed this early definition changed their approach. That is obvious in the AER, 
which played a pioneering role in the versus science approach in the first decade of our study 
and which then supplied other types of definitions from the 1970s. In any case, there turned 
out to be a high degree of definitional convergence until the 1950s towards the versus science 
approach. 
This approach to ideology corresponded to a specific theoretical debate in economics that 
came from the traditional epistemic issue of the production process of scientific knowledge.  
As Mannheim (1936, p. 18) put it, “the concern with the problems and pitfalls involved in the 
search for valid knowledge has constituted more than a negligible part of the studies of a long 
line of brilliant thinkers through Hume (Enquiries concerning the human understanding and 
concerning the principle of morals, 1927), Bentham, Mill (A System of Logic, Ratiocinative 
and Inductive, 1850) and Spencer”. Taken up by Marx in 1845 in The German Ideology, who 
considered the classical economics as an ideology that justified the interests of the ruling 
class, the question, which spread into social science, became: how do you make science in 
spite of the searcher’s subjectivity? The question gave birth to major contributions like the 
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staves off any attempt at scientific knowledge; at the other, ideology would be necessary for 
scientists by “proposing a certain selection of problem for study” (Smolinski, 1973, p. 1192) 
or by providing economists with “preexisting thought structures or frames of reference” 
which “guide [their] selection, analysis, and interpretation of economic facts” (Gruchy, 1939, 
p. 62). 
In most of the cases, the point was to reflect on the scientificity of the economic discipline 
and especially of the adverse theory, thus making ideology a polemical or critical concept. In 
spite of the attempt of some authors to alleviate its polemical quality and even to make it 
useful and part and parcel of the scientific process, generally speaking, economists reached a 
deadlock. They did not manage to move away from the traditional negative connotation of the 
concept. Incidentally, they came up against the Mannheim paradox related to the reflexivity of 
the term. Realizing thus the danger of a negative definition, as opposed to the truth, some of 
the above-mentioned authors of our sample refused to emphasize the opposition with science. 
For instance, Randall (1985, p. 1024) asserted that “the sharp separation of ideology from 
knowledge is not thought possible or especially desirable”. The progressive disappearance of 
this approach from the 1950s in our sample and in the whole literature undoubtedly 
corresponded to this awareness and probably to the fact that economics progressively stopped 
looking into its own scientificity and started to take it for granted. 
 
1.4.2 THE SECOND PERSPECTIVE: IDEOLOGY VERSUS INTEREST  
 
The second significant generation of definitions that appeared in literature brought 
ideology into conflict no longer with science but with the notion of self-interest or more 
generally of rationality in the sense of the rational choice theory. It therefore reverses the 
relationship between the ideology and interest of the Marxist definition, in which ideology 
served private material interests. This approach does not often provide explicit definitions of 
ideology but can, however, be identified in our sample by the words systematically associated 
with the term “ideology” (such as self-interest, benefits, profits or opportunistic behaviour, 
venality and career goals). The basic idea of these kind of definition, well conveyed by Levitt 
(1996, p. 428), is that an ideological behaviour entails a loss of a private profit. However, a 
few authors supply a more accurate definition, such as Kalt and Zupan (1984, p. 281), who 
analyse the traditional opposition between ideology and interest in economics and emphasize 
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the “altruistic” and “moralistic” dimensions of ideology related to the notion of “public 
interest”.16 Indeed, ideology would “refer to […] personal definitions of the public interest, 
pursued as a consumption good that yields satisfactions in the form of moral sentiments” 
(Kalt and Zupan, 1990, p. 104). More generally, this approach supplies a residual definition of 
ideology that is all that cannot be explained by the strict self-interest assumption of the 
rational choice theory. 
Already in the 1930s, Keynes (1936, pp. 383-384) opposed “vested interests” and “ideas”. 
This opposition appears for the first time in our sample with the article of Mason (1963, p. 2), 
who proposed analysing political decisions “under the headings of interests and ideologies”. 
We can see in Figure 1.8 that this approach appeared in the 1960s but really spread in the 
literature in the 1980s and especially from the reference article of Kau and Rubin (1979). In 
fact, this became the main approach in our sample in the 1980s and gave rise to a new strong 
definitional convergence. It supplied more articles in the 1990s, but not compared to the other 
set of definitions. We also notice that, whereas these definitions are provided by new journals, 
the older journals such as the AER adopted this approach at the expense of the versus science 
definitions. Moreover, if we consider that the approach pertains more generally to the 
opposition between ideology and rationality, we can include in this approach several articles 
from our sample that oppose a non-rational, ideological vote with a purely rational one based 
on “the professional qualifications, honesty, integrity or charisma of the candidates” (Andina-
Díaz, 2006, p. 353), in other words the real valence or competence of a candidate (Bernhardt 
et al., 2011; Krishna and Morgan, 2011). This literature stands for a variant of the approach 
based on the irrational features associated with ideology. 
All this trend of definitions pertains to a specific problem in economics. After having 
examined its own ability to produce scientific knowledge through the previous approach, 
economics scrutinized in a further step its basic behavioural assumption, namely the rational 
choice model. Facing the failures of this model to predict some observed behaviours, the 
standard economic theory had to account for what sounded like “dissonance”, “anomaly” or 
“paradox” (North, 1992, p. 479; Sen, 2002, p. 24; Vanberg, 2008). Indeed, in some situations 
                                                 
 
16
 Kalt and Zupan (1984, p. 281): “Pure ideology, if it exists at all, is the manifestation of altruism in the political 
sector. [–] Indeed ideology appears to typically center around the equity side (rights and distributional 
assignments) of the economists’ equity-efficiency dichotomy; […] In the jargon of recent research, the purported 
social objectives of political actors have been termed ‘ideology’. Political ideologies are more or less consistent 
sets of normative statements as to best or preferred states of the world. Such statements are moralistic and 
altruistic in the sense that they are held as applicable to everyone, rather than merely to the actor making the 
statements. Accordingly, political ideologies are taken here to be statements about how government can best 
serve their proponents’ conceptions of the public interest.” 
41 
 
of collective choice, and more generally in politics, the rational choice model has seemed to 
be incapable of providing an account of some individuals’ motivations and behaviours. 
Therefore a significant part of the literature aimed at knowing in which situations and to what 
extent individuals tended to adopt such irrational, benevolent or ideological behaviours, 
sometimes intending to remedy the flaws of the behavioural model of the standard economics. 
That gave birth to “revisionist strategies” consisting of slightly modifying the basic model of 
economic man in order to account for the observed behavioural anomalies. That allowed the 
explicative power of economics to be extended to new fields such as politics, in what was 
called “economic imperialism”. To improve the predictive power of their model, it appears 
that standard economists were far more conciliatory with regard to the self-interest 
assumption than to the rationality assumption (Sen, 2002; Vanberg, 2008). This trend 
concerned in particular two issues: the paradox of collective action (Olson, 1965) and the 
seemingly uninterested individuals’ behaviour in the political field – whether it be the paradox 
of voting or of campaign contribution or the assumption of general interest of politicians 
(Mueller, 2003).  
This is reflected in our sample first with a significant number of articles that use the 
concept of ideology to overcome the paradox of collective action. Thus we noticed two kinds 
of “revisionist strategies” to explain the individually irrational participation in the provision of 
public goods. The first strategy drove some authors to consider ideology as an external 
constraint in the utility maximization problem. The constraint can be of a religious type in 
order to account for work (in)efficiency (Izraeli and Groll, 1980; Kimhi, 1998) or suicide 
attack (Wintrobe, 2006), or of a political type to explain the revolutionary strategies (Roemer, 
1985) or the appointment process (Nixon, 2004). A second and more common strategy was to 
add ideological motivations, namely non-interested, along with motivations related to material 
interests as arguments of the individuals’ objective function, thus considering ideology as an 
end per se. Most of the authors who did so referred to North (1981, pp. 45-58), who discussed 
the role of ideology in ameliorating free-riding behaviour when people have no material 
individual incentive to participate in the provision of a public good. By interpreting ideology 
as a “substitute for material incentives” (Mahoney, 2003, p. 236) that refer to “the utility 
which an individual obtains from identifying his interests with that of a group” (Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg, 1992, p. 420), the articles of our sample explained, in an “enlarged” rational 
choice framework, unionization (Barbash, 1943; Cell, 1980; Fones-Wolf and Fones-Wolf, 
1981; Haberfeld, 1995), strike success (Friedman, 1988; Esteban and Ray, 1997; Dasgupta 
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and Kanbur, 2007), international relations (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992; Mahoney, 2003) 
and more generally the provision of public goods (Mestelman and Feeny, 1988). 
According to our sample, another part of the literature looked into the role of ideology as a 
determinant of choice by investigating the behaviour of politicians. A huge proportion of our 
sample, more than 50 articles, studied the relative part of ideological and interested 
motivations in the behaviour of political representatives and whether this part varies 
according to some situations. More precisely, the question was to know whether, in a period 
of election or, on the contrary, when representatives are immune to any electoral sanction, 
they change their behaviour. From the mid 1980s, the studies focused on representatives’ 
voting patterns in the US Congress (Kau and Rubin, 1979; Kau and Rubin, 1984; Crain et al. 
1986; McGuire and Ohsfeldt, 1986) and gave birth to the “shirking literature” that studied, in 
a formal principal-agent model, to what extent the elected representatives deviate from the 
implicit contract with their voters by not voting in accordance with the preferences of their 
constituency but with their own ideology. This issue gave birth to both formal and empirical 
studies in which ideology was measured as the residue of pure economic or electoral interests. 
Outside a principal-agent framework, other articles from our sample studied the relative 
importance of political-ideological factors and economic factors represented by campaign 
contributions or interest groups.17 Although this approach gave rise to a strong quantity of 
empirical as well as formal studies, it seemed to be inconclusive with regard to the relative 
parts of ideology and interest that lead the politicians’ behaviour and the specific issues on 
which representatives vote more ideologically (Kau and Rubin, 1993, p. 151; Mueller, 2003, 
p. 489).18 
Besides this difficulty in reaching a consensus on its research agenda, this second approach 
to ideology has been much criticized because it provided a residual definition of ideology, as 
what does not tally with the self-interest assumption or more scarcely the rationality 
assumption of the rational choice theory. A debate related to the appropriate definition and 
                                                 
 
17
 They focus on the voting pattern of representatives on different issues such as public spending (Hird, 1993; 
Van Dalen and Swank, 1996; Galli and Rossi, 2002; Winer et al., 2008;), redistributive and fiscal policies (Kau 
and Rubin, 2002; Sobel and Wagner, 2004), public debt (Neck and Getzner, 2001) but also on free-
trade/protectionist laws (Kahane, 1996; Kang and Green, 1999; Irwin and Kroszner, 1999) and 
privatization/liberalization (Ohsfeldt and Gohmann, 1992; Ramírez and Eigen-Zucchi, 2001; Christoffersen and 
Paldam, 2003; Duso and Seldeslachts, 2010). 
18
 Kau and Rubin (1993, p. 151): “The […] question has been confused; some think that ideology and shirking 
are identical, although they are logically separate categories. We show that even if ideological shirking exists, it 
is relatively unimportant. We also show that self-interested (non-ideological) shirking exists.” In a survey on the 
determinants of voting patterns of representatives, Mueller (2003, p.  489) seems to conclude that, even and 
especially on seemingly high ideological issues with no major economic stakes (like child labour), the 
representatives’ votes are led by economic factors. 
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measure of ideology emerged in the shirking literature that wondered whether, with a residual 
definition, the role of ideology in representatives’ behaviour would not have been 
overestimated because what was considered as ideology would be merely omitted interests 
(Peltzman, 1984, p. 210; Davis and Porter, 1989; Goff and Grier, 1993; Kau and Rubin, 1993; 
Seltzer, 1995, p. 1333). Thus Kau and Rubin (1982, p. 278) were among the first to argue in 
favour of “a measure of ideology independent of economic interest”. In the same vein, 
Uslaner (1997, p. 243) proposed giving up the “shirking models based upon residualization” 
in favour of a “partisan approach” of ideology. That is why, from the 1990s, this approach has 
diminished in relative size compared to other approaches (see Figure 1.8). Although this 
approach represented a significant step compared to the previous approach in the shaping of 
ideology as an analytical tool for economists, it conserved some flaws of the latter. Indeed, 
ideology remained defined in a critical and evaluative way according to the self-interest 
criteria of the rational choice model. Moreover, by referring to an irrational behaviour, 
ideology kept its negative connotation. 
 
1.4.3 THE PARTISAN APPROACH 
 
A third significant group of definitions emerged from the content analysis. As with the 
versus interest definitions, no explicit definition is provided but it is identifiable by recurring 
terms associated with the word ideology (such as political, party, partisan, position, 
sympathy, affiliation, tendency, right-left and liberal-conservative). These terms 
systematically refer to the political dimension of ideology and more precisely to a spatial 
position on a left-right or liberal-conservative spectrum, according to a narrow interpretation 
of the Downsian conception of ideology (Downs, 1957). This partisan definition came from 
political science, in which it has become the dominant view (Knight, 2006), and was 
progressively adopted by economists facing the previously mentioned weaknesses of the 
versus interest approach. Contrary to both previous approaches, the partisan definitions are 
cleansed of any pejorative connotation and normative innuendo. Ideology is no longer what is 
not scientific or rational, and that should be so. Neither is it defined any longer in comparison 
with non-ideological forms. From a critical concept in contradiction with science or 
rationality, it became a neutral concept. The flip side of defining ideology in such a positive 
and non-evaluative way is that the concept is deprived of its richness to be reduced to the 
mere partisan or political affiliation of people. 
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Regarding our sample of articles, although a very few definitions of this kind started to 
appear from the 1960s, they really spread in literature in the 1990s to stand for a huge 
majority of definitions in the 2000s (see Figure 1.8). Like Knight (2006, p. 623) for political 
science, we observe a current definitional convergence in economics towards the partisan 
approach to ideology. We also notice that this convergence is not to be attributed to a cohort 
effect with the entrance of new journals in our sample but to a real conversion of the former 
proponents of the versus interest definitions. Indeed, the same journals that published during 
the previous decades papers based on the first and second approaches to ideology have widely 
resorted to the spatial Downsian definition. For instance, even Public Choice, which initiated 
the opposition between ideology and interest, widely adopted the partisan spatial approach 
from the 1990s. 
This Downsian spatial approach to ideology pertains to a traditional debate in political 
science and history that has opposed the “convergence” hypothesis and the “politics matter” 
hypothesis (Imbeau et al., 2001). According to the former, differences among countries in 
political ideology, as well as in institutions and culture, do not matter when it comes to 
explaining policy outputs, because of the industrialization process in western countries 
(Thomas, 1980) or technological determinism (Skinner, 1976). On the contrary, according to 
the latter, variations in partisan variables explain variations in policy outputs (Castles and 
McKinlay, 1979). This research question gave birth to a plethoric empirical literature in the 
framework of the partisan theory (Hibbs, 1977) that was allowed by a simple spatial definition 
of ideology to be translated into a quantifiable measure. Knight (2006, p. 623) explained that 
the success of the partisan approach in political science is probably due to the ascension of 
quantitative methodology over the last half of the 20th century, but also to its simplification 
and intelligibility in the scientific discourse. We can assume that the strong convergence in 
economics towards this approach for the past two decades is probably due to the same 
reasons. But to which problem peculiar to economics does this approach to ideology 
correspond? 
At first sight, the partisan approach presents only an empirical interest in economics that 
consists of studying the effect of the government’s political affiliation on the economic aspect 
of the policy outcomes. Although this study is related to the research question of the versus 
interest approach, the two approaches are indeed different. For the latter, it comes down to 
knowing whether politicians behave only in an interested way. For the partisan approach, it 
comes down to measuring, without denying the importance of economic factors, the effect of 
political ideology on economic outcomes. As with our sample, a wide empirical literature 
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studied the effect of the government’s political colour or political fragmentation on a wide 
range of policies, such as public spending (Borge, 1995; Cusack, 1997; Tellier, 2006; 
Potrafke, 2009), redistributive and fiscal policies (Borge and Rattso, 1997; Perotti and 
Kontopoulos, 2002; Tavares, 2004), public debt (Seitz, 2000; Balassone and Giordano, 2001), 
but also on free-trade or protectionist laws (Brady et al., 2002; Dutt and Mitra, 2005) and 
privatization and liberalization (Figueiredo, 2005; Bel and Fageda, 2009). A smaller literature 
in the field of law and economics investigated the independence of justice by assessing to 
what extent the cases’ outcomes are influenced by the judge’s political ideology (Ashenfelter 
et al., 1995; Lim, 2000; Revesz, 2000; Langer, 2003; Martin and Quinn, 2007; Smith, 2007). 
Generally speaking, this literature reached a consensus (Kau and Rubin, 1993, p. 151) to 
uphold that political ideology does matter, but that is not so overwhelming (Schmidt, 1996; 
Imbeau et al., 2001). 
However, the stakes are not only empirical but theoretical. The theoretical debate pertains 
to the rationality assumption of the rational choice model and especially the individuals’ 
learning process and the possibility of learning in politics. The “convergence” hypothesis 
would be in line with the standard economic theory that predicts the homogenization of the 
learning patterns when individuals face the same information. However the persistence of two 
different interpretation and action patterns, a left-wing one and a right-wing one, represents a 
puzzle for the standard economic theory. Facing the same reality, totally rational individuals 
should correct their learning patterns by a trial and error process. The problem becomes more 
acute when considering the assumption in the partisan literature over the agents’ expectations 
that determine the duration of the effects of the political decisions. Under the rational 
expectation assumption, agents immediately anticipate the policies’ effects, making them 
ineffective (Hibbs, 1977), while, under the adaptive expectation assumption (Alesina, 1987), 
the government can work on the national economy. But this effect is never lasting because the 
economic actors quickly correct their expectations. In short, according to the partisan spatial 
approach, political ideology can only be explained by a failure in the learning process, thus 
putting into question the second and more critical pillar of the standard behavioural model in 
economics. After some arrangements with the self-interest assumption enabled by the versus 
interest approach, this new approach to ideology seems to serve as a setback for the standard 
economic behavioural model. Therefore, in spite of the neutrality of the partisan-type 
definitions, it remains difficult to integrate the concept of ideology into the economic theory 
without sacrificing the funding rationality assumption of the economic man model. 
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The failure to totally rehabilitate ideology according to the standard economic theory is 
probably due to the oversimplification of the spatial definitions. They are said to derive from 
the original Downsian approach. Downs considered ideology as a low-cost signal about future 
voting patterns on a wide variety of issues about which voters are rationally less than perfectly 
informed (Downs, 1957). It is easy to see that the oversimplification made by the partisan 
approach lost the gist of the original Downsian conception of ideology. The problem of this 
simplification is that it focuses only on one part of the definition, namely the position of the 
politician in the political spectrum. It neglects the other basic part of the definition on the 
reasons for this behaviour: the low cost of the signal supplied by this spatial position in a 
context of imperfect information (Hinich and Munger, 1996, p. 2). By forgetting that adopting 
an ideological behaviour is first and foremost rational according to Downs (1957) in the sense 
that this allows the prohibitive costs of collecting information to be saved, this simplification 
leads to a paradoxical situation. Indeed, if we neglect the informative function of ideology of 
supplying information and of allowing communication in politics, ideology is no longer 
rational and even becomes the problem to cope with in the relationship between voters and 
their representatives. Whether one considers the role of signalling in an uncertain and 
imperfect information political world or not, ideological behaviour can be interpreted either as 
“shirking” and a plague for representative democracies or as “signalling” that streamlines the 
democratic process (Nelson, 2002, p. 519). Therefore some authors have proposed coming 
back to the initial Downsian approach focusing on information to re-evaluate and explain the 
seemingly irrational feature of ideology. It gave birth to a new strategy for rationalizing 
ideology according to the rational choice model. By relaxing the assumption of substantive 
rationality and by assimilating costly and scarce information to a good, per se (Arrow, 1971; 
Stigler, 1971), it becomes rational to be ideological. 
 
 
1.4.4 TOWARDS THE “COGNITIVE APPROACH” 
 
This concern to rationalize ideological behaviours gave rise to a fourth and last set of 
definitions based on the informative function of ideology. As opposed to the previous 
substantive definitions of ideology, the “cognitive” approach has supplied procedural 
definitions, focusing on the process of the mind, i.e. how humans perceive, remember, learn 
and think about information. This approach is identifiable in our sample by inference from 
words related to information and more generally the human information handling process 
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(such as information, informative, signal, cognition, cognitive, interpretation, interpret, 
perception, description, prescription, (self-) definition, pattern and system).  
This approach first appeared in our sample in the late 1950s with Matossian (1958, p. 218), 
who developed the ideology’s role of “self-definition”, “description” and “imperative”.19 It 
reappeared in the 1970s with Lau and Frey (1971, pp. 21-22), who assimilated ideology with 
a preference for ordering over the set of possible alternatives, and with Brunner and Meckling 
(1977, p. 73), who stressed “the informative value” of ideology through cognitive procedures. 
While these definitions seem to be marginal in literature in view of our sample, they grew in 
importance in the late 1990s and in the 2000s, as we can see in Figure 1.8. Among these 
definitions, we can see that some of them insist on ideology’s positive role in providing 
people with patterns to interpret information, while others focus on the normative function of 
ideology to supply individuals with behavioural patterns based on rules in specific situations. 
The authors who focus on the descriptive function often supply definitions close to the 
original comprehensive definition of Downs in terms of signalling. That led Wright (1993, p.  
104) to assert that “rather than becoming informed about every issue […], voters can vote for 
politicians whose general ideological outlook is similar to their own”. Thus it is in politicians’ 
interest to maintain their ideological reputations. An ideological reputation acts as a “hostage” 
or “brand name”. Because individuals have little incentive to monitor their representatives’ 
voting record, an ideological reputation provides a signal as to how they will vote in the future 
(Lott, 1987; Seltzer, 1995, p. 1305). We find in our sample other articles that dwell on this 
aspect of ideology (Dougan and Munger, 1989; Wright, 1993; Bonilla, 2004; Wärneryd, 
1994). On the other hand, other definitions highlight the normative role of ideology, by 
assimilating it either as an order of possible social states (Lau and Frey, 1971, p. 21-22; Bisin 
and Verdier, 2000, p. 7) or as “supreme values” (Bernholz, 2001, p. 35; Bernholz, 2006, p. 
224) or “higher-order beliefs” (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2010, p. 11). 
By taking cognition into account, this approach allows a better understanding of the 
process of change since, through examining individual choice, it accounts for the formation of 
collective beliefs that can stabilize or generate equilibrium. In other words, the purpose of the 
approach is to explain the role of beliefs in situations of change and inertia. As soon as one 
starts to consider the assumption of imperfect information, the model of rational choice is no 
                                                 
 
19
 Matossian (1958, p. 218): “Ideology may be defined as a pattern of ideas which simultaneously provides for 
its adherents: (1) a self-definition, (2) a description of the current situation, its background, and what is likely to 
follow, and (3) various imperatives which are ‘deduced’ from the foregoing. In ideology there is a strong 
tendency to merge fact and value, to superimpose upon ‘things as they are’ the things that are desired.” 
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longer able to explain changes in preferences, tastes or beliefs, considered as stable 
(Stringham and Hummel, 2010), and neither is it able to predict equilibrium situations. 
Indeed, the rational expectations lead to a situation in which all is possible, a multitude of 
possible equilibria can occur. Taking into account the process of ideologies’ formation and 
their crystallization into shared mental models (Denzau and North, 1994)20 can enable us to 
explain the persistence of institutional equilibrium and the passage from one equilibrium to 
another. The integration of ideology into the explanation of the process of change is mainly to 
be attributed to North. He insisted on the shared feature of ideology to emphasize the 
phenomenon of “ideological conformism” that reduces the cost of maintaining order by 
avoiding the cost of sanction mechanisms of deviant behaviour (North, 2005). In this case, the 
institutional equilibrium is strengthened by ideology. North and co-authors also propose 
explaining the process of change, and especially institutional change, through the formation 
and evolution of ideologies (Mantzavinos et al., 2004). 
Contrary to the other above approaches, the cognitive approach can no longer consider 
ideology as a mere fact but has to explain its formation and its effects in terms of change or 
inertia. Like Hinich et al. (1998, p. 404), a substantial part of our sample articles addresses the 
issue of “stability and change in a macropolitical context” in a “tradition of thought on 
dynamic processes”. Indeed, some articles propose an endogenous theory of ideology in 
which ideology interacts with another variable such as economic policy (Lau and Frey, 1971; 
Chai, 1998), party platforms (Poutvaara, 2003) or opinion polls (Cukierman, 1991). In these 
theories, ideology is explained by the circular effects with the other variable, but is also 
simply explained in our sample by the formation of the economic beliefs of the economists 
(Caplan, 2002) and of voters (Caplan, 2006), by media (Schulz and Weimann, 1989; Bovitz et 
al., 2002; Andina-Díaz, 2007; Bernhardt et al., 2008; Hargittai et al., 2008) or by political 
institutions (Besley and Case, 2003; Bernhardt et al., 2004; Schultz, 2008). All these articles 
share a focus on the cognitive feature of ideology to explain the formation of ideology and its 
effect on formal (political) institutions.  
                                                 
 
20
 In a reference article on ideology, written by Arthur Denzau, he specifies his definition by considering 
ideologies as “the shared framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess that provide both an 
interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment should be structured” (Denzau 
and North, 1994, p. 4). North initially defined ideology as “the subjective frameworks that individuals possess to 
explain the world around them. Ideologies contain an essential normative element; that is, they explain both the 
way the world is and the way it ought to be. […] There are usually elements of an organized structure that make 
them an economizing device for receiving and interpreting information” (North, 1992, p. 484.) 
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Other articles from our sample study the possible opposite role, the “reinforcement effect”, 
of ideology on informal institutions, either in the economics of transition, where ideology 
would slow down the reform process (Jing’an, 1987; Wolgin, 1997), or in the study of 
cultural or social transmission, where ideology promotes social rigidity (Bisin and Verdier, 
2000; Hoff and Stiglitz, 2010). In any case, when focusing on individuals’ cognitive process, 
ideology appears as a central concept to understand the formation and persistence of 
institutional equilibrium.  Without depriving the concept from all its richness, like the partisan 
definitions did, this approach makes ideology an effective analytical tool for economists. This 
approach goes further than the partisan spatial approach because it adopts a procedural 
approach to ideology able to explain the formation of ideology and to endogenize the concept 
in order to explain a wider range of phenomena. But it also probably contains the most 
significant criticism of the rational choice theory thought the prescriptive or normative feature 
of ideology. By emphasizing the fact that individuals can adopt behaviours led by moral rules 
or ethical values, it denies the consequentialist assumption of the rational choice model.  
 
1.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The present article proposed taking stock of the treatment of the concept of ideology in 
economics. We use an original bibliometric methodology to study the treatment of the 
concept of ideology in the economic journals available on the JSTOR and ECONLIT 
databases. We focused our analysis on 45 top-ranked journals and especially 246 articles with 
ideology as a main topic. It first appeared that, contrary to what is usually thought, the notion 
of ideology has been more and more present in economic literature, in a growing number of 
articles published in a growing number of economic journals. It seems also that, although 
economists became interested in ideology a few decades later than other social scientists, from 
then, i.e. the 1920s, they have produced a constant and significant part of all the studies on 
ideology in all social sciences. Three main results emerged from the bibliometric analysis of 
the sample articles. First, from the 1920s-30s onwards, economists have shown a growing and 
significant interest in the concept of ideology. Second, this interest has given rise to four well-
identified approaches to ideology at different times. Third, these four generations of 
approaches enlightened and undoubtedly contributed to the evolution of economics.  
A content analysis of the sample articles revealed that four main approaches to ideology 
have prevailed in economics at different times. Through a technique of inference, we 
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identified four groups of definitions supplied in the articles. First, following a long tradition in 
science opened by philosophy and sociology, economists considered ideology as opposed to 
science or truth in a majority, at least until the 1950s-60s. Then the new definitional paradigm 
was to define ideology as opposed to rationality and especially self-interest. This trend 
culminated in the 1980s and has since progressively regressed. But, for the two last decades, 
borrowing the definition of social scientists, a majority of economists have focused on the 
political/partisan dimension of ideology. Lastly, a minority of economic studies have placed 
the notions of information and cognition at the heart of their approach to proposing a 
procedural definition of ideology. From this evolution, we can see that economists tended to 
move from a critical notion towards a neutral one. Indeed, initially defined as what is not 
scientific or rational, ideology was then defined in a non-evaluative way, as a simple political 
position or a way of treating information. We also noticed that economists tended to borrow 
the definitions of other disciplines, such as the versus science or the partisan definitions, but 
were also able to propose original definitions such as versus interest and the cognitive 
approach. 
Both tendencies are revealing of the way in which economics managed to make ideology 
an analytical tool that is in line with the standard economic theory or that could contribute to 
improving it. Indeed, by tending towards more and more neutral conceptions of ideology and 
by producing their own definitions, economists could contend with or circumvent the 
deadlocks of the standard economic theory. Indeed, it emerged in the content analysis that 
every definition referred to a specific theoretical debate. The versus science approach tackled 
the epistemic issue of the process of knowledge production, and the papers within this 
approach tried to identify the potential biases inherent to researchers in the production of 
economic science. This first approach was the opportunity to reflect on the scientificity of 
economic science. In this vein, the versus interest definition focuses on one specific 
foundation of the economic theory, the assumption of self-interest in the rational choice 
model. Facing the dissonance of the theoretical predictions and observed ideological 
behaviours, a first “revisionist strategy” consisted of relaxing the assumption of self-interest 
by including additional arguments in the utility function, thus increasing, in a tradition of 
economic imperialism, the explicative power of the rational choice model.  
Contrary to the versus interest approach, the partisan approach, inherited from political 
science, was not devised to challenge an economic theoretical problem but rather had an 
empirical vocation. Nevertheless, it contributed, maybe unconsciously, to strongly 
questioning the standard behavioural model in economics. Emphasizing the permanence of 
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the diversity, or at least the duality, of the patterns of interpretation of the world, it opposed 
the rational model that predicts the convergence of patterns led by an objective learning 
process. It implicitly suggests an alternative behavioural assumption in which the rationality 
can be subjective. Finally, the cognitive approach examines a hole in the standard economic 
theory, through the formation of equilibrium and the persistence of suboptimal equilibrium. It 
proposes solving this puzzle by investigating the process of formation of individual and 
common beliefs. Focusing on the informative value of ideology in an uncertain world, this 
approach offers a second revisionist strategy to explain ideological behaviours with the 
rational choice theory. This approach seems to stand for a looming and fruitful approach and 
research agenda. 
A peculiar feature of the economic approach appears from this study of the treatment of 
ideology. While the concept of ideology has systematically brought into question the basic 
behavioural assumptions of economics and even its scientificity, economists, at least some of 
them, have tried, more or less successfully, to address the loopholes and to integrate ideology 
into economic theory. This emphasizes a potential bias of our study which focuses mainly on 
the orthodox studies published in the top-ranked journals. Indeed, by focusing on the 
“mainstream” approaches to ideology, we have analysed more the way the economists 
“successfully” addressed the challenges than their failures, for instance, emphasized by North, 
whose work is not taken into account in our sample. That is why it would be interesting to 
compare these results with the papers coming from other journals, which are probably less 
optimistic about the ability of mainstream economists, and especially the rational choice 
model, to integrate the concept of ideology. We are totally aware of the potential limits of 
such a work, but in the absence of recent assessment on the studies on ideology in economic 
literature, these preliminary conclusions are valuable and could enable scholars to better 
orient their studies on ideology and to look ahead. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1.1 
Presentation of the journals 
Abbreviation Name of Journals Start End
AER Amercian Economic Review 1911 2007
AJAE American Journal of Agricultural Economics 1968 2004
AJPH American Journal of Public Health 1975 2008
BPEA Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1970 2008
E Econometrica 1933 2009
EDCC Economic Development and Cultural Change 1952 2009
EG Economic Geography 1925 2004
EHR The Economic History Review 1927 2009
EJ The Economic Journal 1891 2009
EJHET European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 1993 2009
ET Econometric Theory 1985 2010
ET Economic Theory 1991 2009
Etrans Economics of Transition 1999 2008
HPoE History of Political Economy 1969 2010
IER International Economic Review 1947 2007
ILRR Industrial and Labor Relations Review 1947 2007
IRLE International Review of Law and Economics 1981 2010
JCE Journal of Comparative Economics 1977 2010
JDE Journal of Development Economics 1974 2010
JE Journal of Econometrics 1973 2010
JEG Journal of Economic Geography 2001 2010
JEH The Journal of Economic History 1941 2004
JEL Journal of Economic Literature 1969 2008
JEP Journal of Economic Perspectives 1987 2007
JET Journal of Economic Theory 1969 2010
JHE Journal of Health Economics 1982 2009
JIE Journal of International Economics 1922 1996
JIE Journal of Industrial Economics 1952 2009
JLabE Journal of Labor Economics 1983 2007
JLE Journal of Law and Economics 1958 2009
JLEO Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1985 2008
JLS Journal of Legal Studies 1972 2008
JMathE Journal of Mathematical Economics 1974 2010
JMCB Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 1969 2009
JMonE Journal of Monetary Economics 1975 2010
JPE The Journal of Political Economy 1892 2009
JPubE Journal of Public Economics 1972 2010
JUE Journal of Urban Economics 1974 2010
PC Public Choice 1968 2008
QJE Quarterly Journal of Economics 1886 2004
RAND The RAND Journal of Economics 1984 2007
RES Review of Economic Studies 1933 2006
REStat Review of Economics and Statistics 1919 2004
SCW Social Choice and Welfare 1984 2010
WBER The World Bank Economic Review 1986 2002
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2. GOVERNMENT SIZE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE: FRANCE IN THE 20TH CENTURY1 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Government has benefits and costs. The benefits include provision of public goods and 
resolution of externality problems, aspects of social justice, and regulation for consumer 
protection; the costs are the excess burden of taxation, incentives for unproductive use of 
resources in rent seeking, and the consequences of principal-agent problems between citizens 
and both politicians and bureaucrats (Hillman, 2009). The benefits and costs suggest an 
optimal size of government. 
We define government size by the proportion of public spending to output and investigate 
the nonlinear relation between the government size and national output. The size of 
government is of course not only measured by public spending and the consequences of 
government are not only the value of output produced. We focus however on these measures. 
Our question is how public spending affects efficiency in the economy as measured by output. 
Past empirical studies investigating a linear relationship between public spending and 
output have been inconclusive.2 Faced with this, the literature has taken two paths. The first, 
following endogenous growth theory, consists of disaggregating the effects of public 
expenditure to investigate the performance of each expenditure component (Angelopoulos et 
al., 2007; Afonso and Furceri, 2010). The second approach explores the nonlinearity 
hypothesis or the BARS curve derived from Barro (1989), Armey (1995), Rahn and Fox 
(1996) and Scully (1994). In previous literature, Grossman (1987, 1988) proposed a 
theoretical framework to account for a nonlinear relationship based on public goods and the 
                                                 
 
1
 This essay is based on Facchini and Melki (2011).  
2
 For recent literature reviews, see Nijkamp and Poot (2004) and Ciccone and Jarocinski (2010). In other 
literature surveys, Bergh and Henrekson (2011) and Pitlik and Schratzenstaller (2011) established that no recent 
study finds a positive relationship between government size and output. 
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excess burden of taxation and disincentives of transfer mechanisms, as well as rent-seeking 
activities. Market and state failure can be invoked to justify the nonlinearity hypothesis, as 
well as the distinction between productive and non-productive public expenditure (Barro, 
1990; Lee, 1995; Devarjan et al., 1996; Chen, 2006). As Tanzi and Zee (1997) and Tabellini 
(2005) emphasize, it is generally difficult for external observers to determine the difference 
between productive and counterproductive spending. 
The literature on the nonlinearity hypothesis has several problems. Past cross-country 
studies assume that all countries have the same government size. The time-series studies 
focusing on one country differ in their methodologies and observation periods, making the 
results difficult to interpret.3 There are also ambiguities and inaccuracies in these studies. 
First, there is lack of consistency regarding whether the economic performance variable 
explained by government size is the level4 or the growth rate of GDP.5 The level of output and 
the growth rate of output are not completely interchangeable from a theoretical perspective. 
From an empirical perspective, problems of spurious time-series regression can arise, because 
the variables government size and GDP are usually found to be non-stationary. The empirical 
literature is also unclear concerning whether the nonlinearity hypothesis refers to a short-term 
effect or to an equilibrium long-term effect of government size6. 
We address these issues by setting out the relationship between government size and the 
level of output. We also address the issues empirically by estimating both a long-term co-
integration relationship and the short-term interactions between government size and GDP. 
We employ the two-step Engle-Granger (1987) co-integration method to estimate a 
nonmonotonic model in which real GDP is explained by government size and squared 
government size measured by the proportion of total public spending in GDP, and we add 
economy openness, population size, and the proportion of taxes in GDP. 
We find evidence of a co-integration nonmonotonic relationship between government size 
as indicated by public spending and real GDP in France for the time period 1896–2008. The 
estimated coefficients indicate that the optimal government size in France is 30% of GDP. 
The evidence for the French case allows a comparison with similar long time-series studies 
                                                 
 
3
 Forte and Magazzino (2011) propose evidence of the diversity of the optimal size of public spending using 
time-series and panel data on European countries in the period 1970-2009. 
4
 See for example Armey (1995) and Vedder and Gallaway (1998). Grossman (1988) studies the relationship 
between a change in government size and GDP growth. 
5
 See for example Gwartney et al. (1998), Forte and Magazzino (2011), Mittnik and Neumann (2003). 
6
 In the literature on the Wagner’s law, some studies estimate a linear cointegration relationship between 
government size and GDP (Henrekson, 1993; Bohl, 1996; Payne and Ewing, 1996; Ghali, 1998; Kumar at al., 
2012). 
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that exist only for the U.S. (Grossman, 1987; Peden, 1991; Scully, 1994; Vedder and 
Gallaway, 1998).7 
The nonmonotonic relationship is also observed when estimating the short-term 
interactions among the variables. This last finding is robust to splitting the observation period 
into sub-samples before and after the Second World War. The Granger-causality tests indicate 
that the relationship found is due to unidirectional causality from government size to output. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and revisits the non-
linearity hypothesis. Section 3 describes the econometric model and methodology. Section 4 
provides the results, which are discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.2 LITERATURE SURVEY: LINEARITY VS. NONLINEARITY HYPOTHESES 
 
2.2.1 LINEARITY HYPOTHESIS 
 
The relationship between government size and economic outcomes was initially studied in 
the framework of a linear model using a Cobb–Douglas production function and was first 
developed by Feder (1982) and adapted by Ram (1986). Since then, the issue has given rise to 
a plethora of empirical studies. Nijkamp and Poot (2004) provide a comprehensive meta-
analysis of 93 studies, undertaken prior to 1998, on the effects of total and specific public 
expenditure and tax rates on economic performance. They conclude that, if the positive 
influence of public spending on education and public infrastructure is confirmed, it is difficult 
to reach an agreement on the effect of total public spending on national output. 
We consider the 41 studies of the meta-analysis of Nijkamp and Poot dealing only with the 
effect of total public expenditure. We update and complete the meta-analysis with 41 
additional recent studies. A better understanding of the contradictory effects of government 
size on economic output revealed in the different studies requires an in-depth analysis of the 
periods and the panels of the countries considered in each study. We also suggest examining 
more deeply the form of the estimated model (linear or nonlinear). The traditional surveys, 
like that of Nijkamp and Poot (2004), merely provide the sign (positive, negative or 
inconclusive) of the relationship without specifying the form of the equation that is tested. 
                                                 
 
7
 In 1960, the size of the public sector was pretty much the same in almost all the Western developed economies 
(Henrekson and Lybeck, 1988; Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000). But in the late 1990s, total government spending 
was about 50% in many countries of continental Europe, like France, and around 35% in the United States, Japan 
and Switzerland (Persson and Tabellini, 2003). 
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Thus, they could classify a study as inconclusive when it provides no evidence of a linear 
relationship but of a nonlinear relationship between government size and economic output, 
such as Grossman (1987) does. Therefore, in our analysis, we add a fourth possible effect 
besides positive, negative and inconclusive, which is a nonlinear inverted U-shaped curve. 
 
 
Table 2.1  
Studies estimating a linear model   
 
 
Among the 82 studies of our sample, the majority, namely 61, test a mere linear 
relationship between government size and output (Table 3.1), while 21 estimate a nonlinear 
negative effect positive effect inconclusive
Ahmed (1986) Bairam (1990) Saunders (1985)
Marlow (1986) Macnair et al. (1995) Levine and Renelt (1992)
Peden and Bradley (1989) Sheehey (1993)
Engen and Skinner (1992) Gemmell (1993) 
Evans and Karras (1994) Andres et al. (1996)
Hsieh and Lai (1994) Agell et al. (1997)
Hansson and Henrekson (1994) Ghali (1999)
Verder and Gallaway (1998) 
Grier (1997)
Fuente (1997)
Karras (1996) 
Gwartney et al. (1998)
Abrams (1999)
Bernholz (2000)
Dalamagas (2000)
Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) 
Fölster and Henrekson (2001)
Alesina et al. (2002)
Dar and Amirkhalkhali (2002)
Illarionov and Pivarova (2002)
Borcherding et al. (2003)
Kustepoli(2005)
Schaltegger and Torgler (2006)
Angelopoulos et al. (2007)
Romero-Ávila and Strauch (2008)
Roy (2009)
Afonso and Furceri (2010)
Bergh and Karlson (2010)
Landau (1983) Sattar (1993) Cronovith (1998)
Assane and Pourgerani (1994) Cooray (2008) Bairam (1990)
Hansson and Hebrekson (1994)
Karikari (1995) Fidrmuc (2003)
Guseh (1997) Anaman (2004)
Zhang and Zou (1998)
Landau (1983) Ram (1986) Kormendi and Meguire (1985)
Barth and Bradley (1987) Scully (1989)
Grier and Tullock (1989) Lee and Lin (1994)
Rao (1989) Lin (1994)
Barro (1990)
Lee (1995)
Barro (1997)
OECD
countries
Developing 
countries
OECD and
developing
 countries
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model (Table 3.2). As we can see in Table 3.1, which presents the results of the studies 
estimating a linear model, 67% find a negative effect of government size, while only 8% find 
the opposite effect, and 25% are inconclusive. The convergence toward a negative influence 
of government size becomes even more evident when considering the studies, whether in 
cross-section or in time series, that focus on developed OECD countries. In fact, 76% of the 
studies uphold a negative effect, while only 5% establish a positive effect and 19% find no 
relationship. The negative effect seems to be slightly less prominent for developing countries 
and in the studies that include both kinds of countries. Indeed, concerning solely developing 
countries, 50% of the sample articles show a negative effect, 17% a positive one and 33% are 
inconclusive. Likewise, the cross-country studies that focus on both developing and 
developed countries provide evidence of a negative effect in 58% of the cases, a positive one 
in 9%, and no clear effect in 33% of the studies. The indication is that the effects of 
government size differ according to the level of development of the countries considered.  
All the 61 “linear” studies focus on a relatively recent period, namely the second half of 
the twentieth century, except Ahmed (1986), whose observation period is 1908–1980. This 
strengthens a proposal that the apparent negative effect is valid only for a recent period. This 
period is characterized by relatively large government size, especially for developed countries 
and we can assume that the seemingly negative effect applies for a relatively high share of 
public expenditure in national income. This is exactly what the small amount of literature on 
the optimal size of government tends to show. 
 
2.2.2 NONLINEARITY HYPOTHESIS 
 
We looked at 21studies estimating a nonlinear relationship between government activity 
and economic performance (Table 2.2). According to these studies, the optimal size of 
government can vary from around 17% to 43.5%of GDP. Most of these studies focus on the 
United States and they tend to converge toward a 20% ratio (Grossman, 1987; Peden, 1991; 
Scully, 1994; Vedder and Gallaway, 1998). Regarding other countries, the studies most often 
find higher optimal sizes, such as 27% for Canada (Chao and Gruber, 1998), 27% for Sri 
Lanka (Herath, 2009), 35% for Iran (Abounoori and Nademi, 2010), 35% for 23 OECD 
countries (Afonso et al., 2003), 40% for low-income countries (Davies, 2009), around 40% 
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for European countries (Forte and Magazzino, 20118; Pevcin, 20049) and between 40% (Forte 
and Magazzino, 2011) and 43% (Pevcin, 2004) for France. Bulgaria and Taiwan appear to be 
exceptions with low optimal sizes, respectively of 21% (Mavrov, 2005) and 23% (Chen and 
Lee, 2005). The seemingly low optimal size of 20% found by Mittnik and Neumann (2003) 
for Germany relates only to consumption expenditure. 
The studies tend to confirm the global negative effect of government size in the second 
half of the twentieth century found in the “linear-model” studies. Indeed, most of the 
countries would be on the downward-sloping portion of their inverted U-shaped curve during 
this period. This effect would be all the more negative when considering rich OECD countries 
because they would have a lower optimal size. Table 2.2 also shows that the different studies 
on specific countries converge more or less towards similar but not identical optimal sizes. 
Even though the optimal sizes provided by the various studies can hardly be compared 
because of significant methodological differences, such as the models used to assess or the 
observation periods, Table 2.2 provides a second indication. There would be a diversity of 
optimal sizes specific to each country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
8
 Forte and Magazzino (2011) find a 37% average optimal state size for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK. 
9
 Pevcin (2004) finds a 36–43% optimal government size for eight EU countries: Italy, France, Finland, Sweden, 
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium. 
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Table 2.2 
Studies estimating a non-linear model 
 
Notes: Optimal size = percentage of total public expenditure in GDP, except Mittnik and Neumann (2003) who 
consider only consumption expenditure and Scully (2000) who considers the optimal tax rate. 
 
 
2.2.3 REVISITING THE NONLINEARITY HYPOTHESIS  
 
For the nonlinear relation depicted in Fig. 2.1.a, optimal government size is . Each dollar 
spent by the public sector implies a benefit and a cost, where F = B – C. The total effect of 
government intervention traditionally aggregated in the nonlinear curve, F, can be 
author period sample optimal size
Grossman (1987) 1929–1982 USA 19
Grossman (1988) 1929–1982 USA -
Peden (1991) 1929–1986 USA 20
Carlstrom and Gokhale (1991) Post-war USA -
Karras (1993) - - 20
Scully (1994) 1929–1989 USA 21.5–22.9
Karras (1996) 1960–1985 118 countries 23
Vedder and Gallaway (1998) 1947–1997 USA 17
Chao and Gruber (1998) 1929–1996 Canada 27
Scully (2000) 1995 22 OECD/112 countries 20.2–22.3
Afonso et al. (2003) 1990–2000 23 OECD countries 35
Mittnik and Neumann (2003) 1968-1994 West Germany 20
Mavrov (2007) 1990–2004 Bulgaria 21.4
Pevcin (2004) 1950–1996 12 EU countries 36–42
Chen and Lee (2005) 1979–2003 Taiwan 23
Magazzino (2008) 1950–1998 Italy 33
Davies (2009) 1975–2002 low-income countries 40
Chobanov and Mladenova (2009) 1970–2009 28 EU countries 25
Herath (2009) 1959–2003 Sri Lanka 27
Abounoori and Nademi (2010) 1956–2006 Iran 34,7
Forte and Magazzino (2011) 1970–2009 27 EU countries 35.39–43.50
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decomposed in the benefits from public spending, B, and the inefficiency costs, C. The 
relationship is presented graphically in Fig. 2.1b. 
 
 
Fig. 2.1 
Decomposition of the non-linear effect of government size on output 
 
 
To account for the shape of the curve of the net benefits, F, we need to justify the shapes of 
the B and C curves. By definition, the B curve, representing the benefits from correcting 
market failures, always increases with the government size, i.e.   . However, but it is 
increasing at a decreasing rate, thus    . That is explained by the law of diminishing 
returns. Indeed, state intervention first corrects the most profitable market failures, for 
Size of state, G 
Real GDP 
G*                Size of state, G 
Costs of government  
intervention (C) 
Benefits of government  
intervention (B) 
Fig. 3.1.a 
Fig. 3.1.b 
0 
Net benefits of government 
intervention (F) 
Real GDP 
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instance by securing the property rights, and progressively sustains less and less profitable 
activities. 
Concerning the costs of public expenditure inherent in state failures, by definition, the 
slope of the C curve is positive, 	    . Furthermore, we argue that the slope is 
increasing, that is to say, 	   . In other words, the costs of public spending increase 
continuously at an increasing rate (Fig. 2.1.b). 
The acceleration of the costs of public spending with government size lies at the heart of 
our contribution. We supply three reasons to explain it. First, the crowding-out effect 
increases more than proportionally with the size of the government, because government 
prices increase at a higher pace than private sector prices. The different rates of price changes 
can be explained by the Baumol’s cost disease of the service sector (Baumol, 1967) or can 
result from the political power of civil servants themselves (Buchanan and Tullock, 1977: 
148). With Baumol’s hypothesis, the public sector is less likely to generate productivity 
improvements. The growing cost of government is explained by the relative productivity of 
the public and private sectors. In Buchanan and Tullock’s hypothesis, the explanation is 
different. As the share of the electorate made up of bureaucrats increases their voting power 
increases. This increased voting power enables appointed public officials to extract higher 
wages from elected public officials. Public sector price increases are generated via the 
electorally coercive relationship between bureaucrats and politicians. The higher the wages of 
bureaucrats, the higher the cost of public spending. 
Second, what we can refer to as the “systemic crowding-out effect” takes place when the 
government size increases. Indeed, market prices solve the knowledge dispersal problem. 
They transmit already-known information and contribute to the process of the formation of 
opinions (Hayek, 1949, 96–106; Kirzner, 1984: 204). Then, competition in the market process 
is a discovery procedure. The inefficiency of the market can be solved because entrepreneurs 
perceive in the inefficiencies the opportunities to rearrange the pattern of input utilization or 
output consumption and to correct their expectation errors (Kirzner, 1978), i.e. the 
opportunities for pure entrepreneurial profits. Public spending to correct market failures 
deprives the members of solutions that the market process would have discovered. We can 
speak about a systemic crowding-out effect because it can reduce both the economic 
knowledge available on the market and the number of participants. 
Third, the political transaction costs increase more than proportionally with the size of the 
government because the displacement costs within the public sector increase with the 
competition between the various interest groups. The intensity of competition increases with 
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the size of the government because public resources become scarce. The pro-education groups 
or the pro-safety ones spend more to obtain the marginal dollar. 
 
2.3. MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
 
2.3.1 SPECIFICATION ISSUES 
 
Investigating the nonlinearity hypothesis between economic activity and government size 
over a long period inevitably involves tackling some specification issues. Most often, the 
relation between economic activity and government size is studied through the estimation of a 
Cobb–Douglas production function. However, in addition to important limitations (Bairam, 
1990: 1427; Hill, 2008), these kinds of models do not take into account the possibility of a 
nonlinear relationship. The empirical literature investigating the nonlinearity hypothesis, 
though, is suspiciously free from control variables. A fairly well-developed empirical 
literature emphasized a small set of variables that are typically useful in the growth model but 
standard variables are missing for our long time period. Consequently, shortcuts like 
including economy openness, total population or the proportion of taxes in GDP along with 
the proportion of public expenditure in GDP are important controls. A variable measuring the 
proportion of taxes in GDP enables us to look at the effect of the proportion of public 
expenditure in GDP on economic activity holding taxes constant. As our focus is on the 
relative advantage of the nonlinearity hypothesis, our time-series investigations are conducted 
using two different specifications: (i) a monotonic model including real GDP, government 
size, economy openness, total population and taxation; (ii) a nonmonotonic model including 
the government size squared along with the variables of the first specification. 
 
2.3.2 CO-INTEGRATION ANALYSIS 
 
Another limitation of the few time-series studies that investigate the nonlinearity 
hypothesis lies in the fact that they do not test for co-integration and provide only a short-run 
analysis of the relationship between government size and economic output. Briefly stated, 
evidence of the co-integration of a set of variables that are integrated of the same order 
implies a long-run relationship between these variables. In other words, any deviations from 
the long-run equilibrium relationship will be corrected. This means that two important forces 
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can cause a change in the variables. A short-term effect indicates the response for one variable 
due to the changes in another variable. The other force refers to the adjustment taken by the 
variables to correct any deviation from the equilibrium. 
To test for co-integration, two commonly used tests are employed – the residual-based test 
of Engle and Granger (1987) (EG test) and the VAR-based test of Johansen (1988) and 
Johansen and Julius (1990) (JJ test). As our aim here is not to investigate all the possible co-
integration relationships between the variables of our model, as intended by the JJ test, we use 
an EG test, which imposes a unique co-integration vector. This test is a two-step procedure 
involving an OLS estimation of a pre-specified co-integration regression and of the error-
correction model based on the error terms of the first regression. In view of the above 
discussion, we are led to estimate, for the whole period 1896-2008, two error-correction 
models, a monotonic one given by equation (1) and a nonmonotonic one given by equation 
(2): 
 
ABC D EF  FBC  C  C  C  C    !"AC"" 
  !"AC""    !"AC""    !"AC""    #!"ABC""  $%%&&  'C (1) 
 
ABC D 	F  (FBC  )C  )C*  )C  )C  )#C 
 +!"AC" "  +!"AC"*   +!"AC""" 
 +!"AC"  +#!"AC" ""  +,!"ABC"  $%%&& " -C (2) 
 
with t = year t;  = difference operator; BC = real GDP at t; C = government size at t; C* = 
government size squared at t; C = economy openness at t; C = total population at t; C = 
taxation at t; $%%&& = time dummy post World War II; EF and 	F = constant terms; Fand (F= 
speed of adjustment to long-term equilibrium; .and ). = long-term impacts;  . and +.!"= 
short-term impacts of the j-lagged variable; 'C and -C= error terms at t; )/0) = the long-
term optimal government size. 
The estimation of these models, however, has to take into account the structural breaks in 
our data. Indeed, as Mittnik and Neumann (2003) suggest, structural changes may dominate 
nonlinearity effects. In particular, the potential optimal government size found for the period 
1896-2008 can be strongly affected when taking account of the structural changes after the 
Second World War. In particular, the building of the Welfare State sharply influenced both 
the composition and the size of public expenditure. The issue of the breaks in our series are 
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more extensively discussed in section 5.1. Two ways are commonly used to deal with this 
issue. The first one is to estimate the model with time dummies included. However this 
solution can only be applied to the estimation of the error correction model and not of the co-
integration relationship. Thus, we include a time dummy for the post-second war years when 
estimating the short-term interactions. The second solution is to re-estimate the models for 
subsamples. For this purpose, we split our whole period into two sub-periods, 1896-1938 and 
1947-2008 and re-estimate both the co-integration relationship and the error correction 
models. 
 
2.3.3 GRANGER CAUSALITY 
 
The identification issue, which consists of identifying the sense of the causality, lies at the 
heart of the literature on the relationship between government size and economic output. 
Although it is supposed to be especially the case of cross-section analyses because of “pooled 
estimates of the effects of government size on economic growth” (Ghali, 1999), the topic is 
also extensively addressed by time-series analyses. Indeed, a significant coefficient can be 
interpreted as causality from economic output to government size, according to Wagner’s law, 
which supposes that as a society becomes more developed, the proportion of public spending 
in total output tends to rise. However, it can be also interpreted as a pure effect from public 
expenditure to economic activity. 
 If we find evidence of co-integration, then this implies that there must be Granger 
causality from the independent variables of our model to real GDP, or vice versa, or both 
ways. To capture the short-term interactions, we employ a multivariate Granger causality 
approach taking into account the error correction term in case of co-integration. Indeed, the 
standard Granger causality tests are misspecified in such a case (Engle and Granger, 1987).  
 
2.4 RESULTS 
 
2.4.1 DATA AND VARIABLES’ DEFINITION 
 
In the following, we use annual data on France covering one of the longest democratic 
periods, from 1896 to 2008. However, data on government size are not available for two 
periods, 1914–1919 and 1939–1946, which correspond approximately to the war periods and 
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the non-democratic Vichy Regime. Deleting missing observations and interpolating across the 
gap are two common options. As the second option ranks the last in terms of size distortion 
and power (Ryan and Giles, 1998), we opt for the first choice and thus exclude these two sub-
periods from our sample period. All the variables are considered in natural logarithms so that 
their first differences approximate their growth rate. The dependent variable, the annual real 
GDP in 1990 constant dollars (Y), comes from Maddison’s website.10 Our main independent 
variable is the size of the government (G), expressed by the total public expenditure (central 
state, social protection and local public authorities) as a percentage of the total GDP. To build 
this variable, we follow Florio and Colautti (2005) and use the historical data of André and 
Delorme (1983), covering the period 1896-1974 but excluding the war periods 1914-1919 and 
1939-1946. We connect it with the official data of the National Institute of Statistics and 
Economic Studies, which provides data on total government size from 1959 to the end of our 
period. 
For the rest of our model, the degree of economy openness (O) is approximated by the 
share of the external trade (exportation + importation) as a percentage of the total GDP, the 
data coming mainly from Asselain and Blancheton (2005). The data on total population (P) 
come from Maddison’s website.11 The variable measuring taxation (T), available on Piketty’s 
website,12 corresponds to an aggregate tax rate as a percentage of national income. The 
description and sources of the variables are given in Table 2.3. 
The evolution of our main variables, real gross domestic product and government size, is 
presented in Fig. 2.2. At first glance, when we look at the big picture over the whole century, 
both variables have steadily increased, thus suggesting a potential common trend. Both 
variables also seem to have been deeply marked, especially by the Second World War. While 
the GDP was rather stable until the Second World War, it has sharply and continuously 
increased afterwards. Regarding government size, it was widely boosted by the First World 
War but decreased immediately afterwards. However, the Second World War has had a long-
lasting effect, called Peacock and Wiseman effect since, after 1945, government spending did 
not return to pre-war levels. Consequently, even though both variables may have a common 
trend in the pre-Second World War period, this does not seem to be any longer the case 
                                                 
 
10Maddison’s website (http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm): Historical Statistics of the World 
Economy: 1-2008 AD- Table 2: GDP levels-France GDP in million 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. 
11Maddison’s website (http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm): Historical Statistics of the World 
Economy: 1-2008 AD- Table 1. 
12Piketty’s website: http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fichiers/public/Grasset2001/Livre/TabChap1.xls 
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2.4.2 TEST RESULTS FOR UNIT ROOT TESTS 
 
As a prerequisite for later analysis, we first examine the time-series properties of the data 
series, using the augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF), the Phillips–Perron (PP), the Generalized 
Least Squares Dickey-Fuller (DF-GLS), Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) 
and the Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock point optimal (ERS) tests. Table 2.4 presents the test 
statistics for the log levels of the series. For real GDP, population and taxation, the five tests 
unambiguously show that null of unit root cannot be rejected at the 5% statistical level or that 
the null of stationarity can be rejected at the 5% level in the case of the KPSS test. Concerning 
government size and openness, only one test (respectively ERS and KPSS) provides evidence 
of stationarity while the others make a strong case of a unit root. The tests on the first 
difference of the variables are provided in Table 2.5 and show that the first difference of the 
variables are stationary, thus supporting the hypothesis that all variables are integrated of 
order one, or I(1). 
 
Table 2.4 
Unit root tests on the log-levels of the variables 
 
Notes: (1) The tests are performed on the log-levels of the variables. (2) ADF, PP, DF-GLS, KPSS, ERS refers 
respectively to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, the Phillips-Perron test, the Generalized Least Squares 
Dickey-Fuller test, the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin test and the Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock point 
optimal test. (3) When it is required, the lag length is chosen according to the Schwarz information criterion. (4) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Deterministic component ADF PP DF-GLS KPSS ERS
real GDP constant, trend -2,474 -1,883 -2,032 0.647*** 10.968
government size constant, trend -3.091 -3.215* -2.489* 0.179** 4.843***
openness constant -1.704 -1.947 -1.734* 0.250 3.555*
population constant, trend -1.210 -0.973 -1.032 0.335*** 33.763
taxation constant -1.744 -1.803 -1.770 0.193** 13.184
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Table 2.5 
Unit root tests on the first log-differences of the variables 
 
Notes: (1) The tests are performed on the first log-differences of the variables. (2) ADF, PP, DF-GLS, KPSS, 
ERS refers respectively to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, the Phillips-Perron test, the Generalized Least 
Squares Dickey-Fuller test, the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin test and the Elliot, Rothenberg and 
Stock point optimal test. (3) When it is required, the lag length is chosen according to the Schwarz information 
criterion. (4) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
However as noted by Perron (1989), in the presence of structural breaks in our series, unit 
root tests can lead to a misleading conclusion that there is a unit root when in fact there is not. 
To address this issue, we run additional unit root tests allowing for structural breaks. We first 
run a test proposed by Perron (1989) in which the break is exogenous. To identify potential 
breaks in our series, we follow Perron who focuses on the effect of the Great Depression of 
1929 and of the first oil shock of 1973 with U.S. data. In addition, an analysis of the secular 
evolution of our series reveals that the years 1918, 1929, 1944 and 1974 often corresponds to 
breaks in our series (1918, 1944 and 1974 for real GDP; WW1, 1929, WW2 for government 
size; 1944 for openness; 1918, 1944, 1974 for population; 1918, 1944, 1974 for taxation). 
Therefore, we perform the Perron test on each of our variables except G (government size) 
because of problems of discontinuity of the series and we take sequentially each of the four 
dates as an exogenous break. Among the three models proposed by Perron, we chose the 
“changing growth model” or type "B" model that is more adapted to our series. Table 3.6 
shows the results of this test. Whatever date is considered as a break, the test does not reject 
the null of the unit root. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Deterministic component ADF PP DF-GLS KPSS ERS
real GDP constant -5.070*** -9.102*** -3.338*** 0.143 1.613***
government size constant -8.326*** -8.340*** -3.518*** 0.081 1.145***
openness constant -11.603*** -11.741*** -11.645*** 0.107 0.175***
population constant -4.989*** -4.980*** -4.344*** 0.409 1.000***
taxation constant -8.421*** -8.607*** -4.496*** 0.104 0.739***
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Table 2.6 
Perron (1989) unit root test on the log-levels of the variables 
 
Notes: (1) For λ=0.3 the 5% critical value is -3.87; for λ=0.5 the 5% critical value is -3.96; for λ=0.4 the 5% 
critical value is -3.94; for λ=0.7 the 5% critical value is -3.85; (2) estimation of the “changing growth model” or 
type "B" model proposed by Perron (1989). (3) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Because Perron (1989) requires the strong hypothesis that we know a priori the date of the 
break, we also run the Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root test with an endogeneous structural 
break either in the intercept (column a) or in the trend (column b).13 As shown in Table 2.7, 
this test can never reject at the 5% significance level the null of unit root14. Therefore, we can 
reasonably assume that all our variables are I(1). 
 
Table 2.7 
Zivot-Andrews unit root test on the log-levels of the variables 
 
Notes: (1) (a) refers to the model allowing for break in intercept and (b) the model allowing for break in trend; 
(2) Tb is the break date endogenously selected. (3) tmin is the minimum t-statistic. (4) k denotes the lag length. (5) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
                                                 
 
13
 We cannot run this test on our original variable of government size, G, because of the missing observations 
during the war periods. However, we propose to show the Zivot-Andrews test on a series of government size that 
we construct by interpolating the gaps during the two war periods. 
14
 For G, government size, the test rejects at the 5% significance level the null of unit root for one of the two 
models, i.e. the model estimating a break in the intercept. However, the test cannot reject the null of unit root at 
1% and the date of the break occurs in 1913, during a period for which we artificially created data to fill the gap 
of the series. Linearly interpolating the series artificially introduces a regime change in our series and may lead 
to unreliable conclusions of the Zivot-Andrews test for this variable. 
Tb
1918 
(λ=0.35)
1944 
(λ=0.54)
1929
(λ=0.43)
1974
(λ=0.75)
real GDP -3.001 -3.617 -3.496 -2.709
openness -2.179 -2.393 -2.437 -2.523
population -2.353 -3.236 -3.067 -1.900
taxation -1.834 -2.893 -2.424 -3.119
Variable Tb tmin k Tb tmin k
real GDP 1960 -3.904 3 1942 -3.749 3
government size 1913 -4.894** 2 1984 -3.822 2
openness 1930 -3.873 3 1942 -3.518 3
population 1915 -2.964 2 1941 -3.671 2
taxation 1919 -4.064 2 1959 -3.498 2
(b)(a)
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2.4.3 TEST RESULTS FOR CO-INTEGRATION  
 
All the variables being integrated of the same order, they satisfy the requirements for the 
possible existence of a co-integration relationship among them. As recommended by Engle 
and Granger (1987), the co-integration model is estimating using an OLS procedure with the 
variables in level. The results are shown in Table 2.8. In column (1a), we estimate for the 
whole period the first specification (1) of our model, i.e. a monotonic relationship between Y 
and G along with the set of control variables. An ADF test is run on the error terms produced 
in order to test for co-integration. The values of the ADF tests are reported in the last row of 
Table 2.8. The absolute value of the test statistic being above the critical value of the 5% level 
of significance, suggested by Engle and Granger (1987: 269), the null of no co-integration can 
be rejected. Therefore, this regression shows significant co-integration between the variables 
of our model and thus between real GDP and government size. This regression gives also an 
estimated long-term multiplier of public expenditure of 0.12, much lower than 1, thus in 
contradiction with the Keynesian prediction. 
 
Table 2.8 
Co-integration relationship 
 
Notes: (1) t-statistics in brackets in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (2) 
ADF: in the last row of the table, we report the statistics of the ADF test on the error terms of the regression. The 
critical values are the ones tabulated by Engle and Granger (1987: 269). 
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a)
constant -25.373***
[23.373]
-34.769***
[16.320]
-54.906***
[5.339]
-53.219***
[4.765]
-31.918***
[18.107]
-41.366***
[20.688]
government size 0.120***
[3.185]
2.010***
[5.250]
0.222***
[3.682]
1.008
[0.538]
-0.021
[0.187]
5.560***
[6.351]
government size² - -0.296***
[4.955]
- -0.127
[0.419]
- -0.743***
[6.408]
openness 0.212***
[7.239]
0.200***
[7.585]
0.380***
[6.693]
0.351***
[3.954]
0.118***
[2.816]
0.185***
[5.455]
population 3.486***
[34.195]
4.082***
[27.060]
6.171***
[6.572]
5.904***
[5.156]
4.151***
[26.316]
4.035***
[33.014]
taxation 0.397***
[11.159]
0.325***
[9.300]
0.322***
[4.991]
0.298***
[3.441]
0.217
[1.484]
0.175
[1.565]
Adj. R2 0.996 0.997 0.912 0.910 0.997 0.998
ADF -4.486** -5.326*** -4.848*** -4.153* -1.832 -2.796
real GDP (1896-2008) real GDP (1896-1938) real GDP (1947-2008)
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Then, we estimate for the whole period the second specification of our model allowing a 
nonmonotonic relationship between Y and G (column 2a). The ADF test on the residuals of 
the regression provides even stronger evidence of co-integration than for the monotonic 
model since we reject, in the nonlinear case, the null of no co-integration at the 1% 
significance level against 5% for the linear model. Moreover, we notice that G, government 
size, has a positive coefficient while G2, the squared term, emerges as having a negative one. 
This provides evidence of a nonmonotonic, inverted U relationship between government size 
and real GDP in the long run. The coefficients of G and G2 also allow us to determine that the 
government size that maximizes the output was reached when the total public expenditure 
represented around 30% of GDP. 
However the estimations for the sub-periods 1896-1938 and 1947-2008 provide mixed 
evidence of co-integration. For 1896-1938, the estimation of the linear model produces error 
terms that are stationary at 5%, as shown in column (3a). Thus, this estimation provides 
evidence of co-integration, giving a long-term multiplier of public expenditure of 0.22, almost 
twice higher than for the whole period, but still inferior to 1. When estimating the nonlinear 
model for this sub-period (column 4a), the null of no co-integration can only be rejected at 
10%. In additions to weak evidence of co-integration for this period, the coefficients of G and 
G2 are respectively positive and negative but do not reach any reasonable level of 
significance. This suggests that a long-term nonlinear relationship is not supported for this 
sub-period. For 1947-2008, neither the monotonic nor the nonmonotonic models show 
evidence of co-integration (columns 5a and 6a). While the signs of the coefficients of G and 
G2 still suggest an inverted U relationship, they cannot be interpreted in the absence of co-
integration. 
However, the fact that the nonlinear co-integration relationship between output and 
government size does not hold when splitting the whole period, is not in contradiction with 
the existence of such a relationship for the whole period. Indeed, a nonmonotonic relationship 
between two variables can only be observed in the presence of a structural break in the 
relationship between the variables, which implies a break in the trend of at least one of the 
two variables. However, as noted above, a structural break (after the Second World War) can 
be only observed over the whole century, but not when considering sub-periods. For each sub-
period, both variables seem to follow a stable trend, which turns out to be common for the 
pre-Second World War period. 
72 
 
 
2.4.4 TEST RESULTS FOR ERROR CORRECTION MODEL AND GRANGER-
CAUSALITY 
 
For short-run dynamics, we estimate the error correction models using the error terms of 
the co-integration regressions. As indicated by the Schwarz criterion, the estimated model 
includes one lag, which allows us to interpret the sign and the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients, which is not the case when the lag length is bigger. Before any interpretation of 
the coefficients, t-tests require normality of the error terms. Thus, for each regression, we 
control for potential outliers and apply a Jarque–Bera test to check for the normality of the 
residuals. A Box–Pierce test is also performed to make sure of the absence of serious auto-
correlation of the error terms. 
 
Table 2.9 
Error correction model 
 
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b)
constant 0.005
[0.687]
0.007
[0.985]
0.012
[0.949]
0.018*
[1.911]
0.007**
[2.389]
0.008**
[2.560]
∆(government sizet-1) -0.136
[1.578]
0.293**
[2.402]
-0.265**
[2.514]
0.039
[0.273]
0.128*
[1.801]
0.354**
[2.337]
∆(government sizet-1)² - -0.087***
[4.587]
- -0.096***
[3.099]
- -0.064***
[-3.799]
∆(opennesst-1) -0.113*
[1.898]
-0.007
[0.137]
-0.209*
[1.911]
-0.225*
[1.886]
-0.084**
[2.515]
-0.050**
[2.455]
∆(populationt-1) 1.270
[1.181]
1.113
[1.116]
-1.419
[0.326]
-2.967
[0.930]
-0.180
[0.338]
-0.015
[0.019]
∆(taxationt-1) 0.120
[0.983]
0.039
[0.418]
0.051
[0.252]
0.098
[0.590]
-0.021
[0.338]
0.100
[1.034]
∆(real GDPt-1) 0.367**
[2.441]
0.201
[1.136]
0.388**
[2.080]
0.178
[1.159]
0.777***
[7.232]
0.739***
[4.992]
error correction termt-1 -0.284***
[3.198]
-0.217**
[2.129]
-0.531**
[2.280]
-0.451**
[2.210]
0.003
[0.063]
-0.071
[0.914]
dummy post WWII 0.008
[0.895]
0.015*
[1.710]
- - - -
Adj. R2 0.227 0.448 0.174 0.350 0.739 0.706
Jarque-Bera 0.240 0.505 0.732 0.876 0.223 0.154
∆(real GDPt) (1896-2008) ∆(real GDPt) (1896-1938) ∆(real GDPt) (1947-2008)
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Notes: (1) White-corrected t-statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. (2) For each regression, we control for the outliers. (3) Jarque-Bera reports the p-value of the Jarque-Bera 
test on the residuals of the regression. 
 
 
The estimations of the error correction models for the whole period and the sub-periods 
1896-1938 and 1947-2008 are provided in Table 2.9. The coefficients of the lagged error 
correction terms confirm our previous findings regarding evidence of co-integration on the 
whole sample and mixed evidence when splitting the period. Indeed, with both the linear and 
nonlinear equations, the coefficient of the error correction term is statistically significant and 
negative for the whole period as well as for 1896-1938. However, although the error 
correction term is negative for the nonlinear post-war regression, it does not reach any 
reasonable level of significance. The different magnitude of the coefficients of the error 
correction terms according to the different time periods also suggests that the speed of 
adjustment during the pre-war period was more than twice as high as in the whole of the 20th 
century. More generally, these coefficients refer to quite a high speed of adjustment in our 
growth model, one-fifth of the divergence from the equilibrium state being corrected each 
year for the whole period. 
Concerning the other variables, regardless of the time period and the model, an increase in 
population and taxation do not seem to have any short run effect on economic growth. 
However a variation in economic openness has a consistently negative, statistically significant 
effect on growth. Concerning our main variable of interest, we notice no linear effect of 
government size in the whole (column 1b, Table 2.9) period but contrasting effects of the 
variable before and after the Second World War15 (columns 3b and 5b). However in the whole 
period and both sub-periods, the estimation of the nonmonotonic model provides strong 
evidence of the inverted U effect of an increase in government size on economic growth 
(columns 4b and 6b). 
The error correction model supplies us with a first indication concerning the Granger-
causality between our variables. While openness and government size Granger-cause real 
GDP, the estimation of the error correction model does not provide evidence of Granger-
causality from population and taxation to GDP. To investigate all the possible causal effects 
between the variables of our model, we conduct, for the whole period, a Granger-causality test 
based on a VAR including all the variables of our model. The test results, reported in Table 
                                                 
 
15
 However we must be careful about these signs because they can vary when increasing the lag length. 
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2.10, show a unidirectional causality from (government size) to (real GDP), approximating 
GDP growth. This unique causality pattern contradicts the Wagner law. The results also 
suggest a linkage running from the (openness) to economic growth but not in the reverse 
direction. These causal relationships hold for the sub-periods and are also in line with the 
evidence provided by Ghali (1998) for France for 1970-199416. Our results are also in 
accordance with other studies in long periods, such as Yuk (2005), which provides empirical 
support for the same causality in the United Kingdom for the period 1830–199317. 
 
Table 2.10 
Multivariate Granger-causality test 
 
Notes: (1) Granger F-Tests are reported. (2) Null hypothesis: the variable in the first column do not Granger-
cause the variable in the first row. (3) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (4) “All” 
denotes the Wald statistic for the joint significance of all lagged endogenous variables (excluding lags of the 
dependent variable). 
 
 
 
2.5. DISCUSSION 
 
2.5.1 METHODOLOGICAL DIVERGENCES IN THE LITERATURE  
 
Rather than merely supplying yet more evidence of the nonlinearity hypothesis for an 
additional country or period, it is interesting to determine whether our result is consistent with 
the related empirical literature. The aim is actually to understand, in the light of our finding, 
                                                 
 
16
 Ghali (1998) runs Granger-causality tests based on a VAR including GDP, the share of investment in GDP, 
the share of total public expenditure in GDP and the share of imports and exports in GDP. He finds evidence of 
the “trade-led growth” and the “public expenditure-led growth” hypotheses for the French case. 
17
 Yuk (2005) estimates a VAR model including GDP, the share of investment in GDP, the share of total public 
expenditure in GDP and the share of exports in GDP. He finds strong evidence of causality from government 
size to output, but mixed evidence for the Wagner law according to the observation periods. The “export-led 
growth” hypothesis is also supported. 
∆(real GDP) ∆(government size) ∆(government size)² ∆(openness) ∆(population) ∆(taxation)
∆(real GDP) -  0.436  0.400  2.791  17.138***  8.310**
∆(government size)  11.002*** -  3.276  1.335  0.773  4.419
∆(government size)²  11.577***  4.100 -  1.102  0.779  3.892
∆(openness)  3.514  3.294  3.428 -  5.625*  0.878
∆(population)  0.171  2.454  2.545  8.271** -  4.792*
∆(taxation)  4.351  18.489***  18.673***  0.529  2.410 -
All  19.082**  37.889***  38.922***  13.574  29.848***  19.739**
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the diversity of the sometimes contradictory results of the studies on the relationship between 
government size and economic performance. We can first notice that our finding of a 30% 
output-maximizing ratio is oddly significantly higher than the usual 20% ratio found in the 
studies on the US. That leads us to wonder whether these differences are due to a 
methodological bias or at least methodological divergences among the studies or rather to 
French or European originality. 
The first possibility is that the optimal point of government size is underestimated in the 
studies on the US because of observations periods that are too short and do not contain many 
observations with a government size below the optimal one found. Indeed, by starting the 
study after the 1930s, i.e. after the occurrence of the optimal point, as is the case for Vedder 
and Gallaway (1998), who started their study in 1947, or only a few years before, in 1929, as 
is the case for Grossman (1987), Peden (1991) and Scully (1994), not enough observations 
before the optimal size are taken into account. Mueller (2003: 546) already underlined that 
“some caution must be exercised in accepting Peden’s [and others’] estimate of optimal 
government size, given the very few observations [they] had when the government was 
smaller than 17 % of national income”. By contrast, in our study, the government size is 
systematically under its optimal size until at least the end of the First World War. That gives 
serious grounds for thinking that the optimal size that we determined is reliable and does not 
suffer from this bias of small sample. 
However, a second possibility is that a diversity of optimal government sizes does exist 
according to the countries considered or more generally the institutional patterns. Indeed, 
while the studies on the US, whether biased or not, tend to reach a consensus on a low optimal 
size, the studies on other countries, with similar biases, tend to converge towards much higher 
sizes. Our finding is in fact consistent with the studies on different panels of countries (Tanzi 
and Schuknecht, 1996; Chao and Gruber, 1998; Afonso et al., 2003; Davies, 2009) and 
especially on the EU countries whose optimal size would be between 37% (Forte and 
Magazzino, 2011)18 and around 40% (Pevcin, 2004)19. Therefore, it does appear that a 
relatively high optimal government size would be a Europe-specific feature compared with 
the US and does not result only from different observation periods. 
                                                 
 
18
 Forte and Magazzino (2011) find a 37% average optimal state size for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK. 
19
 Pevcin (2004) finds a 36–43% optimal government size for eight EU countries: Italy, France, Finland, 
Sweden, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Belgium. 
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However, our result of a 30 % ratio also contrasts with the above 40% ratio of the other 
studies on France (Forte and Magazzino, 2011; Pevcin, 2004). Nevertheless, in this case too, 
this divergence undoubtedly stems from the shorter observation periods of these studies. 
Indeed, Forte and Magazzino (2011) start their analysis in 1970, that is to say around 20 years 
after the occurrence of the optimal size that we determined. Pevcin (2004) starts its analysis in 
1950, thus including very few observations with a government size below 30%. With our long 
time-series analysis, we can be reasonably confident about a 30% optimal size for the French 
government. It turns out that the shorter the observation period, the more the optimal point is 
sensible to the inclusion or exclusion of observations. This is, for instance, the case in the 
study of Mavrov (2007: 58), who estimates that the optimal size for the Bulgarian State is 
21% in the very short period from 1990 to 2004.20 
 
 
2.5.2 RESULTS’ CONVERGENCE IN THE LITERATURE  
 
In spite of the potential biases inherent in the various observation periods, the convergence 
of the empirical findings on different optimal government sizes according to the country 
studied tends to invalidate the thesis of a single inverted U-shaped relationship between 
government size and output for all countries. The stakes are now to establish the determinants 
of the optimal government size. The first intuition was that the variety of government effects 
and optimal sizes was probably due to “different political environments, different spending 
histories, and different patterns of change in non-observable variables, such as the pace and 
pattern of innovation” (Vedder and Gallaway, 1998; Mueller, 2003: 549). However, the 
literature also provides observable factors such as the level of economic development 
(Mueller, 2003: 549; Forte and Magazzino, 2011) and more particularly prerequisites in terms 
of literacy and education, political institutions (political instability, distortionary regulation) 
and cultural environments (Barro, 1990). In one of the latest advancements on the topic, Forte 
and Magazzino (2011) investigate two potential determinants that could be the national 
tradition of the welfare state and the flexibility of the labour market. However, the most 
important determinant of the shape of the inverted U curve seems to remain the national 
economic development. As proof, in a seminal study on 115 “market economies” in the 
                                                 
 
20
 Mavrov (2007: 59): “For example, 2 years smaller period increase optimal size to 22.5% and 3 years – to 25%. 
The same result is possible under increasing the period.” 
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period 1960–1980, Ram (1986: 191) finds an overall positive effect of government size on 
economic outcome, but a closer look reveals that this effect does not empirically hold for the 
8 most developed countries of his panel21. 
The fact remains, however, that a better understanding of the optimal government size and 
its determinants allows us to ensure (a little) consistency among the numerous and 
contradictory studies on the effect of public expenditure on economic activity. The existence 
of an inverted U curve that would be peculiar to each country enables us to understand why 
the empirical findings depend greatly on both the observation period and the countries 
studied. The period is decisive because, by focusing on a rather short one, the huge majority 
of the studies focus either on the rising or the declining portion of the curve, most often on the 
declining one since they study recent periods. Incidentally, they can account for a global 
negative effect with a linear model. However, the studies often omit to specify that the effect 
they find is valid only for a narrow specific size of government, contrary to Peden and 
Bradley (1989: 242), who specify that “the negative relationship between government scale 
and productivity that [they] find is relevant for current ratios of government spending (about 
35%) […and] not inconsistent with the argument that there may be an ‘optimal’ size of 
government”. The panel studied is at least as decisive because, in view of the literature, the 
effect of the government size seems to depend deeply on economic, cultural and political 
institutions. Under these conditions, it turns out to be very informative to perform long time-
series analyses for single countries. 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of this study was to investigate the relationship between government size 
and economic output both theoretically and empirically. Its theoretical originality was to 
decompose the nonlinear curve of the total effect of government activity into two curves 
representing the costs of the state failures and the benefits from correcting market failures. It 
enabled us to unify in a single theoretical framework two sets of theories that are generally in 
competition or that at best disregard each other. 
The main empirical contribution of this paper was to provide evidence of the existence of 
an inverted U-shaped relationship between government size and output using time-series data 
                                                 
 
21
 When focusing on the time-series analyses for France, Italy, Austria, Australia, Germany, Portugal, the UK 
and the USA, we realize that government size either does not play any role or has a negative influence. 
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on France in the 20th century. The main empirical findings are as follows. (1) We 
demonstrated the existence of a long-run co-integration relationship between real GDP, 
government size, total population, economy openness and taxation for the period 1896-2008 
with both a monotonic and a nonmonotonic model. However the co-integration relationship 
received mixed evidence for the sub-periods 1896-1938 and 1947-2008. (2) The linear co-
integration relationship gave an estimated long-term multiplier of public expenditure of 0.12, 
against the Keynesian prediction. (3) The nonmonotonic relationship provided even stronger 
evidence of co-integration for the whole period. (4) It supplied evidence of an inverted U-
shaped relationship with an optimal government size of 30% of the total GDP. (5) The 
nonlinear effect of government size could also be observed when estimating the short-term 
dynamics between the variables. 
We can draw some lessons from this result. First, the size that maximizes output has been 
continuously exceeded in France since the 1950s. Therefore, our empirical finding provides 
us with good reasons to believe that the government size in 2008 was higher by around 20% 
than the output-maximizing size. Like most other industrialized nations, France is currently 
on the downward-sloping portion of its inverted U-shaped curve. If France had kept a 
government size close to the ratio of 30%, it would have experienced on average for the 
period 2000–2008 an annual growth rate of 3.23% instead of the 1.93% actual rate, a 
significant loss of 1.9% per year. 
Another implication of theoretical framework as well as our findings is support for the 
thesis of the diversity of the optimal government sizes according to country and institutional 
pattern. Indeed, the French optimal size of 30% contrasts with the 20% figure found in the 
studies on the optimal size of the US government. However, it is rather in accordance with the 
literature on other countries and especially countries within Europe. Our theoretical 
framework allows us to explain the diversity of the national optimal government sizes and 
more generally of the different efficiencies of governments. These differences result from the 
difference between the benefits from the governments’ ability to correct market failures and 
the costs inherent in state failures. 
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3. THE DETERMINANTS OF THE STATE SIZE IN THE 
20TH CENTURY: EVIDENCE FROM THE OLDEST 
DEMOCRACIES1 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last century, the total government spending as a fraction of GDP, also called the 
government size, has experienced very similar episodes of increase in the industrialized 
countries. The average total government spending in these countries represented around 10% 
of GDP in the late 19th century and around 45% in 19962 (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000). 
However, this common feature conceals historical disparities among the countries. For 
instance, the government size of 7.3% in the United States in the 1870s was around half as 
high as in Italy and France (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000). Such disparities have persisted. 
Indeed, by the late 1990s, the government size was around 35% in the U.S. and above 50% in 
many countries of continental Europe (Persson and Tabellini, 2003). While the literature 
provides general explanations of the growth of government size, we do not know if the 
determinants of government size vary between countries and over time. 
In this paper, we ask whether the long-run determinants of government size differ 
according to the periods and the countries. As one the main causes of the growth of 
government size is attributed to the Baumol’s cost disease, we focus here on this explanation. 
Based on Facchini, Melki and Pickering (2012a)3, we argue theoretically that the Baumol’s 
theory implies that the size of government is increasing in the labor share and that this impact 
                                                 
 
1
 This essay is based on Facchini, Melki and Pickering (2012a, 2012b). 
2
 Maddison (1989) provides very close figures for a similar set of industrialized countries. He estimates that the 
average fraction of total government spending was 11.7% in 1913 and around 46% in 1986.  (Maddison, 1989, p. 
71). 
3
 The theoretical model is developed in Facchini, Melki and Pickering (2012) with a test on OECD data. 
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increases as political ideology moves left and as income rises. We provide a test of our 
theoretical predictions by controlling for most theories explaining the growth of government 
size. For that, we use original time-series data on three democratic countries all over the 20th 
century, i.e. the United-States, the United Kingdom and France. By proposing a dynamic 
model of the growth of government, we allow the determinants of government size to have 
evolved through time and according to a society’s ideology regarding the suitable level of 
government intervention in the economy. We find evidence that the determinants of 
government size mostly vary between countries and over time. Concerning our theoretical 
predictions related to the Baumol’s cost disease, we find a strong support especially for the 
France and the U.K. for the post-second-world-war period. However, our predictions do not 
receive support for the U.S. case. 
The growth of government size has traditionally received numerous theoretical 
explanations. The diversity of explanations is reflected in the empirical studies that do not 
provide aggregation and hierarchy of the different explanations. Indeed, one the one hand, the 
cross-section studies are unable in nature to tackle the issue of the diversity of the 
determinants of government sizes, emphasizing only the most general determinants. On the 
other hand, the time-series studies on the topic mostly focus on one country and on rather 
short observation periods. Moreover, the fact that the existing time-series studies differ in 
their methodologies often avoid a comparison between their findings. This leaves unanswered 
the question of the varying determinants of government size. 
The Wagner’s law, based on the citizens’ demand for government goods, probably focused 
the major part of the attention of the empirical literature. Peacock and Scott (2000) provide a 
critical review of this strand of the literature. In addition to emphasize the quantity and 
diversity of the works, Peacock and Scott conclude that this empirical literature fails to 
provide support for the Wagner’s law.4 Among the numerous studies on the Wagner law and 
more generally on the determinants of the growth size, only Ram (1997) provided a time-
series analysis of government size for different countries, for the period 1950-1980. However, 
the model he estimates includes only income as an independent variable, thus providing no 
information on the other possible determinants of government size. Even when focusing on a 
single determinant, he found a tremendous diversity in the evidence for various countries, 
                                                 
 
4
 Focusing on studies of the U.S. government size, Holsey and Borcherding (1997) already concluded that the 
Wagner’s law was not empirically founded. Concerning other long time-series analyses, Henrekson (1993) did 
not find evidence of the Wagner’s law in Sweden for the period 1861-1990. Studying the period 1821-1969, 
Aubin et al. (1988) showed that the Wagner’s law cannot be validated with French data. 
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suggesting the diversity of the national determinants. Like Ram (1987), we propose a time-
series analysis on different countries but we go further in the study of the diversity of the 
national determinants. Indeed, we augment his econometric model with a comprehensive set 
of independent variables and we significantly extend the observation period. 
On the supply side, Baumol’s (1967) cost disease explains the increasing share of the 
public sector expenditure by the increasing wage in the public sector. Indeed, the absence of 
technological progress in the public sector combined with the price-inelasticity of the demand 
for government goods entails a rise in the public wages. The Baumol’s hypothesis received 
quite solid empirical evidence in the literature5. The studies testing the Baumol’s hypothesis 
have in common to use the difference between the private goods and services price deflator 
and the government’s implicit price deflator as a proxy for the cost disease. However, 
Facchini, Melki and Pickering (2012a) show the limits of such a measure. As a consequence, 
we propose here another methodology, based on an extension of the model of Baumol (1967). 
Using cross-sectional data from the OECD, Facchini, Melki and Pickering (2012a) provide 
strong empirical support for the model presented here. However, their estimation is restricted 
to the post-1970s period due to the limited availability of labor-share data for the OECD 
panel. In the present paper, we test the model over much longer time horizons in a smaller 
sample of countries for which labor share data are available. Investigating the cost disease 
hypothesis at the scale of a century enables us to date when the phenomenon of cost disease 
started in the different countries of our sample. 
In this paper, we also revisit other traditional explanations of the growth of government 
size, which received mixed evidence in the empirical literature. Based on an interest groups 
model, a seminal explanation is provided by Meltzer and Richard (1981) who limit the 
government to a redistributive role according to the voters’ distinct positions in terms of 
incomes6. Meltzer and Richards (1983) document a positive impact of incomes inequality on 
government size with American data but which has not been solid when confronted with 
                                                 
 
5
 Augmenting the empirical analysis of Ram (1987) with data for relative prices, Gemmell (1990) provided 
evidence for the cost disease and against the Wagner’s law. Holsey and Borcherding (1997) review the time-
series studies on the U.S. and conclude that there exists a strong support for increased input prices in the face of 
price inelastic demand as a determinant of the government size. This conclusion was confirmed, often at the 
expense by the Wagner’s law, by most recent studies (Ferris and West, 1996; Borcherding et al., 2004; Neck and 
Gertzner, 2007). 
6
 Holsey and Borcherding (1997) qualify the explanations pertaining to the demand and supply of public services 
as the apolitical explanations. They can be distinguished from the political ones that question the view that 
government is the benevolent servant of the people. A distinctive feature of the political explanations is that they 
are based on the coalition or the interest groups models rather than the median voter model of the apolitical 
explanations (Holsey and Borcherding, 1997, p. 575). 
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additional empirical investigation (Pickering and Rockey, 2011). The Meltzer and Richard’s 
(1981) model might suffer from an omitted variable bias. That tends to be supported by Boix 
(2001) arguing that, given higher abstention rates among the lowest income groups, the effect 
of income inequality on government size depends on the abstention rate. Similarly, the 
apolitical explanation of Rodrik (1998) by the economy openness does not seem to hold when 
taking into account the nature of the electoral system, as shown by Milesi-Ferretti at al. 
(2002). 
Most of the theoretical explanations of the government size are static, thus suggesting that 
the empirical determinants of the government size have not evolved through time. However, 
among the latest developments on the Wagner’s law, Florio and Colautti (2005) provide a 
dynamic model showing that increasing incomes can drive the increase in the growth rate of 
public spending to a certain point where the burden of taxation reverses the process. They 
provide empirical evidence of this dynamic process over the last century for the U.S., the 
U.K., France, Germany and Italy. However, we argue that the demand-side drivers of the 
growth of government requires a democratic process of preference revelation. Therefore, we 
focus our investigation only on democratic countries over the 20th century. 
Still in a dynamic context, Pickering et al (2011) show that income elasticity for demand 
for public spending increases with the leftwing ideology, the latter being defined as the 
median voter’s preference for more government goods. Among the important literature 
studying the effect of the government’s ideology on government size, the time-series analyses 
comparable to ours provide mixed evidence of a positive impact of leftwing governments. For 
the United-States, Kau and Rubin (2002) find that the Pool-Rosenthal measure of Senate 
ideology has a small impact on government revenues. Our time-series provide further 
investigations of the role of government’s ideology on the rise of government size. For that, 
we use a set of different measures of ideology from basic dummy variables to more 
sophisticated index taking into account the evolution of the parties’ ideology. 
The main empirical findings of this paper are as follows. We find that the supply-side 
explanations of government size received the most solid evidence, especially for the UK and 
for France for the post-war period. We also provide some evidence showing that the positive 
effects of costs on the growth of government increase with a left-wing ideology for the whole 
period and with the economic development after the Second World War. A leftwing ideology 
has a positive influence on the government size only in France for the post-second-war period. 
However, most demand-side explanations received no or weak empirical support. Indeed, the 
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Wagner’s law is never supported by our data. We find evidence of a significant effect of the 
incomes inequality only for the U.K. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The econometric 
methodology is discussed in section 3. Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 provides the 
results and some robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. 
 
3.2 THE MODEL: REVISITING THE BAUMOL’S COST DISEASE 
 
Baumol’s (1967) cost disease is one of the primary explanations given for the relative 
growth of the public sector observed in advanced economies since the end of the Second 
World War7. The standard empirical measure of cost disease is the rise in the government 
consumption deflator relative to the private goods and services price deflator. Theoretically 
this is well grounded in the Baumol theory. However, in practice this measure is 
problematical for a number of related reasons. Firstly (all) aggregate price indices suffer from 
measurement error. In the instance of the private goods and services deflator, Lichtenberg and 
Griliches (1989) argue that quality change in particular renders intertemporal comparisons of 
directly observed prices of goods to be of "limited value". The government output deflator is 
beset by the same problem, and this is exacerbated by the fact that the output of public 
services is often unpriced (Simpson, 2009). 
Whilst measurement error alone would be sufficient reason for wanting an alternative 
means of testing the Baumol’s hypothesis, there is an even more serious problem. In practice 
the means by which national statistical offices construct the government consumption implicit 
price index is to use current prices public sector expenditure data divided by their estimate of 
real (chained volume) output. Measured this way, the implied price index therefore increases 
and falls with current expenditure. Because the dependent variable is measured as current 
public sector expenditure divided by current prices GDP, implied price deflator is therefore 
intimately related (and endogenous) to the dependent variable. When both variables are 
derived fundamentally from government expenditure data, it is not surprising that a good it is 
found. 
                                                 
 
7
 Borcherding (1985) estimates that 31% of the observed growth of total government size in the U.S. between 
1902 and 1978 is due to the Baumol effect. Borcherding et al (2004) and similar evidence in a panel of OECD 
countries. 
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This paper proposes an alternative. The Baumol model implies that the relative size of 
government is increasing in the labor’s share. In the original model the labor’s share 
represents total costs. Output in the public sector is labor-intensive to the point that labor is 
output in some instances, so if the labor’s share increases then so does government when 
demand is inelastic. The larger government is, as in regimes that may be classified as 
leftwing, the greater this effect. Cost-disease follows from Baumol’s assumption of constant 
relative shares of output. Given economic growth (driven by the private sector) resources are 
inevitably drawn into the public sector. The impact of the labor share on government size is 
therefore predicted to increase as the economy grows and a larger portion of the workforce is 
subsumed into the public sector. 
In the model proposed here, there are two sectors in the economy. Sector one is the public 
sector, in which labor productivity is constant. Sector two is the private sector, in which labor 
productivity grows exogenously. Formally: 
 
BC D 12C                                                           (1) 
 
BC D 32C45C                                                         (2) 
 
where BC and BC are respectively output in the public and private sector, 2C and 2C are 
employment levels in the two sectors, a and b are exogenous parameters, r is exogenous 
private sector growth and t is a time index. Costs therefore depend only on wages, which 
following Baumol grow in accord with productivity in the "progressive sector", hence 
 
6C D 645C (3) 
 
where W is a constant. 
Baumol examines the evolution of an economy in which the relative outputs of the two 
sectors are maintained, "perhaps with the aid of government subsidy, or if demand for the 
product in question were sufficiently price inelastic or income elastic." Given (1) and (2) this 
means that 
 
3
1
B
B D
2C
2C45C D 7 
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where K is constant and represents society’s choice concerning the appropriate level of 
public output relative to private output. Given these elements, 
 
2C D 89:
;<
=9:;<                                                         (4) 
 
2C D 8=9:;<                                                (5) 
 
where 2 D 2  2. As Baumol discusses, in this scenario the zero-growth sector absorbs the 
labor force over time. Equations (1-5) are simply a restatement of the same in Baumol (1967). 
The size of the government here is defined by total expenditure on production from that 
sector relative to total output: 
 
>C D %<8?<&<                                                      (6) 
 
where following Baumol @C A BC  BC is total GDP and  and  are weights. On the 
other hand, the labor share is defined as 
 
BC D %<8&<                                                     (7) 
 
Substitution of (4) and (7) into (6) gives government size as a function of the labor share 
 
>C D
BC745C
C  745C 
 
with the following concrete hypotheses: 
1. The size of government is increasing in the labor share. 
2. The sensitivity of government size to the labor share is increasing with leftist ideology 
(as proxied in the model by K). 
3. The sensitivity of government size to the labor share is increasing with economic 
development (as proxied in the model by time). 
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However, whilst being necessary conditions of the theory, hypotheses 1 and 2 do not 
require the key Baumol ingredient of constant relative outputs. Baumol himself contrasts 
economy performance in an alternative scenario with constant unit elasticity of demand 
between the two sectors. In this case the relative expenditure on the two outputs is constant, 
hence as Baumol writes, 
 
6C2C
6C2C D
2C
2C D D 
 
where A is a constant. Here cost-disease is benign; the stagnant sector is not increasing in 
relative size, and overall economic growth does not deteriorate over time. Simple substitution 
yields 2C D E8=E, hence in this instance 
 
>C D
DBC
C  D 
 
The size of the government is again positively related with the labor share (hypothesis 1), 
and increasingly so with more leftist ideology (hypothesis 2: this time represented by higher 
values of A). Note however that this time the relationship between government size and the 
labor share is independent of the level of economic development. 
Econometric results that reveal a significant effect of s on g therefore would not by 
themselves indicate evidence of cost disease. However, as stated, such a relationship is a 
necessary condition of supply-side explanations of government expenditure. At a very basic 
textbook level, expenditure increases when costs rise and demand is inelastic. Costs here are 
represented by the labor share, and inelastic demand is the key feature of Baumol’s theory. 
In contrast Wagner’s (1893) law, at least as conventionally interpreted, stresses increasing 
demand for government services with rising income per capita. Under certain not implausible 
conditions demand-side explanations could even imply a negative relationship between the 
size of government and the labor share: If the public sector were especially labor-intensive 
(i.e. relative to the private sector) then an increase in the labor-share would represent an 
increase in the price of public-sector goods and relative expenditure could possibly diminish, 
depending of course on the price elasticity of demand. 
It follows straightforwardly that when the public sector is relatively large, the effect of a 
change in the labor share on government size is increased. Hypothesis 2 also holds with or 
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without cost disease, but again is a distinctive feature of supply-side explanations of 
government size. However, if it is the case that the public sector is increasingly absorbing the 
workforce - a particular feature of Baumol’s theory, then as the economy develops, and thus 
diverts more of its resources into the public sector, the impact of costs on government size 
increase. Hypothesis 3 is therefore the sufficient condition of the cost disease explanation of 
government growth. 
 
3.3 ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
  
3.3.1 SPECIFICATION 
 
Investigating the determinants of government size over a long period inevitably involves 
tackling some specification issues. Most often, the time series analyses potentially suffer from 
omitted variable bias when focusing on one or a few possible determinants of government 
size. However, a fairly well developed empirical literature emphasizes a small set of variables 
typically useful to explain government size. Extending the model proposed by Persson and 
Tabelini (2003), Pickering and Rockey (2011) draw a comprehensive specification including 
income per capita to proxy the Wagner’s law, the share of external trade in GDP following 
Rodrik (1998), the government’s political ideology, demographic variables such as the 
dependency ratio, the share of the working population in total population and cyclical control 
variables such as the output gap8. Our specification includes all these control variables as well 
as additional standard controls such as income inequality relying on Meltzer and Richard 
(1983) and dummies for the war periods thus controlling indirectly for a Peacock-Wiseman 
effect. Finally, the government size has followed an upward trend during the 20th century in 
all countries. To avoid any omitted variable bias due a trend in explanatory variables not 
taken into account in our specification, we include a trend in our specification. Including all 
these controls, we conduct three sets of regressions testing the hypotheses stemming from our 
theoretical predictions. Equation (1’) includes the labor’s share in addition to the controls 
listed above and provides our basline specification: 
 
>C D 1F  1BC  17C  1FC  1G  'C                                   (1’) 
                                                 
 
8
 The output gap is derived from the GDP growth rate using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
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with t = year t; >C = government size at t; BC = the labor’s share at t ; 7C = the government’s 
ideology at t; FC is a vector of control variables including income at t; incomes inequality at t; 
proportion of the population over the age of 65 at t; proportion of the population between 15 
and 64 years of age at t; economy openness at t; output gap at t; time dummy for war periods; 
1F = constant term; 'C = error terms at t. 
It should be noted that in the theoretical model, ideology, representing the society’s choice 
concerning the appropriate level of government intervention, is considered as a constant over 
time for reasons of simplicity. Contrary to the theory, the econometric model reasonably 
allows the society’ ideology to have varied over time. Therefore, equation (1’) is the 
opportunity to test, what we call hypothesis 0 predicting a positive effect of a leftwing 
ideology on government size. Indeed, an increasing leftwing ideology can be regarded in the 
model as a society’s choice for a bigger level of government intervention. Equation (1’) also 
tests the validity of hypothesis 1 of the theory predicting a positive effect of the labor’s share 
on the government size.  
Hypothesis 2 of the model is tested in equation (2’). Hypothesis 2 predicts that the 
sensitivity of government size to the labor’s share is increasing with leftist ideology. As a 
consequence, we include in the baseline specification the interaction variable between 
(leftwing) ideology and labor’s share. Naturally, this interaction is expected to have a positive 
impact on government size. Equation (2’) is given by:  
 
>C D 3F  3BC  37C  3BC  7C  3FC  3#G  'C                        (2’) 
 
Finally, hypothesis 3 of the theory expects the sensitivity of government size to labor’s 
share to increase with economic development. This last proposition provides a sufficient 
condition of the Baumol’s law since the impact of costs on government size increases with the 
economic development. This proposition is tested by estimating a third specification given by 
equation (3’), including in the baseline specification the interaction term between labor’s 
share and income, BC: 
 
>C D EF  EBC  E7C  EBC  EBC  BC  E#FC  E,G  'C                     (3’) 
 
3.3.2 METHODOLOGY 
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We use a simple time series methodology to assess the determinants of government size in 
France, United Kingdom and United States. Following the reasoning mentioned in the 
specification section, we conduct for each country three sets of estimations with an OLS 
method. Our main theoretical predictions involving ideology and labor share does not seem to 
suffer from reverse causality bias. First, the society’s ideology is not suspected to be 
determined by the size of government. Furthermore, this concern is mitigated by the inclusion 
of the lagged dependent variable. Indeed, the specification provides the contemporaneous 
relationship between the variables while ideology is traditionally supposed to be effected by 
long-term factors9. Second, while government size is unlikely to affect labor share, it remains 
possible that a third dynamic drives both labor share and government size. Indeed, the labor 
share has its own driving variables, which problematically also may independently drive 
government size. One possibility is due to the economic cycle: different macroeconomic 
theories posit different predictions for the cyclical behavior of the labor share. In simple real 
business cycle models it is acyclical. In “old Keynesian models” - emphasizing nominal wage 
rigidity, the labor share can be anti-cyclical depending on the elasticity of demand for labor. 
In contrast the new Keynesian literature, as exemplified by Gali and Gertler (1999), 
emphasizes price-stickiness, which implies a pro-cyclical labor share. To address this problem 
the regression analysis includes controls for the output gap. The labor share may also be a 
reflection of changing preferences, tastes or ideology towards inequality in society. A high 
labour share may indicate an egalitarian ideology as society sets institutions and policies in 
order to increase relative rewards to workers rather than owners of capital. However, the 
regression analysis includes ideology and income inequality. 
Regarding the estimation method, we follow the basic methodology proposed by Ram 
(1987). This consists in estimating the variables in level since the correlation between the first 
differences could partly reflect the short-term pro- or counter-cyclical public policy measures. 
However differently from Ram, we specify a linear relationship and not in log-levels that 
would be somewhat arbitrary. To avoid the problem of spurious regressions due to non-
stationarity of the variables, as illustrated by Granger and Newbold (1977), we also allow the 
error term to be autoregressive. This comes to estimating the relationship through a feasible 
least-squares procedure subject to the postulate of a first-order autoregressive process for the 
stochastic term. This hypothesis is verified because the estimates indicate that the 
autoregressive parameter is sizeable and statistically significant in most cases. Therefore, by 
                                                 
 
9
 See Pickering and Rockey (2011) for a discussion of the factors affecting ideology. 
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including an autoregressive term in the baseline specification, equation (1’) yields the 
following equation:  
 
>C D 1F  1BC  17C  1FC  1G  1#>C  'C                           (4’) 
 
Therefore, considering the period t-1, equation (4’) can be rewritten as follows: 
 
>C D 1F  1BC  17C  1FC  1G  C  1#>C  'C         (5’) 
 
By substracting (4’) from (5’), we have: 
 
A>C D 1  1ABC  1A7C  1AFC  1#A>C  'HC                   (6’) 
 
With AI : the first difference operator; 1: a constant term and 'C D 'C  'C. 
Our baseline specification amounts to equation (6’) considering the first differences of the 
variables. As a consequence, whether the variables of our model are stationary or integrated 
of the first order, our baseline specification is not subject to spurious regressions. 
Furthermore, given the presence of the lagged dependent variable in the specification, the 
estimates provide the current period (or short-run) impact of government size and ideology. 
The long run effect of these variables can be calculated by multiplying the point estimate by 
C/C  1#, where 1# is the point estimate of the lagged dependent variable. 
Finally, the estimation method has to take into account the structural breaks in our series. 
In particular, the determinants of the growth of government size may have strongly evolved 
over the 20th century, especially before and after the Second World War. Indeed, the war 
corresponds to a change in both the level and the structure of public expenditures. We notice 
that for the three countries, the Second World War has had a long-lasting effect, called 
Peacock and Wiseman effect. After 1945, government spending kept on increasing without 
returning to pre-war levels. This period also corresponds to the building of the Welfare State 
that sharply influenced both the level and the composition of public expenditure with an 
increasing part of social spending and thus of public services. This may have reinforced the 
phenomenon of cost disease, thus provoking a break in the relationship between labor’s share 
and government size. To address this potential break in the evolution of government size, we 
re-estimate the models for subsamples. For this purpose, we split our whole period covering 
approximately the 20th century into two sub-periods, one before 1938 and the other after 1946. 
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Therefore we are led to estimate for each country the three specifications for the whole period 
such as the two sub-periods. 
 
3.4 DATA 
 
The data are annual and the sources are described in appendix. Table 3.14 in appendix 
provides the variables’difinitions common the the three countries. Tables 3.15, 3.16 and 3.17 
in Appendix present the sources and the statistics of the data for each country. Concerning the 
independent variables, we consider the total public expenditure including all levels of the 
public sector and all kinds of public expenditures, as a percentage of total output. For the 
United-States, we build this variable for the period 1869-2005 based on two sources, the 
Statistical Abstract of the United States and the Economic Report of the President10. For the 
numerator, we use the sum of the expenditures of the federal, state and local government 
expressed in thousand current dollars. For the denominator, we employ the Gross National 
Product in thousand current dollars. For the United-Kingdom, based on Mitchell (2007a), the 
variable of government size is available from 1869 to 2003 and corresponds to the total 
government spending as a ratio of the Gross Domestic Product. Like Florio and Colautti 
(2005) for France, we used the historical data of André and Delorme (1983), covering the 
period 1871-1974, but excluding the war periods 1914-1919 and 1939-194611. They provide 
data on the ratio of total public expenditure (central state, social protection and local public 
authorities) to the output. We connect this series with the official data of the National Institute 
of Statistics and Economic Studies, which provides data on total government size from 1959. 
Figure 3.1 depicst the data for the three countries. We notice a common upward trand in 
government size over the 20th century for the three countries. This common trend can be 
decomposed into a stable trend until the First World War and a stready increase afterwards. 
However, like much other OECD countries, government size stabilized from the 1990s. In 
spite of this common evolution, we can notice some discrepencies between the three 
countries. The american level of government size has bee constantly below the British level 
which has been itself constantly below the French level all over the observation period. This 
can be reflected in the means of the variables: 20% for the U.S., 26% for the U.K. and 31% 
                                                 
 
10
 We followed the methodology proposed by Grossman (1987). 
11
 The demand size explanation requires a democratic process. A good reason to exclude the war periods in the 
French case is that France was not democratic during the World War 2. 
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for France given that the French means is artificially lows because data is not available for the 
war years. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.1  
Government size in the U.S., U.K. and France – 1869-2008 
 
 
To build the variable of the labor’s share in the national income for the priod 1900-2011 
for the U.S., we use the data proposed by Klein and Kosobud (1961) for the period 1900-1953 
and we followed Gollin (2002) who uses the data provided by the U.S. Department of Labor: 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, available for the period 1947-2011. For the UK, we also follow 
Gollin (2002) for the period 1869-1980, which employs the data of Mitchell (1988, p.828) of 
income from employment divided by the national income. We connected this series with the 
series of labour income share ratio proposed by the OECD, available from 1981 to 2011. For 
France, we used the data of the labor’s share in the total value-added availalble on 
Piketty’swebsite12 from 1896 to 2008. Figure 3.2 depicst the data for the three countries. We 
can notice that labor is rather stable for the three countries. This evolution is consistent with 
the result of the litereture according to which this variable is found to be stationary (Gollin, 
2002). The levels of labor share for the three countires can be hardly compared; the data 
coming from different sources with sometimes different definitions (see Klein and Kosobud 
(1961) for a discussion of the varying definitions). 
                                                 
 
12
 http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fichiers/public/Grasset2001/Livre/TabChap1.xls 
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Fig. 3.2  
Labor share in the U.S., U.K. and France – 1869-2008 
 
 
The principal ideology index used in this paper is a dummy variable, left dummy,  coded 1 
when the majority of the Lower Chamber of the partliament is composed of left-wing deputies 
and 0 otherwise. In the absence of an index of government’s political ideology over such long 
periods as ours, taking such a basic measure presents several advantages. Indeed, it relies on 
similar common features of the political institutions of the three countries counsidered. First, 
the three countires have in common to have a lower chamber that holds the legislative power 
and that is elected by the universale (male) suffrage from the beginning of our observation 
period. Second, because these countries have a traditional bipartite political system from at 
least the end of the 19th century, the relative political color of the governing party can esaily 
be identified at any period of time. Third, a dichotomic ideology index enables us to avoid the 
tricky issue of the intensity of the government’s ideology, which can be more or less right(-
left)-wing. Nonetheless, it is important to verify that results obtained with alternative 
measures, and especially more accurate indexes, are not meningfully different. We also 
choose the dummy variable as our main ideology index since it enables comparisons between 
the coubtries. Indeed, a dummy variable provides the same raw information for the three 
countries while an index measuring for instance the seats percentage of the parties can be 
influenced by the political (proportional/majoritarian) system inherent in each country. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
18
69
18
75
18
81
18
87
18
93
18
99
19
05
19
11
19
17
19
23
19
29
19
35
19
41
19
47
19
53
19
59
19
65
19
71
19
77
19
83
19
89
19
95
20
01
20
07
US
UK
Fr.
94 
 
However, one way to address the issue of the intensity of the government’s ideology is to 
consider the percentage of rightwing deputies in the Chamber. This index allows us to take 
into account the demand-driven ideological change in the sense that voters express their 
preferences for more or less left (/right). This index also allows to take partially into account 
the supply-driven change in the sense that a large majority in the parliament can pass a bill 
more eseally, especially because some bills require more than the absolute majority to be 
passed. For this purpose, we build a continuous index, left ideology, indicating the percentage 
of left-wing seats in the Chamber. It is distributed between 0 and 1; 0 reflecting the absence of 
left-wing members in the Chamber, and 1, a Chamber totally filled with left-wing deputies. In 
this manner, we can build an alternative measure of ideology for the whole period for each 
country. As expected, the ideology variables, left-dummy and left ideology, are positively 
correlated for the three countries (see Tables 3.18, 3.19 and 3.20 in Appendix). 
However this index does not take into account the fact the right(-left)wing ideology 
evolves through time, an important feature of the supply-driven ideological change. To 
address this issue, we use an index coming from the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) data 
of Budge et al. (2001), only available from around 1945. This index provides the median 
voter ideological position in each country by weighting party ideologies according to their 
votes received. The MRG data are a time-varying, cross-country measure of party positions, 
which allows comparisons between the results obtained for each country. This variable,left 
mainfesto, is measured from -100 to +100 so that -100 is extreme right and 100 is extreme 
left. This index can be used as a robustness check for the post-Second World War sub-period. 
This ideology index is significantly different from the previous indeology 
measures.Indeed,they are either not correlated nor the French case or negatively correlacted 
for the U.K. and the U.S. cases. 
For the three countries, the variable income is given by the real GDP per capita. For that, 
we use the data of the GDP levels in million 1990 internatioal Geary-Khamis dollars and data 
of the total population size, coming both from Maddison’s webiste, available from 1869 to 
2008. The variable output gap comes from the same source and measures the deviation of 
aggregate output from its trend value in percentage. For the three countries, the main measure 
of incomes inequality, income, represents the share of personnal income of the top 0.05% 
percentile group in the country. The data is provided by Atkinson (2005). As alternative 
measures of inequality, we also resort to the share of personnal income of the top 0.1% and 
the top 0.01% percentile groups in each country. The data are available for the periods 1913-
2000 for the U.S., 1908-2000 for the UK and 1915-1998 for France. 
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The age dependancy ratio, prop65, is given by the proportion of the population over the 
age of 65 and the share of the active population, prop1564, is given by the proportion of the 
population between 15 and 64 years of age. The variable openess  measures the ratio of 
external tade (inports+exports) as a percentage of output. For the U.S., the last three variables 
are provided by the United State Census Bureau (2012)13 from 1900 to 2002. For the UK, the 
last three variables comes from Mitchell (2007a). As the data related to openness ends in 1993 
for the U.K., we complete it for the last years with the data of Penn World Table14. For 
France, the data for the demographic variables come from Mitchell (2007a) and the data for 
openness comes from Asselain and Blancheton (2005). 
 
3.5 RESULTS 
 
3.5.1 FRANCE 
 
Tables 3.1 contains the estimation results for France for the whole periods 1921-1998 
while Table and 3.2 contains the results for France for the sub-periods 1921-1938 and 1946-
1998. Column 1 of Table 3.1 presents the results of the baseline specification including the 
lagged dependent variable, labor share, left dummy and income along with a set of control 
variables not reported here for the sake of clarity. We can notice that the model does well in 
explaining government size with an adjusted R² of 0.98. In this specification, real income per 
capita does not reach significance, providing no support for the Wagner’s law explanation of 
government size. Columns 1a and 1b of Table 3.2 presents the estimate results for the same 
specification for sub-periods. The absence of significance of income is supported in these 
estimates. Importantly, concerning hypothesis 0, the ideology index, left dummy, is not 
statistically significant for the total period and for the pre-war period but is positive and 
significant at the 5% level fro the post-war period. Given the presence of the lagged 
dependent variable, the parameter estimates reflect the current-period (or short-run) impact of 
the explanatory variables. The long-run can be recalculated and is given by 0,844/(1-0,585) = 
2,033. This effect is sizeable since and can be interpreted as follows. The long run impact of a 
switch from a totally rightwing parliament to a totally leftwing one is an increase in the size of 
                                                 
 
13
 The electronic format of the database is provided by the United State Census Bureau (2012). For a hardcopy, 
see also Mitchell (2007b). 
14
 https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/ 
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government of 20%. Thus hypothesis 0 receives a strong support only for the second 
subperiod for France. 
 
 
Table 3.1  
The determinants of government size in France – total sample period 
Notes: (1) each regression includes the following variables that are note reported in the table: a constant, 
inequality, prop1564, prop65, openness, output gap, and time dummy variables for the outliers. (2) the war years 
are excluded from the sample. (3) White-corrected standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (4) A Jarque-Bera test was performed on the residuals of each 
regression to check the normality of the residuals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
lagged government size 0.641***
(0.057)
0.593***
(0.069)
0.645***
(0.056)
labor share 0.145*
(0.083)
0.230**
(0.100)
0.020
(0.117)
left dummy 0.132
(0.288)
-9.170*
(0.470)
0.135
(0.285)
labor share*left dummy - 0.122*
(0.071)
-
income 0.3405
(0.537)
0.136
(0.555)
-0.572
(1.035)
labor share*income - - 0.012
(0.011)
Observations 69 69 69
Adjusted R² 0.987 0.987 0.986
government size (1921-1998)
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Table 3.2  
The determinants of government size in France – subperiods 
 
Notes: (1) each regression includes the following variables that are note reported in the table: a constant, income, 
inequality, prop1564, prop65, openness, output gap, and time dummy variables for the outliers. (2) White-
corrected standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) A 
Jarque-Bera test was performed on the residuals of each regression to check the normality of the residuals. 
 
 
Concerning hypothesis 1, the labor share is estimated to be positive and significant at 10% 
for the whole period. This low level of significance can be explained by the absence of effect 
of labor share in the first subperiod and a effect significant at the 5% for the second 
subperiod, as shown by Table 3.2. According to the estimated coefficient of column 1b, Table 
3.2, a sustained one percent increase in the labor share is estimated to result in an increase in 
the size of government by 0.43% of GDP. Like hypothesis 0, hypothesis 1 is supported only 
for the post-war period for France. 
In columns 2 and 3, Table 3.1, interaction terms are included, with the objective of testing 
hypotheses 2 and 3. The first interaction term is the product of the labor-share and left dummy 
over the full sample. This variable has an expected positive coefficient and is significant at the 
10% level (column 2). However, when reestimating this specification for subperiods in 
columns 2a and 2b of Table 3.2, this variable is no more significant. Therefore, hypothesis 2 
is never supported in the French case. The second interaction term is the product of the labor-
(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b)
lagged government size 0.035
(0.257)
0.047
(0.216)
-0.283
(0.199)
0.585***
(0.125)
0.586***
(0.126)
0.573***
(0.112)
labor share -0.833
(0.521)
-1.609**
(0.646)
-6.268***
(1.069)
0.180**
(0.087)
0.164
(0.114)
-0.142
(0.123)
left dummy -0.699
(0.954)
87.71
(54.65)
-1.251*
(0.595)
0.844**
(0.388)
2.872
(8.814)
0.992**
(0.385)
labor share*left dummy - -1.286
(0.795)
- - -0.026
(0.111)
-
income -12.94
(12.72)
-28.44*
(12.12)
-100.9***
(15.23)
0.050
(0.838)
-0.012
(0.918)
-2.848*
(1.445)
labor share*income - - 1.397***
(0.255)
- - 0.034**
(0.014)
Observations 18 18 18 51 51 51
Adjusted R² 0.889 0.918 0.963 0.978 0.978 0.980
government size (1921-1938) government size (1948-1998)
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share and income. Column 3, Table 3.1, shows that this variable is positive as expected but 
not significant. However, when the estimates results for subperiods show that this variable 
positively and significantly affects government size (columns 3a and 3b, Table 3.2). The 
discrepancy between the significance for the whole period and subperiods can be explained by 
the fact that estimates for the whole period include the war years that can bias the estimates. 
Thus we can consider that hypothesis 3 is verified in France for the whole period. Being a 
sufficient condition of the Baumol’s cost disease, the validity of hypothesis 3 supports that 
increase in costs is a driver of the growth of government in the 20th century. 
 
3.5.2 UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 presents the estimate results in the United Kingdom for the whole 
period (1908-1999) and both subperiods (1908-1938 and 1946-1999), respectively. Colum 1 
Table 3.3 estimating the baseline specification shows an statistically insignificant effect of 
income. This is confirmed for the first subperiod (column 1, Table 3.4) while estimates for the 
second subperiod shows a significant and negative effect of income on government size. In 
both case, the Wagner’s law predicting a positive effect of income is not supported for the 
U.K. case. More importantly, the ideology index is not significant for the total period and the 
post-war period but is positively and statistically significant at 7% for the pre-war period. This 
provides some supports for hypothesis 0 before the Second World War for the U.K.. 
Regarding hypothesis 1, the estimate results consistently shows that the labor share positively 
and significantly affects government size, for the whole period as well as the sub-periods. 
However, the magnitude of the long-run effect of labor share differs between the subperiods. 
Indeed, according to the estimated coefficients of columns 1a and 1.b, Table 3.4, a sustained 
one percent increase in the labor share results in an increase in the size of government by 
5.33% before the war and 1,95% afterwards. 
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Table 3.3  
The determinants of government size in the U.K. – total sample period 
Notes: (1) each regression includes the following variables that are note reported in the table: a constant,  
prop1564, prop65, openness, output gap, and time dummy variables for the two world wars and the outliers. (2) 
White-corrected standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) 
A Jarque-Bera test was performed on the residuals of each regression to check the normality of the residuals. 
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Table 3.4  
The determinants of government size in the U.K. – subperiods 
 
Notes: (1) each regression includes the following variables that are note reported in the table: a constant, 
prop1564, prop65, openness, output gap, and time dummy variables for the outliers. (2) White-corrected 
standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) A Jarque-Bera 
test was performed on the residuals of each regression to check the normality of the residuals. 
 
 
We now estimate the subsequent hypotheses. The estimation results support hypothesis 2 
concerning the conditional effect of labor cost to the government’s ideology only for the pre-
war period. Indeed, the interaction variable between labor share and left dummy has a positive 
and significant only for the period 1908-1938. This could suggest that the cost disease 
concerns especially the pre-war period. However, hypothesis 3, the sufficient condition of a 
cost disease is only supported for the post-war period. In column 3b, Table 3.4, the interaction 
variable between labor share and income is positive and statistically significant. Therefore, 
the sufficient condition of the cost disease is supported for the post-war period. The absence 
of evidence for hypotheses 0 and 2 in spite evidence of cost disease for the post-war period 
can be explained by the fact the left-right ideological divide in the U.K. after the war is not 
only structured around the preference for the appropriate level of government intervention in 
(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b)
lagged government size 0.411**
(0.150)
0.376***
(0.126)
0.406**
(0.150)
0.618***
(0.063)
0.638***
(0.061)
0.687***
(0.044)
labor share 3.140**
(1.224)
4.259***
(1.179)
1.793
(8.849)
0.747***
(0.164)
0.716***
(0.207)
-0.696
(0.641)
left dummy 5.863*
(3.165)
-200.2**
(76.83)
6.105
(4.020)
-0.237
(0.554)
8.875
(17.13)
-0.643
(0.431)
labor share*left dummy - 3.247**
(1.209)
- - -0.135
(0.247)
-
income 15.19
(11.23)
12.36
(9.001)
-1.678
(110.1)
-3.998***
(0.928)
-3.857***
(0.905)
-12.02***
(3.801)
labor share*income - - 0.272
(1.739)
- - 0.118**
(0.049)
inequality 9.266***
(2.601)
6.426**
(2.358)
9.049***
(3.059)
3.369***
(0.769)
3.402***
(0.754)
3.501***
(0.774)
Observations 31 31 31 54 54 54
Adjusted R² 0.951 0.962 0.948 0.937 0.950 0.966
government size (1908-1938) government size (1946-1999)
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the economy. Some other significant dimensions may have influenced the post-war right-left 
divide thus making ideology innapropiate to proxi the society’s choice concerning the 
appropriate level of government intervention. In any event, the evidence that Baumol’s cost 
disease is only supported for the most recent sub-period is in line with our assumption that the 
impact of costs on government size increases as the economy develops. 
Concerning the control variables, incomes inequality is an important driver of government 
size in the U.K.. Indeed, income inequality is positive and statistically significant for both 
sub-periods. Thus, the hypothesis of Meltzer and Richard (1981) receives strong empirical 
support for the English case.  
 
3.5.3 UNITED STATES 
 
Table 3.5 and 3.6 report the estimation results for the United States for the whole period 
(1913) and the subperiods (1913-1938 and 1846-2000). Concerning the ideology variable, the 
results do not speak volume. The coefficients hardly reach the 10% significance level. The 
coefficient of left dummy has an expected positive sign for the whole period according to 
column 1, Table 3.5, but only at the 10% significance level. Moreover, the variable does not 
reach significance for the sub-periods (columns 1.a and 1.b, Table 3.6). Thus hypothesis 0 is 
hardly supported here. Concerning, hypothesis 1, column 1, Table 3.5, shows a positive and 
statistically significant effect of labor share on government size for the whole period. 
However, this variable is no longer significant when re-estimating the model for the pre- and 
post-Second World War sub-periods, as shown in columns 1a and 1b, Table 3.6. The absence 
of significance of labor share for sub-periods comes from the fact that the regressions for sub-
periods exclude the war years. When estimating the model for the period 1939-2000 including 
the war years, labor_share turns out to be positive and statistically significant. However, 
these estimates are not reported here. That leads us to think that for the American case, 
hypothesis 1 does not hold outside these periods. 
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Table 3.5  
The determinants of government size in the U.S. – total sample period 
 
Notes: (1) each regression includes the following variables that are note reported in the table: a constant, 
inequality, prop1564, prop65, openness, output gap, and time dummy variables for the two world wars and the 
outliers. (2) White-corrected standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. (3) A Jarque-Bera test was performed on the residuals of each regression to check the 
normality of the residuals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78 78 78
&,,'.),-5'#+9'+)($:' 3A;;;
738
3A	;;;
738
3A;;;
738
&-#)(0#' 3A;;;
73A8
3;;;
73A8
3A
73	8
&'*).99/ 3
738
<	3;
738
3
738
&-#)(0#';&'*).99/ < 3;
738
<
$+%-9' <3
73A8
<3	
73AA8
<3
738
&-#)(0#';$+%-9' < < 3
738
('#5$-+(   
B.>('.)D? 3A 3A 3A
,-5'#+9'+)($:')7A<8
103 
 
Table 3.6 
The determinants of government size in the U.S. – subperiods 
 
Notes: (1) each regression includes the following variables that are note reported in the table: a constant, 
incquality, prop1564, prop65, openness, output gap, and time dummy variables for the outliers. (2) White-
corrected standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) A 
Jarque-Bera test was performed on the residuals of each regression to check the normality of the residuals. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicting an increasing effect of the labor share with a left-wing ideology 
does not receive robust empirical support for the U.S.. Indeed, column 2 of Table 3.5 shows, 
for the whole period, a positive effect of the interaction term between labor share and left 
dummy, but only significant at 10%. When spiting the period, the coefficient of this variable 
does not reach significance (columns 2a and 2b, Table 3.6). Table 3.5 also shows that 
hypothesis 3 is never supported, whatever the sample period. Indeed, the interaction variable 
between labor share and income, while positive, does not reach significance. In brief, the 
theory does not support any support with the U.S. data. 
 
 
 
 
 
(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b)
lagged government size 0.398
(0.239)
0.388
(0.240)
0.412
(0.240)
0.188**
(0.071)
0.193**
(0.082)
0.202***
(0.073)
labor share 0.523
(1.214)
-0.074
(1.307)
-1.683
(6.405)
0.100
(0.142)
0.089
(0.163)
-0.426
(0.500)
left dummy -14.00
(14.87)
58.21
(132.0)
-14.52
(14.39)
-0.413
(0.894)
3.335
(20.371)
-0.716
(0.914)
labor share*left dummy - -0.920
(1.684)
- - -0.044
(0.246)
-
income -15.27
(9.754)
-14.38
(9.155)
-48.12
(94.48)
-2.114**
(0.787)
-2.145**
(0.836)
-4.638**
(2.117)
labor share*income - - 0.426
(1.215)
- - 0.031
(0.023)
Observations 26 26 26 55 55 55
Adjusted R² 0.748 0.737 0.732 0.918 0.916 0.918
government size (1913-1938) government size (1946-2000)
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3.5.4 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
In the robustness checks, we investigate more thoroughly hypotheses 0 and 2 with 
alternative measures of ideology. We use an index based on the seats percentage of the 
leftwing parties, available for the whole period. We use also an index based on the evolution 
of the parties’ manifesto with data provided by Budge et al. (2001). In this set of regressions, 
we reestimate the baseline specification and the specification with the interaction between the 
ideology variable and labor share for each country and for each sample period to check the 
sensitivity of the estimates results. 
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 provide these robustness checks for France for the whole period and the 
subperiods, respectively. In general, the use of left ideology instead of left dummy provides 
more support for hypotheses 0 and 2. Indeed, for the whole period, hypothesis 0 becomes 
significant at 10% while it did not reach significance in the previous estimates. Moreover, 
Hypothesis 2 becomes significant at the 5% level while it was significant at 10% prior. For 
the first subperiod, hypothesis 0 is not verified with the new measure while hypothesis 2 that 
was not significant prior becomes significant at 5%. For the second subperiod, the results are 
unchanged: hypothesis 0 is still significant and hypothesis 2 is still insignificant. However, 
when using the ideology measure based on the parties’ manifesto for the second subperiod, 
hypothesis 0 is not verified while hypothesis 2 received a strong support. 
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 provide these robustness checks for the U.K. for the whole period and 
the subperiods, respectively. Basically, the conclusion regarding hypotheses 0 and 2 are 
unchanged, except for the first subpriod for which left ideology provides lower level of 
significance but consistent coefficients. Finally, Tables 3.11 and 3.12 provide the robustness 
checks for the U.S.. Using alternative ideology indexes for the U.S. does not modify the 
conclusions concerning the few support for hypotheses 0 and 2. With left ideology as an 
alternative index, hypothesis 2 seems to be supported for the first subperiod but only at the 
10% level. 
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Table 3.7 
Robustness Checks 
The determinants of government size in France – total sample period 
 
Notes: (1) each regression includes the following variables that are note reported in the table: a constant, income, 
inequality, prop1564, prop65, openness, output gap, and time dummy variables for the two world wars and the 
outliers. (2) White-corrected standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. (3) A Jarque-Bera test was performed on the residuals of each regression to check the 
normality of the residuals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2)
lagged government size 0.656***
(0.058)
0.580***
(0.074)
labor share 0.122
(0.083)
0.410**
(0.162)
left ideology 1.611*
(0.887)
-38.70*
(20.64)
labor share*left ideology - 0.52**
(0.269)
Observations 69 69
Adjusted R² 0.987 0.988
government size (1921-1998)
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Table 3.8 
Robustness Checks 
The determinants of government size in France – subperiods 
 
Notes: (1) each regression includes the following variables that are note reported in the table: a constant, income, 
inequality, prop1564, prop65, openness, output gap, and time dummy variables for the outliers. (2) White-
corrected standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) A 
Jarque-Bera test was performed on the residuals of each regression to check the normality of the residuals. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1a) (2a) (1b) (2b) (1b) (2b)
lagged government size 0.029
(0.268)
-0.316
(0.268)
0.503***
(0.126)
0.503***
(0.127)
0.615***
(0.135)
0.597***
(0.112)
labor share -0.803
(0.556)
3.155**
(1.294)
0.1459*
(0.080)
0.151
(0.2091)
0.197*
(0.100)
0.275***
(0.085)
left ideology -3.491
(5.269)
-575.23**
(202.20)
3.456***
(1.213)
2.750
(25.274)
labor share*left ideology 8.436**
(2.979)
0.009
(0.322)
left manifesto 0.008
(0.029)
-1.271***
(0.467)
labor share*left manifesto 0.016***
(0.005)
Observations 18 18 51 51 50 50
Adjusted R² 0.889 0.941 0.981 0.981 0.976 0.979
government size (1921-1938) government size (1948-1998)
107 
 
Table 3.9 
Robustness Checks.  
The determinants of government size in the U.K. – total sample period 
 
Notes: (1) each regression includes the following variables that are note reported in the table: a constant, income, 
inequality, prop1564, prop65, openness, output gap, and time dummy variables for the two world wars and the 
outliers. (2) White-corrected standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. (3) A Jarque-Bera test was performed on the residuals of each regression to check the 
normality of the residuals. 
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Table 3.10 
Robustness Checks.  
The determinants of government size in the U.K. –subperiods 
 
Notes: (1) each regression includes the following variables that are note reported in the table: a constant, income, 
inequality, prop1564, prop65, openness, output gap, and time dummy variables for the outliers. (2) White-
corrected standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) A 
Jarque-Bera test was performed on the residuals of each regression to check the normality of the residuals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78 78 78 78 78 78
&,,'.),-5'#+9'+)($:' 3A;;
73	8
3;;
738
3;;;
738
3;;;
738
3A;;;
73	8
3;;;
73	8
&-#)(0#' 3A;;
73	8
3	;;
738
3	;;;
738
3A
738
3	;;;
73A8
3A;;;
738
&'*)$.'-&-,/ <3A
738
<3A;
738
3	
73A8
3
73A8
< <
&-#)(0#';&'*)$.'-&-,/ < 3;
738
< <3
73A8
< <
&'*)9+$*'(- < < < < 3A
738
<3
73A8
&-#)(0#';&'*)9+$*'(- < < < < < 3A
73	8
('#5$-+(      
B.>('.)D? 3A 3A 3A	 3A 3A 3A
,-5'#+9'+)($:')7A<A8 ,-5'#+9'+)($:')7A<AAA8
109 
 
Table 3.11 
Robustness Checks. 
The determinants of government size in the U.S. – total sample period 
 
Notes: (1) each regression includes the following variables that are note reported in the table: a constant, income, 
inequality, prop1564, prop65, openness, output gap, and time dummy variables for the two world wars and the 
outliers. (2) White-corrected standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. (3) A Jarque-Bera test was performed on the residuals of each regression to check the 
normality of the residuals. 
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Table 3.12 
Robustness Checks. 
The determinants of government size in the U.S. –subperiods 
 
Notes: (1) each regression includes the following variables that are note reported in the table: a constant, income, 
inequality, prop1564, prop65, openness, output gap, and time dummy variables for the outliers. (2) White-
corrected standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) A 
Jarque-Bera test was performed on the residuals of each regression to check the normality of the residuals. 
 
 
3.5.5 DISCUSSION 
 
No variable emerged from our empirical analysis as a common and consistent determinant 
for the three countries. Concerning the demand-side explanation, the popular Wagner’s law 
received no support for any of the three countries. However, hypothesis 1 introducing a new 
determinant of government size in the literature, i.e. the labor’s share, receives some support 
for the three countries. Indeed, as shown in Table 3.12 that summarize the regressions 
outcomes regarding our hypotheses, labor share appears as a determinant for the three 
countries for the total sample period. However a closer to the pre-war and post-war 
subperiods indicates that this determinant affects government size especially during the post-
war subperiod for France and all over the period for the U.K. However, the impact of labor 
share in the U.S. case seems to come from the war period and is not more valid when 
excluding the war periods from the regressions. 
(1a) (2a) (1b) (2b) (1b) (2b)
lagged government size 0.441**
(0.159)
0.439**
(0.147)
0.202***
(0.068)
0.212**
(0.081)
0.458***
(0.140)
0.464***
(0.137)
labor share 1.076
(1.074)
3.364***
(0.870)
0.054
(0.124)
-0.224
(0.785)
-0.022
(0.154)
-0.430
(0.329)
left ideology -0.660**
(0.267)
-4.076**
(1.769)
-0.046
(0.038)
0.483
(1.447)
- -
labor share*left ideology - 0.046*
(0.021)
- -0.006
(0.017)
- -
left manifesto - - - - -0.120*
(0.062)
2.840
(2.339)
labor share*left manifesto - - - - - -0.035
(0.028)
Observations 26 26 55 55 49 49
Adjusted R² 0.826 0.837 0.921 0.919 0.925 0.925
government size (1913-1938) government size (1946-2000)
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Table 3.13 
Summary of the findings 
 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
Besides, we argued that a positive effect of labor share is not a sufficient condition for the 
Baumol’s cost disease and found that hypothesis 3 was verified for the whole period for 
France and only for the post-war period for the U.K. but never in the U.S. case. In addition we 
know that the U.S. has had a relatively low government size all over the sample period while 
France has had a relatively high one during the same period. This suggests that the Baumol’s 
cost disease explains the differences in government size among countries. Indeed, the U.S. has 
had a rather low government size and has not been affected by the cost disease. France has 
experienced a high government size and has been early affected by the cost disease. The U.K. 
government size has been medium compared to the two other countries and has been 
influenced by the cost disease only in the post-war period. Moreover, the absence of cost 
disease in the U.S. case departs from the abundant literature finding a significant role of the 
cost disease in the explanation of the growth of the U.S. government (see for instance 
Borcherding, 1985; Ferris and West, 1996). We argued here theoretically and empirically that 
their finding can be biased due to a measurement problem of the government’s cost. 
However, hypothesis 0 assuming a static effect of ideology received robust empirical 
support only for the post-war France but not for the other countries. By contrast, hypothesis 3 
suggesting a dynamic effect of ideology varying with the labor share received support for the 
pre-war U.K. and U.S. and the post-war France. This proves the relevance of proposing 
dynamic models with a varying effect of ideology. Our evidence of a conditional effect of 
ideology is in line with Pickering and Rockey (2011) and Fachini, Melki and Rockey (2012). 
They document, with OECD data, a conditional effect of ideology to income and labor share, 
respectively. As mentioned above, the little evidence for hypothesis 0 of a static effect of 
ideology can stem from the fact that a leftwing ideology is not always a good proxy for the 
total period pre-war period post-war period
H0: positive effect of left ideology - UK* France***
H1: positive effect of labor share France*, UK***, US** UK** France**, UK***
H2: positive effect of labor share*left ideology France*, US* UK**, US* France**
H3: positive effect of labor share*income - France*** France**, UK**
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society’s choice of higher government size. Indeed, our findings suggest that in the U.S. and 
in the post-war U.K., the right-left divide has not been structured by this issue. 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
 
This paper proposed an original test of the Baumol’s costs disease. Based on the model 
developed by Fachini, Melki and Pickering (2012), we investigated the ability of this model to 
explain the differences in the evolutions of the government size in the U.S., the U.K. and 
France over the 20th century. Contrary to the literature that traditionally measures the cost 
disease with the difference between the private sector price deflator and the government’s 
implicit price deflator, we use the labor’s share as a supply-side explanation of the growth of 
government. We argued theoretically that the positive effect of the labor’s share on the 
government size increases with a left-wing society and with the economic development. We 
found empirically that the cost disease, as defined in our theory, has affected the countries 
with higher government sizes. This could explain the rather high French government size 
from the 1920s and the U.K. government size from the end of the Second World War. 
Contrary to an established result of the empirical literature on the U.S., we found no evidence 
of the Baumol’ hypothesis for this county. 
The demand-size explanation of the growth of governments did not receive strong support 
with our data. Indeed, we found no evidence of the Wagner’s law. The explanation based on 
the voters’ preferences for more or less government intervention received strong support only 
for France for the post-second-world-war period. While this explanation cannot explain the 
relatively high government size in the pre-war period, the voters’ ideology is a good candidate 
to explain the growth of government during the post-war period. Besides, the explanation of 
Meltzer and Richerd (1981) based on a model of median voter received empirical support 
only for the U.K. while Meltzer and Richerd (1983) provided empirical evidence with data in 
the U.S..  
Our findings prove the relevance of studying the determinants of government growth for 
different countries and different periods. Indeed, each country turns out to have its own 
determinants that could vary temporally. Further research on the topic requires additional 
dynamic explanations taking into account the conditional effects of the determinants of the 
size of government. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 3.14 
Variables’ definition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
variable definition
government size total public spending (central, Social security and local admin) 
as a percentage of total output
income GDP levels in million 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars per capita
inequality share of total personal income of the top 0.05% percentile groups in Fr
labor share labors's share in the national income
left dummy dummy coded 1 when the majority in the lower chamber of the parliament is 
Republican (U.S.) / Conservative (U.K.) / rightwing (France), 0 when it is Democrat
left manifesto ideology for the median voter (generated from the raw party data). This is measured 
from -100 to +100 so that -100 is extreme right and 100 is extreme left
left ideology percentage of Republican/Conservative/rifgtwing seats in the lower chamber
openness total exports+general imports as a percentage of GDP
output gap derived from the real GDP growth rate using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (6.26)
prop1564 percentage of population aged 14<age<65
prop65 percentage of population aged 65 and over
WW1 dummy coded 1 for the years of World War 1 and 0 otherwise
WW2 dummy coded 1 for the years of World War 2 and 0 otherwise
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Table 3.15 
Variables’ sources and statistics for the U.S. 
 
 
 
Table 3.16 
Variables’ sources and statistics for the U.K. 
 
mean max. min.  std. sev.  obs. source
government size 20,53 69,95 4,76 12,32 137 Statistical Abstract of the United States
Economic Report of the President
income 11,04 31,36 2,44 8,34 139 Maddison’s website. Historical Statistics of 
the World Economy, Table 2
inequality 4,33 9,87 1,89 2,13 88 Atkinson (2005)
labor share 84,28 114,60 71,80 6,14 112 Klein and Kosobud (1961)
U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor 
Statistics
left dummy 0,36 1,00 0,00 0,48 106 United State Census Bureau (2012)
left ideology 45,15 69,52 20,55 9,98 106 United State Census Bureau (2012)
left manifesto 11,28 22,62 1,64 5,74 49 Budge et al. (2001)
openness - - - - - United State Census Bureau (2012)
output gap - - - - - own calculation
prop1564 - - - - - United State Census Bureau (2012)
prop65 - - - - - United State Census Bureau (2012)
mean max. min.  std. sev.  obs. source
government size 25,92 73,61 6,58 16,96 135 Mitchell (2007a)
income 8,54 23,74 3,03 5,50 140 Maddison’s website. Historical Statistics of 
the World Economy, Table 2
inequality 3,47 8,53 0,79 2,46 93 Atkinson (2005)
labor share 64,07 75,16 48,27 6,79 143 Mitchell (1988)
OECD website
left dummy 0,59 1,00 0,00 0,49 142 Mitchell (2007a)
left ideology 49,19 76,42 23,28 12,86 142 Mitchell (2007a)
left manifesto -7,31 17,20 -32,52 11,97 53 Budge et al. (2001)
openness - - - - - Mitchell (2007a)
Penn World Table
output gap - - - - - own calculation
prop1564 - - - - - Mitchell (2007a)
prop65 - - - - - Mitchell (2007a)
115 
 
 
 
Table 3.17 
Variables’ sources and statistics for France 
 
 
 
Table 3.18 
Correlation matrix for the U.S. 
 
 
 
Table 3.19 
Correlation matrix for the U.K. 
 
mean max. min.  std. sev.  obs. source
government size 31,21 54,93 10,60 15,12 124 Andre and Delorme (1987)
National Institute of Statistics and Economic 
Studies
income 7,68 22,29 1,90 6,36 138 Maddison’s website. Historical Statistics of 
the World Economy, Table 2
inequality 3,58 9,39 1,63 2,16 84 Atkinson (2005)
labor share 76,14 98,47 60,17 5,82 113 Piketty’s website
left dummy 0,41 1,00 0,00 0,49 132 see essay 4 of this dissertation
left ideology 0,45 0,86 0,11 0,21 137 see essay 4 of this dissertation
left manifesto 0,54 26,02 -16,67 10,00 52 Budge et al. (2001)
openness - - - - - Asselain and Blancheton (2005) 
World Bank
output gap - - - - - own calculation
prop1564 - - - - - Mitchell (2007a)
prop65 - - - - - Mitchell (2007a)
government size labor share income left dummy left ideology left manifesto inequality
government size - -0,32 0,87 -0,19 -0,27 0,74 0,29
labor share - - -0,54 -0,12 0,11 -0,31 -0,57
income - - - -0,02 -0,14 0,79 0,63
left dummy - - - - 0,69 -0,05 0,28
left ideology - - - - - -0,01 0,23
left manifesto - - - - - - 0,62
inequality - - - - - - -
government size labor share income left dummy left ideology left manifesto inequality
government size - -0,09 0,32 -0,16 -0,39 0,74 0,43
labor share - - 0,04 -0,10 0,14 -0,13 -0,45
income - - - 0,28 0,29 0,54 -0,11
left dummy - - - - 0,81 -0,24 -0,16
left ideology - - - - - -0,34 -0,51
left manifesto - - - - - - 0,23
inequality - - - - - - -
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Table 3.20 
Correlation matrix for France 
 
 
government size labor share income left dummy left ideology left manifesto inequality
government size
- 0,06 0,95 -0,07 -0,01 -0,44 -0,85
labor share
- - 0,01 -0,18 -0,41 0,25 -0,33
income
- - - -0,04 0,08 -0,48 -0,85
left dummy
- - - - 0,78 -0,39 0,06
left ideology
- - - - - -0,46 0,07
left manifesto
- - - - - - 0,49
inequality
- - - - - - -
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4. POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
IN A DEMOCRACY: THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE, 1871 - 
20041 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
For a few years, an increasing literature has focused on the economic consequences of 
individuals’ social norms such as social capita and trust2. However, other essential social 
norms such individuals’ political sentiments, also called political ideology, have received less 
attention. As proof, Sala-I-Martin et al. (2003) classified the 67 most common variables in the 
growth model literature, without referring to any explicit measure of political ideology. This 
seems even more surprising that the influence of partisan effect on various policies3 as well as 
the growth effects of many policies, have been extensively studied. This lack of interest for 
the growth effect of political ideology can stem from the fact that political ideology is 
commonly assumed to affect business cycle and not the long-run trend of the economic 
growth. Indeed, as Alesina (1987) theoretically argues, the government’s political ideology is 
supposed to affect short-term economic fluctuations through the citizens’ expectations4. 
However, the institutional economics literature argues that ideology plays an essential role in 
long run performance through individual or public choice (North, 1990, 1992). Indeed, the 
individuals’ political ideology can directly affect growth through informal institutions such as 
                                                 
 
1
 This essay is based on Facchini and Melki (2012). 
2
 See Knack and Keefer (1997), Whiteley (2000), Durlauf  (2002), Zak and Knack (2001), Beugelsdijk et al. 
(2004). 
3
 See Imbeau et al. (2001) for a meta-analysis on the effects of political ideology on various policies. 
4
 Concerning the empirical literature, Alesina (1988) shows that in the United-States, Democrats perform better 
during the early years of the term, as they implement monetary and expansionist budget policies not immediately 
expected by voters. Alesina et al. (1997) confirm this finding with panel data OECD data for the period 1960-
1993. Dubois (2005) finds for France in the post-1979 period that the GDP growth increases during the six 
quarters following the election of a left-wing government. In this line, recent works show that the governments’ 
political ideology by itself matters for the expectations of financial markets (Snowberg et al., 2007) and for 
private consumption (Gerber and Huber, 2009). 
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culture and social norms in terms of labor and savings behaviours. The voters’ ideology can 
also indirectly work on growth through the formal institutions embodied in policies for which 
they vote. Both effects are of course closely related since the formal institutions resulting 
from the electoral choices stem, at least partially, from the country’s culture. 
In this paper, we ask whether and how variations in voters’ ideology, measured by the 
political affiliation of the parliament, have played a role in explaining economic growth. We 
investigate this question with time-series data on France for the period 1871-2004, covering 
the whole of the French democratic experience. Using as a main ideology index the 
composition of the Lower Chamber of the parliament, elected by the universal suffrage 
throughout the observation period, enables us to have a big picture of the ideological 
orientation of a society in a given time period. The purpose of the paper implies to investigate 
the transmission policy channels through which ideology impacts growth. As voters’ ideology 
may be regarded as the society’s choice concerning the appropriate level of government 
interference in the economy, we focus here on the size of government as a possible 
transmission mechanism between ideology and growth. Nevertheless, our point is not to 
determine immutable growth-enhancing policies than can be associated with right- or leftwing 
policies. Indeed, one can reasonably expect any policy to have different performance 
according to the environment, especially at the scale of a century. 
The theoretical literature exploring the ideological long-term effects with equilibrium 
consequences is scarce. Benabou (2008) argues theoretically that societies can embrace 
ideologies leading to equilibrium associated with inappropriate public responses to market 
failures. In his model, citizens can adopt an inefficient leftist ideology, voting for an 
excessively large government or a laissez-faire ideology with blind faith in the invisible hand. 
Bjornskov (2005) provides a theoretical framework supporting that people with a strong merit 
assumption (thinking that inequality is fair and expecting high returns to effort) are more 
productive and thus directly foster economic performance. In addition, people with such an 
assumption votes for rightwing parties promising stronger legal systems, thus indirectly 
boosting economic growth. Another strand of the literature focuses more specifically on the 
relationship between voters’ ideology and redistributive policies5.  
To the extent that voting behaviour is a proxy for voters’ social norms, the level of 
government intervention in the economy is an ideal transmission mechanism to study the 
indirect effect of voters’ ideology on growth. Indeed, most studies on ideology assume and 
                                                 
 
5
 See Piketty (1995), Benabou and Ok (2001), Saint-Paul (2010).  
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provide consistent supports that more leftwing voters or societies wish higher levels of 
government intervention. In this context, the endogeneous growth theories provide useful 
predictions regarding the growth effect of government intervention. While excessive 
government intervention is typically found to be detrimental to growth (Barro, 1991), 
investment in protection of property rights lead to higher growth (Hann and Sturm, 2000). 
However, redistribution can reduce the private incentive to accumulate capital and to invest. 
On the other hand, public investment, creating positive incentives for the private sector, has a 
positive effect on growth, as documented by the empirical literature (Romp and De Hann, 
2007). In this study, we approximate the level of government intervention by the size of 
government measured by the share of total public spending in GDP. 
Among the few empirical evidence of an ideological effect on growth, Bjornskov (2005) 
initially uses panel data for the period 1970-2000 to show that countries to the right of the 
average experience more growth, especially thanks to better legal systems and less 
government intervention.6 Accordingly, using panel data, Bjornskov (2008) provides evidence 
that the higher the income inequalities are, the more a government shift to a right-wing 
ideology improves growth.7 On the contrary, Osterloh (2012) using similar data, provides 
evidence for the absence of growth effect of an aggregated index of ideology. However, he 
shows that parties with preferences corresponding with market intervention and welfare state 
policies impacts on growth negatively. Most of the empirical research on the effects of 
political ideology has in common to use time-varying ideology indexes based on the parties’ 
manifesto. In this regard, our paper differs from the existing literature in that we study the 
effect of ideology measured by the actual composition of the parliament, according to the 
right-left divide of the moment. Such a measure has the advantage to avoid an ex-ante 
definition of the right and the left. We do not need here to associate a certain group of parties 
(left or right) with certain sets of policies. Indeed, in all bi-party democracies, one can clearly 
identify a right and a left at any period of time while it is impossible to define ex-ante the 
content of a rightwing (/leftwing) policy. However, the manifesto-based ideology indexes has 
admittedly the advantage to account for the time varying ideology. In this paper, we cope this 
issue by allowing our index to have different effects in different periods. For that we use 
interaction between our ideology index and time dummies for periods in which one could 
                                                 
 
6
 The countries ranked as right-wing experienced 0.25% additional growth per year compared to the left-wing 
ones (Bjornskov 2005, p.140). 
7
 At the mean inequality level, a move from a center to a center-right government is associated with a .28 
percentage points increase in the annual growth rate (Bjornskov 2008, p.306). 
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reasonably expect the ideological divide to have changed. In this view, our approach is 
complementary to the research based on manifesto indexes and provides additional insights 
on the topic. 
By investigating the growth-ideology relationship, this paper is also inevitably related to 
the literature studying the effects of economic fluctuations on policy sentiments, i.e. voting 
along a left-right axis (see Durr, 1993; Stevenson, 2001; Markussen, 2008). This literature 
consistently claims that policy sentiments shift leftwards when the economy is prospering and 
to the right during recessions. This leads us to take seriously the identification issue between 
political ideology and economic growth. Until now, the empirical literature has not provided 
appropriate instrumental variables for political ideology, except Bjornskov and Potrafke 
(2012) who use government employment as an instrument to study the effect of ideology on 
economic freedom. In this paper, we propose an appropriate econometric methodology to 
cope with a possible endogeneity bias and determine appropriate instruments for ideology. 
Our time series-analysis covering 130 years departs from the existing literature studying 
the effects of political ideology. Indeed, the literature is mainly composed of cross-sectional 
studies that focus on a group of countries or regions inside a country. As a consequence, we 
avoid the main difficulties inherent to these studies. The first one stemming from fairly short 
observation periods that generally do not exceed 25 years (Potrafke, 2012). The second one is 
related to the delicate measure of the cross-national differences of the right- and leftwing 
ideologies.8 In their meta-analysis, Imbeau et al. (2001) notice that partisan effects would be 
too subtle to ensure sufficient robustness of cross-sectional statistical estimations. 
In this paper, we provide empirical support that rightwing majorities in parliament 
experience more economic growth than leftwing majorities all over the period 1871-2004. 
The long run effect of a switch from a totally leftwing parliament to a totally rightwing one is 
an increase in the GDP growth rate of 1.20%. The growth effect of political ideology is robust 
when splitting the sample period into two subperiods before and after the Second World War. 
The use of Granger causality and 2 SLS methods makes us confident that the flaw of causality 
is running from political ideology to economic growth. We find evidence that government 
intervention in the economy, approximated by government size, is the transmission channel 
through which ideology impacts growth for the post-war period but not for the pre-war 
period. Far from denying the evolution of right- and leftwing parties since 1945 and a fortiori 
                                                 
 
8
 Using the Database Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al. 2001), the ideology index of suspiciously shows that 
France is perceptibly more right-wing than the U.S. between 1975 and 2000 (Bjornskov, 2005, p.144). 
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since 1870, we thus provide evidence that the level of government intervention is an issue that 
has structured the right-left ideological divide in France for the post-war period. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the empirical strategy. 
Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
4.2 DATA 
 
4.2.1 THE IDEOLOGY INDEXES IN THE LITERATURE 
 
The empirical research on the growth effect of political ideology provides some measures 
of ideology mainly based on the parties’ manifesto. Bjonrskov (2005, 2008) employs the 
categorization by Beck et al. (2001) based on the parties’ names and platforms9. As numerous 
researches of the effects of political ideology, the index used by Osterloh (2012) comes from 
the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) data of Budge et al. (2001). Based on the content 
analysis of party manifestos, the MRG data provides an index for each party according to 
numerous policy issues, identifying time-variant party preferences. Given that the political 
platforms of rightwing (/leftwing) parties evolved through time, a rightwing (/leftwing) party 
of the 1950s can be classified by the MRG as more leftwing (/rightwing) than a leftwing 
(/rightwing) party of 1980s. This classification has admittedly the advantage to account for 
the time varying ideology of parties but disregards the real political divide that structured the 
political landscape of a country at any point of time.  
Moreover, the construction of such manifesto-based indexes require ex ante assumptions 
on what rightwing and leftwing policies are. As a consequence, the endogeneous construction 
of these indexes allows to study a priori the transmission channels between ideology and 
growth. However, we seek here to determine a posteriori these channels, with an ideology 
index independent of its potential channels. Under the assumption that the MRG data reflects 
properly the parties’ preferences for specific policies10, research on the growth effects of this 
                                                 
 
9
 Beck et al. define the largest government party according to whether they have a leftwing, centrist or rightwing 
political orientation. 
10
 One cannot totally discard the hypothesis that manifestos are strategically written texts, which possibly not 
reflect the party’s ideology. However, the empirical literature supports that, for at least some dimensions, policy 
preferences of governments derived from party manifestos are correlated with policy actions after the election 
(see Budge and Hofferbert (1990) for some expenditure categories, Bräuninger (2005) for public expenditure, 
Quinn and Toyoda (2007) for international capital account regulation). In this context, research on the effects of 
such an index comes to studying the ability of the index to explain the actual political choices. 
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index comes to study the economic performance of some policies, making the focus on 
ideology in itself secondary. 
 
4.2.2 BUILDING AN IDEOLOGY INDEX FOR FRANCE SINCE 1870 
 
First, it should be stressed that a measure of ideology makes sense only if elections are 
democratic so that voters can reveal their true preferences. The French case provides one of 
the longest stable democratic periods since the establishment of the 3rd Republic in 1870, 
which was briefly interrupted by the Vichy regime (1940-1945) during World War II11. For 
these reasons, our study starts in 187112, date of the Constituent Assembly election and 
excludes the non-democratic Vichy period. We also exclude the World War I period that 
corresponds to an unusually situation gathering both right- and leftwing parties in the Union 
Sacrée government. Given that the Lower Chamber of the parliament is the sole political 
institution elected by the universal suffrage throughout the period 1870-2004, our ideology 
index focuses on the composition of this Chamber13. In this regard, our index reflects the 
voters’ political ideology and culture.  
Another important prerequisite for the building of an ideology index is the existence and a 
permanence of a right- left ideological divide. As the right-left divide originates in France in 
the wake of the French Revolution, this divide is already firmly established and structured the 
political landscape in 1870. The permanence of this divide all along our period has been 
subject to much debate among historians and analysts of the French political life14. It appears 
from this debate that two trends have cohabitated all along the French democratic experience: 
on the one hand, the variety and the diversity of the political groups and parties and, on the 
                                                 
 
11
 Historically, France was the first European country to introduce universal male suffrage in 1848. After having 
experienced, in the wake of the French Revolution, two empires, three constitutional monarchies and two 
attempts of Republic, France adopted de facto in September 1870 a parliamentary republic with the Third 
Republic (1870-1940). 
12
 The regime was only really established in 1875 with the adoption of the Wallon Amendement (constitutional 
bill) and the constitutional laws. The National Assembly was and still is split in two chambers: an Upper one, the 
Senate and a Lower one, the House of Deputies, which is the sole institution elected by direct universal suffrage.  
13
 An additional reason to focus on the Lower Chamber is that the Third Republic leaves almost no room for the 
executive power, being qualified the “Republic of deputies” (Goguel 1946). This bicameralist system 
characterizes the functioning of the French democracy until now, with the exception of the Vichy Regime. The 
Forth Republic (1946-1958) followed upon the previous one with roughly the same institutions. But under the 
Fifth Republic (1958-nowadays), the Parliament is composed of the Senate and the National Assembly, which 
became the Lower Chamber. By consequent, after 1958, we focus on the National Assembly to characterize the 
parliament’s political affiliation.  
14
 The most emblematic authors that deny a connection among the rights and the rights are Aron (1957) and 
Rémond (1963) although the latter acknowledges that the tendency among historians is to underpin the thesis of 
a continuity or a gist of the lefts and the rights through time (Rémond 1963, p. 13-23). Mayer (1997, p.15) 
argues that the left-right divide seems to remain a touchstone in the French political landscape. 
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other hand, the dualism of the fundamental (right/left) tendencies (Goguel 1946, p.19). 
Historians such as Siegfried (1930) provideds striking examples of stability in the voting 
patterns and of the relative weight of the two main tendencies since 1871. Although noone 
can deny that this divide has evolved through time15, it seems to have been permanently 
structured by certain economic issues such as public spending and public debt16 (Fridenson 
2005, p.587; Becker 2005, p.313).  
Within this context, we build an ideology index measuring the parliament’s political 
ideology on a yearly basis since 1871. This index is a continuous variable indicating the 
percentage of right-wing seats in the Lower Chamber. It is distributed between 0 and 1; 0 
reflecting the absence of right-wing deputies, and 1, a Chamber totally filled with right-wing 
deputies. An immediate difficulty comes from the identification of the affiliation of a given 
party, especially as some of them, mostly from the left, moved from the extreme left to the 
centre-right over decades. To classify the various majorities, we use several sources provided 
by historians (see Table 4.10, Appendix). As the moderate parties participated in the 
formation of the majorities and was active inside these, they are assigned the affiliation of the 
government to which they belonged. Additionally, we do not include in our index the few 
independent deputies, the “Non-Inscrits”, after having verified that their presence would not 
influence the colour of the majority. Furthermore, for the data on election years, during which 
the majority in the parliament may shift, we consider the composition of the outgoing 
Chamber, that is to say the percentage of right-wing deputies before the election. Figure 4.1 
presents the index. Left-wing parties governed for 79 years, as compared to 55 years for right-
wing ones. The mean of the index is 0.44 showing that the parliament is slightly more 
leftwing on the observation period and the standard deviation is 0.21.  
 
                                                 
 
15
 The continuity of this divide is not that obvious for the early years of the French democracy. Indeed, during 
the first three decades of the Third Republic, until the “Ralliement” of the Church to the Republic in 1898, the 
main ideological opposition was between a republican left in favour of a republican regime and secularization 
and a conservative right supporting a monarchist and religious government system. 
16
 In 1871, left and right were already opposed upon the debt due to the cost of war against Prussia (1970-1971) 
and La Commune (1871) and of the colonial strategy (Fridenson 2005, p.587; Becker 2005, p.313). As early as 
the 1870’s and especially since Waldeck-Rousseau’s government in 1899, the left developed its main issues 
(Duclert 2005, p.211) such as the regulation of working time and working conditions, wealth redistribution 
through tax and the denunciation of the « mur de l’argent ». Even though some leftwing governments such as 
Combes’s one or the “Bloc des gauches” are often presented as socially shy (Candar 2005, 223), all the main 
laws on labor market (minimum wage, working time regulation and more generally labor market entrance and 
exit conditions) were adopted by lefty majorities in parliament. The left seems to have been rather in favor of 
nationalization of certain strategic public sectors, redistributive policies likely to decrease inequalities (Fridenson 
2005, p.592 – 589) and a strict regulation of freedom of contract. 
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Fig. 4.1 
Evolution of the Ideology index for the French parliament from 1871 to 2009 
 
 
Nonetheless, it is important to verify to what extent results obtained with alternative 
measures of ideology can differ. For that, we first construct a dummy variable coded 1 when 
the majority in the Lower Chamber is rightwing and 0 otherwise. While this alternative 
measure provides general information on the parliament’s affiliation, our main index seems 
more suitable to study the policy channels from ideology to growth. Indeed, as most bills are 
voted on by qualified majority, our main index, measuring the size of the majority, can 
capture the fact that a strong majority could more easily implement its favourite policies and 
thus strengthening its growth effect. Second, as in reality there are substantial lags between 
preferences, as expressed in the ideology index, and policy enacted by government, we also 
use a moving average of the previous ten years of our main index. Such a measure of ideology 
also provides a better proxy for the persistence of voters’ ideology. Finally, for comparison 
purposes, we use an ideology index based on data coming from the Manifesto Reasearch 
group (MRG) data of Budge et al. (2001). This data is available for the period 1946-1997. 
Following Pickering and Rockey (2011), annual series are constructed for the median voter 
ideology position by weighting party ideologies according to their vote received. This is 
measured from -100 to +100 so that -100 is extreme left and 100 is extreme right.  
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4.2.3 SPECIFICATION ISSUES 
 
In the following, all variables are considered in logarithm so that they first differences 
approximate their growth rates. The dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP, from 
Maddison’s website17. Figure 4.2 depicts the data. To our knowledge, Maddison’s data is 
believed to be the most reliable source among the long-term data available for the French 
GDP. A comparison with the series provided by Toutain (1997), available from 1890, shows 
that the two series are highly positively correlated as expected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.2 
French real GDP growth rate (1869-2009) 
 
 
The time-series literature investigating the growth effect of government established a set of 
variables typically useful. Based on a Cobb–Douglas production function developed by Ram 
(1986), growth models commonly include the share of investment in real GDP, labor force, 
openness of the economy and the share of government expenditure in real GDP. In our 
empirical analysis, investment is given by the gross domestic capital formation as percentage 
of GDP and the main source used is Maddison’s website18. The labor force represents the 
                                                 
 
17
 http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm 
18
 http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm 
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average annual hours actually worked and mainly provides from Cette et al. (2009). Openness 
is the percentage of the sum of importations and exportations in total GDP and is provided by 
Asselain and Blancheton (2005). The share of government expenditure, that we call 
government size, measures the total public spending (central state, social protection and local 
public authorities) in total GDP and is constructed by linking André and Delorme (1987) and 
the series of the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). All variables 
used in this analysis are extensively described in Table 4.10 in Appendix. 
While these variables generally enter the regressions in growth rates or in first differences 
in time-series analyses19, the literature is divided on whether government size, should enter 
the regression in level or in growth rate. While Ram (1986) argues theoretically for the use of 
the growth of government size in the growth models, he acknowledges that specifications can 
include the variable in level, as initially did by Landau (1983). Among others using time-
series data20, Kocherlakota and Yi (1996) derive certain time-series properties implied by 
endogeneous growth theories, arguing for the use of government size in level in the growth 
models21. One implication is that temporary changes in government policies can have 
temporary effects of output growth but permanent effects on output levels. 
As our purpose is to investigate the long run growth effect of government, our model 
includes government size in level. However, as government size is an ideal candidate as a 
transmission channel between ideology and output growth, the presence of this variable in the 
specification could hide the potential indirect effect of ideology on growth. Thus our baseline 
specification excludes government size and includes investment, labor, openness and the oil 
price, an important control especially for the post second war period (Perron, 1989)22. We 
estimate a second specification including our ideology index in level into the baseline 
specification. Then, to perform a miniature sensitivity check of the impact of ideology and 
explore the transmission mechanisms, we include government size along with the ideology 
index into the baseline specification. Finally, the lagged dependant variable is systematically 
included as a regressor because of the possible persistence in economic growth and of 
                                                 
 
19
 We use these variables in log-first differences, which make the series stationary and enables us to avoid any 
concerns of spurious regressions with variables integrated of different order. Indeed, it is an establisged result in 
the growth literature that these variables are stationary in first differences. 
20
 See for instance Jones (1995), Evans (1997), Kocherlakota and Yi (1997).  
21
 However, the use of the level government size along with variables in first difference that are stationary or 
I(0), can produce spurious regressions if government size is not I(0). Mittnik and Neuman (2003) justifies the 
use of the level government size by the fact, although unit root tests may support the hypothesis of non-
stationarity, this variable cannot be integrated of order one, I(1), since it is somewhere between 0 and 1, by 
definition. 
22
 Indeed, Perron (1989) showed the importance of the oil shocks in the trend of the U.S. output.    
127 
 
problems of serial autocorrelation. Given the presence of the lagged dependent variable in the 
specification, the estimates provide the current period (or short-run) impact of government 
size and ideology. The long run effect of these variables can be calculated by multiplying the 
point estimate by 1 / (1 - b), where b is the point estimate of the lagged dependent variable. 
 
4.2.4 STRUCTURAL BREAKS 
 
A concern inherent in time series analyses, especially covering a period of more than one 
century, is the possible structural break in our series. With the same data than used in this 
paper, Facchini and Melki (2011)23 extensively explore this issue. They show that the year 
1945 is a natural structural break for both the French real output and government size. They 
also provide evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between government size and real 
output, as a consequence for the present analysis that the relationship between ideology, 
government size and output growth may have evolved over time. To take into account the 
possible breaks in the relationship investigated, we employ three different methods. First, we 
reestimate our model including time dummies. A dummy for the post (second) war period is 
included, as well as dummies for the three different republics covering our observation 
periods. Indeed, one can reasonably expect the institutional setting inherent in each republic 
to have played a role. A second solution to investigate the changing effect of political 
ideology on growth is to add interactions between ideology and the republic dummies, in 
which one can expect that the political beliefs may have changed. A last solution consists in 
splitting the whole observation period into a pre- and post-war periods and reestimating our 
model for these subperiods. 
 
4.2.5 REVERSE CAUSALITY BIAS 
 
A final concern is that ideology may be endogeneously determined. Indeed, ideology may 
have deep cultural determinants, such as historical, legal or sociological factors. However, 
such variables are in large part highly persistent and the analysis here controls for the 
(political) institutions. We also estimate a specification including socio-demographic 
variables. Moreover, our inclusion of the lagged dependent variable further mitigates these 
concerns. However, ideology can also be influenced by short-term economic fluctuations, as 
                                                 
 
23
 This paper corresponds to chapter 2. 
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illustrated by Markussen (2008). Indeed, he theoretically argues that the median voter’s 
ideology shifts leftwards when the economy is prospering because when he feels that he is 
getting richer, he also demands more insurance. We employ two strategies to cope with this 
issue. Following Pickering and Rockey (2011), the use of the 10-year moving average of our 
ideology index can lessen concerns about endogeneity since the ideology measure 
substantially predates the observations of output growth. However, this kind of Granger 
causality does not imply true causality because it remains possible that a third dynamic drives 
both ideology and economic growth. As a consequence, we also adopt a 2 SLS estimation of 
our model by instrumenting ideology with the socio-economic variables provided by 
Markussen to explain political ideology and the government employment uses as an 
instrument by Bjornskov and Potrafke (2012). 
 
4.3 RESULTS 
 
4.3.1 OVERALL RESULTS 
  
At first sight, the French economic growth seems to be higher under the legislatures with a 
right-wing majority in the parliament over the period 1871-2004. In fact, on average, the 
growth rate under a right-wing majority at the Lower Chamber is almost 4% while it is 2.4% 
under a left-wing one. However, this insight needs to be empirically tested to conclude on its 
robustness. Consequently, we estimate the effect of ideology in a standard setup for the whole 
sample period 1873-2004. Column 1 of Table 4.1 reports the results of estimating the baseline 
model without political ideology nor government size, which deserves a few comments. First 
of all, the growth rate of the investment share and of openness are statistically significant and 
positive, which conforms to standard assumptions. However, the variations in labor and oil 
price never attain significance. The absence of effect of the labor variable is not an unusual 
result in the literature (see for instance Roy, 2009). Moreover, it is unlikely that oil prices 
affected the French economic growth before the Second World War, which explains the 
absence of significance of oil price in this battery of tests. So, despite these reservations the 
model does a good job explaining annual growth performance, as the fit and explanatory 
power is satisfactory. 
Turning to the question of the paper, political ideology indeed seems to contribute to 
growth. In column 2, the coefficient of ideology is statistically significant at 5%, which can be 
considered more than satisfactory given the crudeness of the measure. Although little 
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emphasis should be put on the size of the estimate, it suggests that a rightwing ideology has a 
positive and statistical significant effect on economic growth. Given the presence of the 
lagged dependent variable, the parameter estimates reflect the current period (or short-run) 
impact on economic growth of the explanatory variables. Thus the impact of ideology on the 
long-run steady-state level of growth can be calculated from the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable and yields the coefficient 0,012. To interpret this coefficient, consider an 
archetypal parliament full of leftwing deputies compared to an archetypal parliament full of 
rightwing deputies. If we take the switch from an archetypically leftwing parliament to an 
archetypically rightwing one, then the long-run impact of this switch is an increase in the 
GDP growth rate of 1.20%, all else equal. As a comparison, we run the same regression with 
an alternative measure of ideology, given by a dummy variable, right dummy. Column 3 
shows that this measure of ideology does not reach any reasonable level of significance. This 
implies that, more than the mere affiliation of the parliament’s majority, the size of the 
majority matters. This can also suggest that the growth effects of ideology is mediated by 
policies voted in the parliament. 
Columns 4-5 test whether this result is stable to the inclusion of government size that could 
proxy for a transmission mechanism. Column 4 includes only government size in the baseline 
specification. This variable is not statistically significant, thus seeming not to be a relevant 
transmission mechanism. This is confirmed in column 5 when including both the ideology 
index and government size in the regression. Indeed, including government size has the effect 
of increasing the magnitude and the significance of the ideology variable. This can be 
explained by the fact the growth effect of ideology is not mediated by the size of government 
but also by a changing relationship between government size and economic outcome, as 
suggested by the non linearity hypothesis between government size and output24. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
24
 For a literature review, see Facchini and Melki (2011), which corresponds to essay 2. 
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Table 4.1 
Economic growth and political ideology, 1873-2004 
 
Notes: (1) The observation sample excludes the war years. (2) White-corrected standard errors in brackets. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) We control for the outliers with annual 
dummy variables. A Jarque-Bear test is systematically performed to make sure of the normality of the error 
terms. (4) A Box-Pierce test is performed to make sure of the absence of serial auto-correlation. 
 
 
4.3.2 ADDITIONAL CONTROLS 
 
To control for the potential structural break in the relationship, we include time dummy 
variables in the model with ideology and government size. Column 1, Table 4.2 shows the 
estimate results of the specification including ideology, government size and a dummy for the 
post-second war period. The effect of right ideology is robust when including a post-war 
dummy but government size turns out to be negative and significant at the 1% level. This 
tends to confirm the changing growth effect of government size over our sample period. 
Controlling with time dummies for the republics provides the same conclusion, as shown in 
column 2. This also supports the hypothesis that ideology impacts economic growth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
constant 0.025***
(0.002)
0.035***
(0.005)
0.015
(0.017)
0.009
(0.015)
0.061**
(0.025)
∆(lag. real GDP) 0.121**
(0.047)
0.105*
(0.054)
0.115**
(0.051)
0.117**
(0.049)
0.105*
(0.055)
∆(investment) 0.240***
(0.039)
0.236***
(0.038)
0.241***
(0.038)
0.243***
(0.039)
0.230***
(0.036)
∆(labor) 0.289
(0.309)
0.357
(0.317)
0.2941
(0.324)
0.304
(0.313)
0.366
(0.320)
∆(openness) 0.286***
(0.105)
0.270**
(0.112)
0.282**
(0.110)
0.277**
(0.107)
0.275**
(0.113)
∆(oil price) -0.008
(0.012)
-0.009
(0.011)
-0.009
(0.012)
-0.009
(0.012)
-0.009
(0.011)
right ideology - 0.011**
(0.004)
- - 0.015**
(0.007)
right dummy - - 0.005
(0.006)
- -
government size - - - 0.004
(0.004)
-0.006
(0.005)
R² 0.675 0.693 0.677 0.678 0.696
Observations 118 118 118 118 118
∆(real GDP) 1873-2004
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independently of the growth effects of each republic. This suggests a stable relationship 
between ideology and growth over the sample period. Controlling for a set of persistent 
demographic variables, such as the dependency ratio, the share of active population in total 
population and the tertiary enrolment as well as for electoral years confirm the significantly 
positive and negative effects of ideology and government size, respectively (column 3). The 
absence of significance of electoral year shows that the growth effect of ideology that we find 
is not due to the arrival of a new government that artificially boosts output. 
Another way to tackle the issue of a changing effect of ideology over our period, we 
estimate the effects of interaction variables between our ideology index and the three 
republics, first without including government size in the regression. Column 1, Table 4.3 
shows a positive and significant effect of the interactions variables for the 3rd and the 5th 
Republic, while the interaction with the 4th republic does not reach significance. As the 4th 
republic represents only a decade in a sample period of 130 years, we can be rather confident 
in the stability of the effect of ideology on growth. However, including government size into 
this specification alters the qualitative results regarding the interaction terms. Indeed, as 
shown in column 2, the interaction term with the 5th Republic is no longer significant while 
the interaction with the 4th Republic reaches the 10% significance level and is negative. This 
suggests that government size could be a relevant transmission channel for the post-war 
period and especially during the 5th Republic. 
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Table 4.2 
Economic growth and political ideology, 1873-2004 
 
Notes: (1) The observation sample excludes the war years. (2) White-corrected standard errors in brackets. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) We control for the outliers with annual 
dummy variables. A Jarque-Bear test is systematically performed to make sure of the normality of the error 
terms. (4) A Box-Pierce test is performed to make sure of the absence of serial auto-correlation. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
constant 0.150***
(0.037)
0.177***
(0.049)
0.172***
(0.053)
∆(lag. real GDP) 0.070
(0.047)
0.043
(0.052)
0.040
(0.056)
∆(investment) 0.225***
(0.034)
0.214***
(0.034)
0.211***
(0.036)
∆(labor) 0.162
(0.287)
0.307
(0.274)
0.342
(0.310)
∆(openness) 0.240**
(0.093)
0.242***
(0.088)
0.242**
(0.093)
∆(oil price) -0.009
(0.011)
-0.008
(0.010)
-0.006
(0.011)
right ideology 0.016**
(0.006)
0.018***
(0.006)
0.018***
(0.006)
government size -0.039***
(0.012)
-0.031**
(0.013)
-0.030**
(0.014)
∆(prop65) - - 0.146
(0.293)
∆(prop15_64) - - -0.048
(0.191)
∆(tertiary_enrollment) - - 0.007*
(0.004)
elecloral year - - 0.003
(0.005)
post WWII dummy 0.039***
(0.014)
- -
republic dummy - yes yes
R² 0.732 0.744 0.748
Observations 118 118 115
∆(real GDP) 1873-2004
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Table 4.3 
Economic growth and political ideology, 1873-2004 
 
Notes: (1) The observation sample excludes the war years. (2) White-corrected standard errors in brackets. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) We control for the outliers with annual 
dummy variables. A Jarque-Bear test is systematically performed to make sure of the normality of the error 
terms. (4) A Box-Pierce test is performed to make sure of the absence of serial auto-correlation. 
 
 
4.3.3 TACKLING THE REVERSE CAUSALITY BIAS 
 
As noted above, a potential concern in this analysis is that ideology may be endogeneous. 
As ideology is supposed to be mainly affected by long run determinants, controlling for such 
determinants partially alleviate possibilities of reverse causality. That is what we did in the 
previous set of regressions when controlling for republics and demographic variables. 
(1) (2)
constant 0.040***
(0.006)
0.169***
(0.038)
∆(lag. real GDP) 0.036
(0.054)
0.021
(0.051)
∆(investment) 0.235***
(0.034)
0.217***
(0.032)
∆(labor) 0.247
(0.256)
0.309
(0.237)
∆(openness) 0.250***
(0.086)
0.2547***
(0.076)
∆(oil price) -0.008
(0.011)
-0.002
(0.009)
government size - -0.036***
(0.001)
right ideology*3rd republic 0.014***
(0.004)
0.034***
(0.007)
right ideology*4th republic -0.015
(0.010)
-0.015*
(0.009)
right ideology*5th republic 0.018**
(0.008)
0.002
(0.008)
R² 0.774 0.801
Observations 118 118
∆(real GDP) 1873-2004
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Another way of tackling this issue is to estimate the model by taking the moving average of 
our ideology index. Column 1, Table 4.4 provides the estimate results of this specification. 
With such a measure, the magnitude and significance of the ideology is even strengthened, 
thus supporting that ideology Granger causes output growth and that the ideology effect is a 
long-run one, through persistent social norms. Finally, we turn to a 2 SLS estimation method 
by investigating the traditional variables explaining ideology as potential instruments. The 
result of the first stage of the 2SLS estimate is provided in Table 4.5. The variation in the 
dependency ratio and in immigration appears as good instruments. However, unlike 
Markussen (2008), economic factors such as unemployment do not affect ideology with our 
data. The estimate result of the second stage is provided in Table 4.4, column 2 and shows 
that the coefficient of ideology is robust compared to the previous OLS estimates. All this 
makes us confident about the absence of endogeneity in the relationship studied. 
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Table 4.4 
Economic growth and political ideology, 1873-2001 – OLS and 2SLS second-stage estimates 
 
Notes: (1) The observation sample excludes the war years. (2) White-corrected standard errors in brackets. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) We control for the outliers with annual 
dummy variables. A Jarque-Bear test is systematically performed to make sure of the normality of the error 
terms. (4) A Box-Pierce test is performed to make sure of the absence of serial auto-correlation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) OLS (2) 2SLS
constant 0.098***
(0.028)
0.038***
(0.006)
∆(lag. real GDP) 0.126***
(0.045)
0.095**
(0.043)
∆(investment) 0.226***
(0.037)
0.242***
(0.032)
∆(labor) 0.159
(0.268)
0.449*
(0.255)
∆(openness) 0.284***
(0.095)
0.265***
(0.069)
∆(oil price) -0.021**
(0.010)
-0.008
(0.010)
right ideology - 0.013**
(0.005)
right ideology average 0.028***
(0.007)
-
government size -0.014**
(0.006)
-
R² 0.717 0.702
Observations 110 110
∆(real GDP) 1873-2001
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Table 4.5 
Political ideology, 1873-2001 – 2SLS first-stage estimates 
 
Notes: (1) The observation sample excludes the war years. (2) White-corrected standard errors in brackets. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) We control for the outliers with annual 
dummy variables. A Jarque-Bear test is systematically performed to make sure of the normality of the error 
terms. (4) A Box-Pierce test is performed to make sure of the absence of serial auto-correlation. 
 
 
right ideology 1873-2001
2 SLS
constant -1.523***
(0.078)
∆(investment) -0.314
(0.481)
∆(labor) -7.682*
(3.924)
∆(openness) -1.334
(1.032)
∆(unemployment) -0.078
(0.192)
∆(self employment) -0.152
(0.282)
∆(life expectancy) -0.902
(18.19)
∆(tertiary_enrollment) -0.164
(0.267)
∆(strike) 0.005
(0.027)
∆(age) 0.325
(8.620)
∆(prop65) 14.27***
(0.008)
∆(prop15_64) 7.145*
(3.887)
∆(immigration) 21.11***
(3.341)
republic dummy yes
R² 0.624
Observations 111
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4.3.4 RESULTS FOR SUBPERIODS 
 
We now turn to the analysis of the growth-ideology relationship for the pre- and post-war 
subperiods. Table 4.6 provides the estimates results for the pre-war period 1873-1938. The 
baseline specification does not include oil price that is not relevant for this subperiod. Column 
1 shows that influence of right ideology is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Column 2 shows that when government size is included in the specification without ideology, 
it has a positive influence of government size but that reaches only the 10% significance level. 
When including both variables in the model, the effect of ideology is robust while 
government size does not reach any reasonable level of significance. This set of regressions 
support our previous intuition of a growth effect of ideology that is not mediated by the public 
spending channel for this period. 
Table 4.7 provides the estimates results for the post-war period 1947-2004. When ideology 
alone is included in the baseline specification, it has a positive and significant influence on 
output growth (column 1). For comparisons purposes, we run the same regression with 
alternative measure of ideology. For this subperiod, the dummy variable of ideology has a 
positive effect and reaches the 5% significance level (column 2). However, when using the 
manifesto-based index built from the MRG data available for the period 1947-1997, ideology 
does not impact growth (column 3). That justifies the use of our index of ideology that does 
not associate a priori the right and the left with typical growth-enhancing policies whose 
effects can have evolved though time. When interacting our main ideology index with the 
dummies for the 4th and the 5th Republic, we find again the significant positive effect of right 
ideology for the 5th Republic and the absence of effect during the 4th Republic (column 4). 
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Table 4.6 
Economic growth and political ideology, subperiod 1873-1938 
 
Notes: (1) The observation sample excludes the war years. (2) White-corrected standard errors in brackets. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) We control for the outliers with annual 
dummy variables. A Jarque-Bear test is systematically performed to make sure of the normality of the error 
terms. (4) A Box-Pierce test is performed to make sure of the absence of serial auto-correlation. 
 
Table 4.8 investigates the transmission mechanisms for the post-war period. As a 
comparison, column 1 reports the estimates result including ideology in the baseline 
specification. When government size alone is added to the baseline specification, it has a 
significant and negative effect (column 2). This result is in line with the non-linearity 
hypothesis that emphasises an inverted U relationship between government size and output. 
Thus France could be on the downward portion of its curve in the post-war period. When 
ideology and government size enters the same specification, this has the effect of rendering 
political ideology insignificant (column 3). In consequence, there seems to be some evidence 
that the effect of political ideology may run through public spending in the economy. To 
further investigate the public spending transmission mechanism, Table 4.9 explores the effect 
of ideology on government size for the post-war period. We use the comprehensive 
(1) (2) (3)
constant 0.084***
(0,014)
-0.059
(0,050)
0.075
(0,056)
∆(lag. real GDP) -0.080
(0,077)
-0.0005
(0,087)
-0.083
(0,080)
∆(investment) 0.173***
(0,044)
0.221***
(0,049)
0.173***
(0,045)
∆(labor) 1.808***
(0,535)
1.156*
(0,614)
1.839***
(0,572)
∆(openness) 0.288**
(0,123)
0.294**
(0,142)
0.285**
(0,126)
right ideology 0.041***
(0,009)
- 0.041***
(0,010)
government size - 0.031*
(0,018)
0.002
(0,017)
R² 0.768 0.697 0.7687
Observations 60 60 60
∆(real GDP) 1873-1938
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specification of Facchini, Melki and Pickering (2012b)25 investigating the determinants of 
government size in democratic countries, including France, all along the 20th century. 
According to their finding, government size proves to depend on political ideology for the 
post-war period. Indeed, right ideology has a negative and statistical significant impact on 
government size, as shown in Table 4.9. This last result definitely supports the hypothesis that 
government size has been a transmission channel from ideology to output growth for the post-
war period. While our investigation leaves unanswered the transmission mechanisms between 
ideology and growth before the Second World War, we provide evidence that the rightwing 
parliaments fostered output growth by limiting the size of the government during the post-war 
period.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
25
 This article corresponds to Chapter 3. The specification estimated here is based on the specifications used in 
Persson and Tabelilini (2003) and includes additional controls. The specification estimated in Table 4.9 includes 
the labor’s share in the total value-added from Piketty (2006), the real GDP per capita from Maddison’s website, 
income inequality from Atkinson (2005), the output gap given by the deviation of aggregate output from its trend 
value calculated from data from Maddison’s website, prop1564, prop65 and openness. 
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Table 4.7 
Economic growth and political ideology, subperiod 1947-2004 
 
Notes: (1) White-corrected standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. (2) We control for the outliers with annual dummy variables. A Jarque-Bear test is systematically 
performed to make sure of the normality of the error terms. (3) A Box-Pierce test is performed to make sure of 
the absence of serial auto-correlation. 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 0.054***
(0.007)
0.036***
(0.005)
0.042***
(0.006)
0.036***
(0.004)
∆(lag. real GDP) 0.151***
(0.041)
0.168***
(0.041)
0.167***
(0.048)
0.136***
(0.041)
∆(investment) 0.168***
(0.051)
0.157***
(0.052)
0.150**
(0.056)
0.168***
(0.050)
∆(labor) -0.037
(0.244)
0.065
(0.239)
0.312
(0.280)
-0.027
(0.241)
∆(openness) 0.284***
(0.058)
0.302***
(0.058)
0.282***
(0.065)
0.267***
(0.057)
∆(oil price) -0.018*
(0.010)
-0.018*
(0.010)
-0.013
(0.013)
-0.017*
(0.009)
right ideology 0.017**
(0.007)
- - -
right dummy - 0.008**
(0.004)
- -
right ideology manifesto - - -2.42E
(0.0003)
-
right ideology*4th republic - - - -0.007
(0.008)
right ideology*5th republic - - - 0.018**
(0.007)
republic dummy yes yes yes -
R² 0.714 0.705 0.689 0.721
Observations 58 58 51 58
∆(real GDP) 1947-2004
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Table 4.8 
Economic growth and political ideology, subperiod 1947-2004 
 
Notes: (1) White-corrected standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. (2) We control for the outliers with annual dummy variables. A Jarque-Bear test is systematically 
performed to make sure of the normality of the error terms. (3) A Box-Pierce test is performed to make sure of 
the absence of serial auto-correlation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
constant 0.054***
(0.007)
0.391***
(0.039)
0.389***
(0.042)
∆(lag. real GDP) 0.151***
(0.041)
0.046
(0.029)
0.046
(0.030)
∆(investment) 0.168***
(0.051)
0.159***
(0.033)
0.159***
(0.034)
∆(labor) -0.037
(0.244)
-0.049
(0.152)
-0.054
(0.161)
∆(openness) 0.284***
(0.058)
0.220***
(0.038)
0.221***
(0.039)
∆(oil price) -0.018*
(0.010)
-0.007
(0.006)
-0.007
(0.006)
right ideology 0.017**
(0.007)
- 0.0005
(0.005)
government size - -0.096***
(0.010)
-0.095***
(0.012)
republic dummy yes yes yes
R² 0.714 0.878 0.878
Observations 58 58 58
∆(real GDP) 1947-2004
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Table 4.9 
Government size and political ideology, subperiod 1948-1998 
Notes: (1) The specification estimated includes important controls not reported in the table: a constant, real GDP 
per capita, labor share, income inequality, prop15_64, prop65, openness, output gap and annual dummy 
variables for the outliers. (2) White-corrected standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) A Jarque-Bear test is systematically performed to make sure of the normality of 
the error terms. (4) A Box-Pierce test is performed to make sure of the absence of serial auto-correlation. 
 
 
4.4. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has asked whether differences in political ideology lead to differences in 
economic performance in France. It is a first attempt to investigate this issue with time-series 
data, covering a period of more than one century. Quite surprisingly, our finding regarding the 
effect of ideology on growth is consistent with the few panel studies investigating the issue 
for post-1970 periods. We also provide evidence in line with the existing literature regarding 
the transmission channel of government intervention since rightwing governments experience 
less government involvement in the economy. However, this transmission mechanism should 
be carefully considered as the influence of political ideology on government size is 
insufficient to explain its growth effect all along the French democratic experience. The 
unexplained effect can stem from other policy channels such as labor regulation or by the 
individuals’ social norms that could directly work on growth. Further research is required to 
investigate other possible transmission mechanisms so as to distinguish the indirect effect 
mediated by policies and the direct effect of social norms. 
However, our work differs from the rest of the literature investigating immutable growth-
enhancing policies typically associated with the left and the right. Indeed, as documented by 
an important empirical literature, we assumed here that the same policy can have varying 
growth effects depending on the context and therefore right(-left)wing parties can adopt 
different policies to promote growth at different periods of time. This assumption led us to use 
government size 1948-1998
lag. government size 0.503***
(0.126)
right ideology -3.456***
(1.213)
R² 0.985
Observations 51
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a measurement of political ideology based on the historical right-left divide. We argued that 
such an ideology measure is suitable for the investigation of the growth effects of ideology 
and provided robust results regarding the ideology-growth relationship. This method should 
be regarded as a complement to the increasing investigations based on manifesto data. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 4.10 
Description and Source of Variables 
 
Notes: (1) website of the French National Assembly : http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/ (2) Laurent de 
Boissieu’s website: http://www.france-politique.fr/laurent-de-boissieu.htm 
 
 
 
Name Defintion Source
age Average age of the total population INED: Institut National d'Etudes 
Démographiques
elecloral year dummy variable coded 1 for the years of election and 0 otherwise -
government 
size
percentage of total public spending (central state, social protection 
and local public authorities) in total GDP
André and Delorme (1987)
National Institute of Statistics and 
Economic Studies (INSEE)
immigration percentage of foreigners in the total population National Accounts - INSEE
investment gross Domestic capital formation  as percentage of GDP at current 
prices.
Maddison's website
 labor  Average annual hours actually worked   Cette et al. (2009)
OECD 
life expectancy life expectancy at birth INSEE
INED
oil price crude oil price barrel. Real Constant 2005 dollars http://www.ioga.com/Special/crudeoil
_Hist.htp
openness percentage of the sum of importations and exportations in total GDP Asselain and Blancheton (2005)
World Bank
post WWII 
dummy 
dummy variable coded 0 before 1945 and 1 afterwards -
prop15_64 percentage of population aged 14<age<65 Mitchell (2007)
prop65 percentage of population aged 65 and over Mitchell (2007)
real GDP annual gross domestic product in million 1990 international Geary-
Khamis dollars
Maddison’s website. Historical 
Statistics of the World Economy.
right dummy dummy coded 1 for the years when the rightwing deputies have the 
majority in the Lower Chamber of the parliament
see: right ideology
right ideology percentage of the right-wing deputies in the Lower Chamber of the 
Parliament (Chamber of Deputies for the 3rd and 4th Republic and 
National Assembly for the 5th Republic) excluding French overseas 
departments and  territories
Website of the French National 
Assembly
Laurent de Boissieu’ s website
Goguel (1946), Rémond (1963)
right ideology 
average
10-year moving average of right ideology see: right ideology
right ideology 
manifesto
median voter ideology position by weighting party ideologies 
according to their vote received
Manifesto Reasearch group (MRG) 
(Budge et al., 2001)
self employment percentage of self-employment including people working on their 
own account without help except for family workers
Flora et al. (1987)
International Labour Organization 
(ILO)
strike number of individual non-worked days National Accounts - INSEE
tertiary 
enrollment
percentage of the number of students in universities in the total 
population
Mithcell (2007)
unemployment unemployment rate Villa (1994)
INSEE
3rd republic dummy variable coded 1 for the period 1871-1940 and 0 otherwise -
4th republic dummy variable coded 1 for the period 1946-1958 and 0 otherwise -
5th republic dummy variable coded 1 for the period 1959-2008 and 0 otherwise -
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5. WHAT MOVES POLITICAL IDEOLOGY? AN 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ELECTORAL VOLATILITY 
IN FRANCE SINCE 18891 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Ever since the seminal work of Kramer (1971), a large body of literature on economic 
voting has explored the impacts of macroeconomic changes on incumbent support in 
elections. According to the hypothesis on government responsibility for national economic 
conditions, voters tend to punish or reward the incumbent on the basis of their economic 
performance. The responsibility hypothesis has been extensively debated by this volume of 
literature in order to discover which party, in a multi-party system with coalitions, is held 
responsible by voters and to what extent candidates of the governing majority could be 
considered as incumbents in different elections, such as local elections (Grier and McGarrity, 
1998). As Nannestad and Paldam (1994) noted in their literature review, the responsibility 
pattern only makes sense for governments that actually rule – as in the case of the USA and 
the UK – but not for other countries where minority governments have little control over the 
economy. In the theory of economic voting, it is also implicitly assumed that economic 
factors affect only government popularity whereas the popularity of opposition parties is 
influenced by political factors, most often missing in models (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994, p. 
218). In brief, the theory focuses on the voting pattern for only a few parties in government 
and, within this theoretical framework, no work investigates the possible impacts of the 
economy on the votes for other parties. 
                                                 
 
1
 This essay is based on a joint work with François Facchini. 
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For their part, political scientists have focused on the determinants of electoral instability 
of party system or total electoral volatility, measured as an index of the volatility of votes for 
all the parties from one election to another. This phenomenon has traditionally drawn 
considerable attention for at least three reasons2. First, electoral stability mirrors the process 
of conflict encapsulation and democracy institutionalization (Bartolini and Mair, 1990). 
Second, electoral volatility epitomizes the vitality or competitiveness of a political system, 
that is to say its ability to make possible new winning alternatives (Dassonneville and 
Hooghe, 2001). Third, electoral volatility reflects the emergence of a new kind of voter, 
independent of political parties, the ‘swing voter’ (Dalton, 2006). The few studies that have 
examined the impacts of economic conditions on total electoral volatility tend to assume that 
economic performances affect volatility through votes cast for the incumbent (Mainwaring 
and Zoco 2007; Nooruddin and Chiiber, 2008). Economic variables were included in the 
models only from the perspective of economic voting. Therefore they leave unanswered the 
question of whether economic conditions can entail other types of voting behaviours than 
economic voting and more generally the question of the voting patterns for non-governing 
parties. 
The limitations of the theory of economic voting cause both an empirical and a theoretical 
problem. From an empirical perspective, the theory has received limited support and provides 
no clear answers (Alesina, Londregan and Rosenthal, 1993; Chappell and Suzuki, 1993; 
Anderson, 2007 for a critical analysis of the literature). Moreover, the theory accounts for 
only a limited part of electoral behaviour because, whatever the economics are, volatile voters 
represent only a limited part of the total electorate, for instance 50% for an advanced 
democracy like the French one (Cautrès and Muxel, 2009, p.46). From a theoretical 
perspective, by reducing the vote to its instrumental dimension, the theory of economic voting 
is unable to explain the inertia of voting patterns and votes for non-governing parties, to 
whom the responsibility hypothesis cannot be applied. Indeed, according to the theory, voters 
incur only economic costs when voting. They incur no psychological costs of self-
contradiction of ideological inconsistency when changing their votes, for instance, from a 
rightwing to a leftwing party. Under these conditions, voters are never attached to a party in 
the sense that they do not need to justify their choice. The absence of ‘justification costs’ 
                                                 
 
2
 For empirical literature on electoral volatility in Western democracies, see : Bielasiak (2002), Mainwaring and 
Torcal (2006), Rose and Munro (2003), Shamir (1984), Dalton et al. (2000), Mair (2005), Drummond (2002), 
Birch (2003), Lachat (2007). 
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makes the cost of volatility nil for voters. On the contrary, taking into account all the costs of 
voting suggests that voting for the left when having voted for the right at the previous election 
is costly for voters and can thus lead them to avoid doing so even though they have an interest 
in it. Therefore, taking into account the ‘justification costs’ in voting theory allows a better 
understanding of how and when voters change their vote. 
Faced with the limitations of the theory of economic voting, the present paper tries to 
explain change in voting pattern with a theory of ideological voting that takes into account the 
justification costs of voting. We interpret electoral volatility as a mirror of voters’ ideological 
instability and attempt to explain it by economic or political events that modify the 
justification costs of voters’ ideology. Ideological change can be accounted for by the revision 
of the previous patterns of interpretation that are not consistent in the face of new information. 
If new information refutes old ideologies, electoral volatility is fostered. Therefore, the article 
raises the following two questions. First, what are the determinants of electoral volatility? In 
other words, which events affect ideological change? Second, to what extent the determinants 
of total electoral volatility differ from the determinants of the punishment of the incumbent? 
To address these issues, we use time-series data on 46 democratic elections that took place 
in France from 1889 to 2011, the longest period ever studied in multivariate analyses of 
electoral volatility. The French case is particularly relevant for at least three reasons. First, the 
study of electoral volatility requires a multi-party system with several non-governing parties. 
Most cases studied in the literature on economic voting have traditionally focused on the U.S. 
(Kramer, 1971; Mueller, 2003) and the U.K. (Goodhart and Bhanasali, 1970), two bi-party 
systems, and on Switzerland (Schneider, Pommerehne and Frey, 1981), where the 
government is systematically a coalition of all parties. Therefore the French multi-party 
system with an identifiable opposition appears an appropriate case for studying both 
economic voting and total electoral volatility. Second, France is particularly well-adapted for 
a time-series analysis, as it provides one of the longest stable democratic periods with the 
universal male suffrage adopted in 1848 and the establishment of the Third Republic in 1870. 
In fact, no study of electoral volatility exists on the very long run, except that by Bartolini and 
Mair (1990) on the period 1885-1985 for western democracies (but only after 1920 for 
France). Third, as Mair (1993, p.123) observed, adopting a long-term approach allows 
mitigation of some findings that would be relevant only for short and recent periods, such as 
the sudden increase in volatility since the 1970s. Therefore, this long-term approach is an 
opportunity to take part in the debate on the emergence of a volatile ‘swing voter’ in place of 
the traditional partisan voter. 
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The main results of the present study are that electoral volatility in France since 1889 has 
depended on the traditional socio-political variables described in the literature and on the 
variation in the growth rate of the income per capita. However, the vote share of the 
incumbent does not depend on the economic growth but on unemployment. This supports the 
hypothesis of another type of voting shift than the pure economic voting. That tends to give 
credence to our theory of ideological voting in addition to a pure economic voting.  
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical 
framework. Section 3 presents the data. The empirical strategy is described in Section 4. 
Section 5 provides the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
5.2 AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF ELECTORAL VOLATILITY 
 
Our explanation of electoral volatility is based on a theory of ideological change. The basic 
idea of the article is that a voter confirms his vote as long as its justification costs are low. 
This implies that no event occurs and calls into question the underlying justification of his 
beliefs and values system. Ideology is defined here as the justifying part of this beliefs 
system. Volatility occurs when ideologies which justify political choices give birth to a 
phenomenon of ‘cognitive dissonance’ in the sense of Festinger (1957). 
According to the theory of cognitive dissonance, the individual, facing new information 
not consistent with her beliefs system, is placed in a state of self-contradiction. To recover a 
state of cognitive consonance, the individual can engage in a rationalization process (Brady, 
Clark and Davis, 1993, p.37; Bronner, 2006, p.17). She seeks to adapt her beliefs system to 
new information. Yet this process is not without costs. It can explain both the inertia and the 
volatility of electoral choices. In this sense, electoral volatility mirrors the process of 
rationalization engaged in by voters. Thus volatility increases with the costs to justify past 
choices and thus the underlying ideologies. Individuals are led to revise their judgement to 
avoid having a false representation of the world. They need a ‘successful or true 
representation of the world’ (Radnitzky, 1980, 1987; Radnitzky and Bernholz, 1987). An 
appropriate representation limits uncertainty and improves the quality of expectation. In this 
sense, it is a source of efficiency. The revision or rationalization of the ideology is all the 
more possible as the number and range of dissonances are high. 
What causes variation in the justification costs of voters’ ideologies? Underlying cognitive 
dissonance is an event that creates discontinuity for a voter. This event can contradict, weaken 
and make obsolete his political ideology. It can be internal or external. Inconsistency is a 
cause of internal events, such as the paradox of Evil (Denzau and North, 1994, p.25). It places 
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individuals in a crisis of sense (Denzau and North, 1994, p.25). Mental experiment is another 
kind of internal event. 
Conversely, external events can be civil wars (e.g. the Glorious Revolution in England in 
1688), military defeats, revolutions (e.g. the French Revolution of 1789, the Russian 
Revolution in 1917, the Meiji Revolution in 1868), breakdowns (e.g. Eastern Europe and the 
USSR 1989), or military coups (e.g. Chile 1971). They can be of different magnitude and are 
assumed to be the cause of sudden institutional changes (Williamson, 2000, p.598) because 
they create generalized dissonance. Such events can be decisive in terms of electoral 
behaviors because they confirm or refute the ideologies of a significant part of the electorate. 
Whether internal or external, these events call into question voters’ political ideologies, 
increase their justification costs and lead them to revise their beliefs. The robustness of an 
ideology depends on its capacity to account for new facts and to make them consistent with an 
actual beliefs system. Electoral volatility is all the higher as voters’ political ideologies are 
weak, not robust. On this basis, it is possible to assume that major social, economic and 
national or international political crises are at the root of variation in the justifications costs of 
earlier ideologies. In times of crisis, voters are led to change their votes when facing 
situations of social and economic unrest. Under these conditions, the success and failure of 
alternative political systems can also affect the justification costs of actual ideologies and 
foster electoral volatility. 
This theoretical framework leads us to make two main predictions that will be tested in the 
rest of the article. The first hypothesis is that (1) a change in the national environment such as 
economic conditions increases the voters’ ideological instability and thus the electoral 
volatility. The second hypothesis is that (2) a change in the national or international 
conditions does not affect only the votes for the incumbent as predicted by the theory of 
economic voting but affects the votes for all the parties, including the non governing parties. 
5.3 DATA 
 
5.3.1 BUILDING AN INDEX OF ELECTORAL VOLATILITY 
 
Electoral volatility can be defined as the ‘net electoral change between two consecutives 
elections’ (Bartolini and Mair, 1990, p.19). Therefore, electoral periods (the period from one 
election to the next) are the unit of observation in the rest of our study. According to the 
classical aggregated electoral volatility index of Pedersen (1979), it is usually calculated by 
adding the absolute value of change in percentage of votes gained or lost by each party, 
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including the incumbent, from one election to the following one divided by two.3 The index 
takes into account both the demand-driven changes in terms of voters’ preferences and the 
supply-driven changes in terms of creations, disappearances, mergers and schisms of parties. 
Therefore, in a party system composed of n parties, 
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where vote is the share of the total votes received by party i in election t. The electoral 
volatility can vary from zero = total stability to 100 = total instability. 
To build this index for France over a long period, we consider the 46 democratic elections 
that have taken place since 1889. We take into account the 30 legislative and constituent 
elections since 1889, the date at which accurate data became available, and the 16 cantonal 
elections since 1945, excluding by-elections with too small electorates and those not 
representative of the total number of voters. The index of electoral volatility is calculated by 
considering the difference of votes for elections of the same nature but not that between a 
legislative election and a cantonal one. When legislative and cantonal elections take place in 
the same year and we thus have two indexes, as was the case in 1967, 1973 and 1988, we use 
the index for legislative elections for reasons of homogeneity. The passage from the Fourth 
Republic before World War Two and the Vichy regime to the Fifth Republic also warranted 
special treatment. First, we do not calculate electoral volatility between the elections before 
and after the World War Two. Thus we have no index for the year 1945 even though cantonal 
elections and elections for the Constituent Assembly took place then. The elections for the 
Constituent Assembly of 1945 are taken into account to calculate the index between the 
election for the Constituent Assembly in 1945 and that in 1946. To calculate the index for the 
legislative election of 1951, however, we consider the legislative election of 1946 and not the 
election for the Constituent Assembly of 1946 for reasons of homogeneity. Finally, we take 
into account the cantonal election of 1945 to calculate the index related to the cantonal 
election of 1949. This method allows us to compare elections of the same type systematically.  
Some difficulties also arose in calculation of the Pedersen index because of the changes, 
mergers and splits of political parties (Pedersen, 1979; Powell and Tucker, 2009; Sikk, 2005). 
The most appropriate solution is to calculate the difference between a party’s vote share and 
                                                 
 
3
 The sum is divided by two to avoid double-counting because each party’s gains correspond to another party’s 
losses. 
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the summed vote share of its predecessor parties before a merger or its successor parties after 
a split (Sikk, 2005; Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Dassonneville et al., 2011, p. 13). The major 
difficulty, however, was establishing affiliations between parties because most parties change 
their names from one election to another, especially during the Third Republic and the post-
World War Two period. On the basis of several historical sources (see Table 5.7 – Appendix), 
we established the affiliations presented in Tables 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10 – Appendix. The tables 
should be interpreted as follows. As shown in Table 5.10 – Appendix – focusing on the 
legislative elections in the Third Republic, we built seven blocks of parties. The total 
percentage of votes of block i in election t is given by adding the percentage of votes received 
in t by all the parties ranked as i in our table. Then, to calculate the index, we consider the 
difference of the percentage of votes received by block i from one election to another. 
Therefore, as we focus more on blocks of parties rather than individual parties, our index is an 
intra-block index as defined by Bartolini and Mair (1990, p. 28) rather than a pure Pedersen 
index. 
Figure 5.1 plots the evolution of the index of electoral volatility since 1889. It appears that 
the French electoral volatility followed a general downward trend. It seems to be in 
contradiction with the findings of Bartolini and Mair (1990) who do not find any significant 
trend in electoral volatility for the western democracies in the period 1885-1985, especially 
for France from 1910. The average index is 14. The highest levels of volatility were reached 
at the beginning of our observation period, during the stabilization of the French democracy 
corresponding to the beginning of the Third Republic (Electoral-Volatility1893= 29, EV1906 = 
31) and, to a lesser extent, at the beginning of each Republic (EV1958 = 26 for the Fifth 
Republic and EV1949 = 23, EV1955 = 23 for the Fourth Republic). In spite of these general 
trends, electoral volatility remained quite erratic. Indeed, although volatility seemed to 
stabilize from 1960 to 1990, it increased again during the last two decades. 
 
 Fig. 5.1 
Electoral Volatility in France 1
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5.3.3 SOCIOLOGICAL VARIABLES 
 
 
Vote and therefore volatility in votes is traditionally explained by sociological variables in 
terms of social cleavage, age or sex. First, when women were allowed to vote in 1944, they 
tended to vote for the right but this tendency progressively disappeared. This is usually 
explained by their access to the labor market and the homogenization of living conditions. 
However, as the date of the women’s enfranchisement corresponds to a deep institutional 
change in France, the Fourth Republic, it seems impossible to isolate the effect of the 
women’s vote on volatility in our study. Second, the age of voters is traditionally taken into 
account because young people tend to vote for leftwing parties whereas the elderly more often 
go for the right. This is important when we study electoral volatility, of course, but what 
really matters is that, according to our theory, older voters have strong political capital and 
stick to their electoral habits. To check the expected negative effect of the age of the 
electorate on volatility, we introduce a variable age, measuring the median age of the total 
population5. 
 
5.3.4 ELECTORAL TURNOUT 
 
A variable of electoral turnout is generally used to test the mobilization hypothesis 
according to which the introduction of new or previously abstaining voters with different 
preferences from those of regular voters (Bartolini and Mair, 1990, p. 174) increases 
volatility. If, however, we focus on abstention, the phenomenon can be interpreted in another 
way according to our theory. Indeed, momentous events that make voters’ political beliefs 
obsolete mean they either vote differently or decide to abstain from voting. In this case, 
abstention is expected to be positively correlated with volatility. To take this effect into 
account, we built a variable measuring the number of effective voters (turnout), which is 
derived from the same sources as those used to build the index of electoral volatility.6 
 
5.3.5 INSTITUTIONS 
 
                                                 
 
5
 Source: the French National Institute of Demographic Studies (Institut National d’Etudes Démographiques, 
INED). 
6
 In the empirical analysis, we use alternative measures such as the number of people registered on the electoral 
lists and one referring to the rate of abstention. 
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Following Converse (1996) who argues that attachments to parties increased with the 
length of support for a party and exposure to elections, Mainwaring and Zocco (2007, p. 161) 
assume that “newly established party systems would become more stable over time as voters 
have more time to identify with parties”. As Mainwaring and Zocco (2007) suggest, however, 
the age of democratic institutions can matter more than the mere passage of time. As Figure 
5.1 suggests, we have good reasons to think that institutional change and durability influenced 
electoral volatility rather than the mere passage of time. To control this potential influence, 
we build a variable (republic_duration) representing the duration of each Republic. We also 
test a variable (new_republic) coded 1 for the first election following the establishment of a 
republic. Moreover, as our sample includes elections of different natures, we control for that 
with a variable (election_type) distinguishing the different kinds of elections. This variable is 
coded 1 when the election considered in our sample is a legislative election and 0 when it is 
cantonal election.  
 
5.3.6 PARTY SYSTEM FRACTIONALIZATION 
 
Since Pedersen (1983), the fragmentation of the party system has traditionally been 
expected to increase electoral volatility. If the parties are fragmented, there are fewer 
ideological differences between them and, as a consequence, voters can easily move from one 
party to another. An alternative explanation would be that a system with small parties 
resulting from high fragmentation entails less volatility because they have a strong political 
identity. As these parties and their voters have a high ideological specialization, they are not 
ready to abandon their strong political capital and to change their votes. To capture the effect 
of party system format, we can consider, like Bartolini and Mair (1990), simply the number of 
parties in each election (fragmentation). Fragmentation is more often given by the number of 
parties weighted by their share of votes, however. We thus calculate the index of electoral 
fractionalization of the party system (fragmentation_RAE) proposed by Rae (1968). 
Therefore, in a party system composed of n parties, 
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where vote is the share of the total votes for party i. The index can vary from 0 = total 
concentration to 1 = total fractionalization. 
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concerns of spurious regressions. Moreover, it is worth noting that the tests do not reveal that 
that variable electoral_volatility is trend stationary. This information tends to confirm 
Bartolini and Mair (1990) and Dassonneville and Hooghe (2001) who do not find any 
significant trend in electoral volatility in Western Europe for the periods 1885-1985 and post-
1945, respectively.  
 
Table 5.1 
Unit root tests on the levels of the variables 
 
Notes: (1) The tests are performed on the levels of the variables. (2) k indicates the lag length chosen according 
to the Schwarz information criterion. (3) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table 5.2 
Unit root tests on the first differences of the variables 
 
Notes: (1) The tests are performed on the first log-differences of the variables. (2) k indicates the lag length 
chosen according to the Schwarz information criterion. (3) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
 
Variable Deterministic component ADF k
electoral_volatility constant, trend -6.368*** 0
age constant, trend -3.471* 5
turnout constant, trend -10.65*** 0
fragmentation constant, trend -5.387*** 0
growth of real per capita income constant -5.276*** 0
unemployment constant, trend -3.477* 6
inflation constant -4.475*** 1
incumbent_votes constant -5.374*** 0
Variable Deterministic component ADF k
∆(electoral_volatility) constant -4.682*** 3
∆(age) constant -4.443*** 0
∆(turnout) constant -7.671*** 3
∆(fragmentation) constant -8.082*** 1
∆(unemployment) constant -3.559** 0
∆(incumbent_votes) constant -5.453*** 3
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5.4.2 REGRESSION RESULTS  
 
To investigate to what extent the determinants of electoral volatility differ from the 
determinants of the change in the incumbent’s vote share, we run different battery of 
regressions. A first one studies the determinants of total electoral volatility. A second one 
studies the determinants of the incumbent return rate. A main difficulty comes from the small 
number of observations that does not exceed 43. To keep a sufficient number of freedom 
degrees, we investigate sequentially two different sets of factors explaining electoral 
volatility: the institutional factors and the socio-political factors. In all the following 
regressions, we estimate with an OLS method, time-series data for 46 elections held in France 
between 1889 and 2011. We systematically perform a Jarque-Bera test to make sure that the 
error terms follow a normal distribution and that the estimate results do not depend on some 
outliers. We also perform a Box-Pierce test to make sure that the error terms are not auto-
correlated. In the presence of serial auto-correlation of the error-terms, an autoregressive term 
is included into the regressions. 
A four-variable model, in which we include republic_duration, new_republic, republic, 
election_type, is first estimated to test the effects of political institutions on total electoral 
volatility. As shown in Table 5.3, the institutional variables perform poorly in explaining 
electoral volatility. Only the variable republic reaches a reasonable level of significance. 
Indeed, the coefficient of this variable is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. 
This implies that the volatility level was higher under the early republics, the 3rd and 4th 
Republics, than under the 5th Republic. This suggests that volatility depends on specific 
features to each Republic (voting system, instability of the government), which are specified 
in our model. The instability of governments under the 3rd Republic may be a good candidate 
for explaining the higher electoral volatility under this period. However, as shown in Table 
5.3, the duration of each republic as well as the establishment of a new republic do not 
explain electoral volatility. Moreover, election_type does not reach significance. Therefore, 
the different nature of elections (legislative/cantonal) included in our sample does not explain 
electoral volatility. In short, the institutional setting of each republic seems to have played a 
role in the evolution of electoral volatility, although we are not able to clearly identify which 
feature of each republic has mattered. In the rest of the analysis, we only keep the variable 
republic in the following specifications. 
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Table 5.3 
Electoral Volatility and institutions, 1889-2011 
 
Notes: (1) N = 43 elections. (2) White-corrected standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) No outlier. 
 
 
Then, we estimate a 3-variable model including the traditional socio-political variables 
explaining electoral volatility, that is to say the ageing of the electorate, (age), the variation 
in turnout (turnout), the variation in party-system fragmentation (fragmentation). The 
estimates result is shown in Table 5.4, column 1. We can notice that all variables reach a 
reasonable level of significance. The ageing of the electorate has the expected negative impact 
on electoral volatility. Party-system fragmentation, measured as the total number of parties, 
has a positive and statistically significant but at only 10% impact on volatility9. An increase in 
turnout has the expected effect of increasing volatility10. Therefore all these variables are kept 
in the following specifications. 
 
 
                                                 
 
9
 We also tested the effects of other common measures of party-system fragmentation: the indexes of political 
fragmentation (Rae, 1968) and of the effective number of parties (Laasko and Taagepera, 1979). Quite 
surprisingly, the coefficients of these indexes do not reach any reasonable level of significance (for reasons of 
clarity, the results of these regressions are not presented here). Bartolini and Mair (1990) provide us with an 
explanation of the absence of effect of these indexes. Indeed, indexes capturing the number of parties weighted 
by their share of votes amounts to an index providing the number of major parties. Although this measure is 
adapted to explain volatility in a two-party system, it is not the case in a multi-party one such as the French one. 
10
 Alternative measures of turnout such as the number of registered citizens and the abstention rate have the same 
effect although the regressions results are not reported here. 
electoral volatility (1889-2011)
constant 25.928***
[8.437]
republic_duration
-0.042
[0.053]
new_republic 3.731
[6.509]
republic
-2.666*
[1.508]
election_type 0.996
[1.848]
R² 0.200
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Table 5.4 
Electoral Volatility, 1889-2011 
 
Notes: (1) N = 42 elections. (2) Heteroskedastic Whyte type standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) We control for the year 1906 that appears as an outlier. 
 
 
Thus, the benchmark specification or our model includes the 4 variables, republic, (age), 
(turnout), (fragmentation). To investigate the economic determinants of electoral volatility, 
we add sequentially different economic variables to the benchmark model. Column 2 of Table 
5.4 reports the estimates result of the model including the variation of the growth of the real 
per capita income. The variable is statistically significant at the 1% level and the predicted 
negative impact on electoral volatility. This effect is robust when including the other 
economic variables, the variation in inflation and unemployment, as shown in column 5. The 
coefficient of the change in the growth of real per capita income remains significant at the 6% 
level. In addition, the change in inflation and unemployment does not impact volatility, 
according to columns 3, 4 and 5. The absence of influence of inflation contrasts with other 
studies, mainly on Latin America, where inflation increases electoral volatility (Remmer, 
1991; Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007). That can be explained by the absence of hyper-inflation 
for a long period in France, differently from Latin America. However, the influence of a 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
constant 14.449***
[0.908]
24.033***
[4.459]
27.389***
[5.328]
29.448***
[6.360]
21.293***
[4.652]
∆(age) -5.416***
[1.362]
-3.985**
[1.571]
-4.614**
[2.030]
-4.249**
[1.873]
-4.266*
[2.146]
∆(fragmentation) 2.201*
[1.157]
2.006**
[0.868]
1.817*
[0.919]
1.636**
[0.610]
1.477
[0.899]
∆(turnout) 1.42E-07**
[5.10E-08]
1.49E-07***
[4.65E-08]
1.51E-07***
[5.23E-08]
1.43E-07***
[5.03E-08]
1.34E-07**
[5.83E-08]
republic - -2.271**
[0.970]
-2.938**
[1.126]
-3.325**
[1.362]
-1.697
[1.010]
∆(growth of real per capita income) - -21.237***
[3.739]
- - -37.393*
[19.286]
∆(inflation) - - -0.095
[0.108]
- 0.109
[0.208]
∆(unemployment) - - - 0.192
[0.826]
0.066
[0.776]
R² 0.408 0.600 0.396 0.407 0.627
electoral volatility (1889-2011)
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change in economic growth can be due to the effect of the economic environment on the 
changes in the incumbent’s vote share.  
We now conduct a test to make sure that the effect of economic growth on electoral 
volatility that we find is not only mediated through the effect of the economic growth on the 
incumbent’s return rate, as predicted by the theory of economic voting. For that, we propose a 
straightforward test. Column 1, Table 5.5 reports the estimate our benchmark model including 
the variable of economic growth. If the effect of this variable is only due to its effect on the 
incumbent’s return rate, then including the incumbent’s return rate in the benchmark model 
should remove the effect of the growth variable on electoral volatility. Column 2, Table 5.5 
reports the result of the benchmark model including the variation of the incumbent’s vote 
share, i.e. the incumbent’s return rate. We notice that the effect of the growth variable is 
robust to the inclusion of the incumbent’s return rate. Moreover, the magnitude and the t-
statistics of the growth of real per capita income are reinforced in column 2. This supports the 
hypothesis that the growth variable affects the total electoral volatility, given the effect of the 
growth variable on the incumbent’s return rate. As a consequence, this provides evidence of 
our hypothesis of an ideological voting, different from a pure economic voting. Moreover, the 
variable measuring the change in the incumbent votes is not significant. This suggests that the 
variation in the incumbent’s votes is not a major dimension of the variation in total votes. 
In a last set of tests, we more directly investigate the determinants of the incumbent’s 
return rate. To explain the incumbent’s return rate, we include the variable measuring the 
change in fragmentation, the change in turnout, and the republic variable capturing the effect 
of potential changes in the electoral rules and constituencies. In addition, because of problems 
of serial correlations, the following regressions include an autoregressive term. The test 
results are presented in Table 5.6. Columns 2 and 4 show that the change in the growth of real 
per capita income and the change in inflation does not impact the change in the incumbent 
votes share. However, the change in unemployment significantly decreases the incumbent’s 
return rate (column 3). This effect is robust when including the economic variables all 
together in the model. This last finding is in line with the empirical literature on vote 
functions. More interesting for us, our finding supports that changes in economic environment 
can have different effects on the vote share for the incumbent and for other parties. While the 
incumbent’s return rate is affected by the change in unemployment, the return rate for the 
non-governing parties and for all parties in general is affected by fluctuations in the growth or 
real per capita income. 
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Table 5.5 
Electoral Volatility and incumbent’s votes, 1889-2011 
 
Notes: (1) N = 42 elections. (2) Heteroskedastic Whyte type standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (3) We control for the year 1906 that appears as an outlier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2)
constant 24.03***
[4.455]
21.36***
[4.307]
∆(age) -3.985**
[1.571]
-4.125**
[1.749]
∆(fragmentation) 2.006**
[0.868]
0.891
[0.765]
∆(turnout) 1.49E-07***
[4.65E-08]
1.72E-07***
[4.25E-08]
republic -2.271**
[0.970]
-1.693*
[0.918]
∆(growth of real per capita income) -21.23***
[3.739]
-23.246***
[7.353]
∆(incumbent_votes) - -0.067
[0.069]
R² 0.600 0.599
electoral volatility (1889-2011)
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Table 5.6 
Incumbent’s votes, 1889-2011 
 
Notes: (1) N = 40 elections. (2) The equations include an autoregressive term to avoid problems of serial 
correlation. (3) Heteroskedastic Whyte type standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. (4) No outlier. 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
In recent years, the electoral fortunes of incumbent have focused much attention in 
academic research. The present paper suggests that, although it is an important issue, the 
determinants of electoral behaviour cannot be properly understood without taking into 
account the vote share for non governing parties. An analysis of the elections in France from 
1889 to 2011 reveals that the aggregated electoral volatility has strongly depended on the 
economic environment along with traditional socio-political variables. We provide evidence 
that the fluctuations of the economic environment have not affected the vote shares for the 
incumbent and for other parties.  
In addition, as part of the convergence process occupying political economy on the issue of 
electoral behavior, this article proposed an alternative theory of voting to the pure economic 
voting. Indeed, we argue empirically and theoretically that economic voting based on the 
incumbent’s punishment can only account for a limited part of voting patterns. The economic 
fluctuations determine the vote share received by parties other than the incumbent. The 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
constant -2.299
[9.658]
-2.794
[9.981]
-4.778
[12.383]
-2.924
[9.806]
-1.346
[11.819]
∆(fragmentation) -4.727**
[2.002]
-4.753**
[2.043]
-5.193**
[2.001]
-5.273**
[2.045]
-6.522**
[2.426]
∆(turnout) 2.45E-07*
[1.43E-07]
2.30E-07
[1.43E-07]
2.09E-07
[1.38E-07]
2.41E-07
[1.54E-07]
2.72E-07*
[1.60E-07]
republic 0.602
[2.137]
0.779
[2.205]
1.354
[2.633]
0.790
[2.169]
0.678
[2.528]
∆(growth of real per capita income) 17.447
[19.502]
59.834
[40.475]
∆(unemployment) -2.629**
[1.023]
-2.560**
[1.043]
∆(inflation) -0.147
[0.191]
-0.447
[0.367]
R² 0.522 0.539 0.576 0.539 0.608
∆(incumbent_votes)
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limitations of the economic voting theory stem from the fact that this theory neglects some of 
the costs inherent in electoral behaviour. 
To cope with this limitation, we proposed an explanation of the voting patterns based on 
the voters’ ideological instability. This instability is reflected in the phenomenon of electoral 
volatility. The core of this theory is the concept of ‘justification costs’ in the determination 
and change of ideologies. The basic idea is that, in the presence of a change in the 
environment, individuals’ system of interpretation of the world will be adapted to justify and 
explain it. Otherwise, the event increases the justification costs and can drive individuals to 
change their ideology and their vote. According to an individualist and subjectivist theory or 
belief formation, events should not affect in the same way the whole of the electorate, 
especially the rightwing and the leftwing voters. Incidentally, the article raises an issue 
hitherto unexplored by studies on electoral volatility: the fundamental need to explore the 
specific determinants of volatility inside rightwing and leftwing blocks. That opens up new 
perspectives on the study of electoral volatility in particular and on electoral behaviours 
generally. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 5.7  
Description and Source of Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Definition Source
age median age of total population INED (institut national d’études 
démographiques)
electoral 
volatility
sum of the absolute values of change in 
percentage of votes gained or lost by each 
party from one election to the following one 
divided by two
Website of the French National Assembly
Laurent de Boissieu’ s website
Goguel (1946)
fragmentation Total number of parties see: electoral volatility
growth real GDP per capita growth rate Maddison’s website
National accounts- INSEE (National 
Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies)
incumbent votes vote shares received by the incumbent party see: electoral volatility
inflation inflation rate Thomas Piketty's website
OECD website
new republic dummy variable coded one for the first two 
elections of each Republic and zero for the 
other elections
own calculation
republic duration Variable counting of the time elapsed from 
the establishment of a new Republic
own calculation
republic variable coded 3 for the years of the 3rd 
Republic, 4 for the years of the 4th Republic 
and 5 for the years of the 5th Republic
own calculation
turnout effective number of voters see: electoral volatility
election type Dummy variables coded one for the 
legislative elections and zero for the 
cantonal elections
own calculation
unemployment unemployment rate Villa (1994)
INSEE (National Institute of 
Statistics and Economic Studies)
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Table 5.8 
Parties’ Affiliations in the Legislative Elections under the Third Republic 
  1889 1893 1898 1902 1906 1910 1914 1919 1924 1928 1932 1936 
Section Française de l’Internationale Communiste/ 
Communistes 
- - - - - - - - 1 1 1 1 
Socialistes 2 2 2 - - - - 2 2 2 2 2 
Socialistes Révolutionnaires - - - 2 - - - - - - - - 
Socialistes réformistes - - - 2 - - - - - - - - 
Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière - - - - 2 2 2 - - - - - 
Divers Gauche - - - - - - - - - 2 2 3 
Radicaux-Socialistes - 3 3 - - - - - - - - - 
Socialistes Indépendants - - - - 3 - - 3 3 3 - - 
Parti Républicain Radical - - - - 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Républicains Socialistes - - - - - 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 
Radicaux - 4 4 - - - - - - - - - 
Parti Républicain Radical  
et Radical Socialiste 
- - - 4 - - - - - - - - 
Radicaux Indépendants - - - - 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Républicains de gauche  - - - - 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Démocrates Populaires - - - - - - - - - - 4 4 
Républicains 5 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Républicains Progressistes - 5 5 - - - - - - - - - 
Action Libérale Populaire - - - 5 5 5 - - - - - - 
Union Républicaine - - - - - 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Monarchistes (conservateurs) 6 6 6 - - - - - - - - - 
Ralliés  - 6 6 - - - - - - - - - 
Réactionnaires - - - 6 6 6 6 - - - - - 
Indépendants - - - - - - - 6 6 6 6 6 
Conservateurs - - - - - - - 6 6 6 6 6 
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Nationalistes (Révisionnistes, Boulangistes,  
Socialistes Révisionnistes, Antisémites,  
Démocrates Chrétiens) 
7 7 7 - - - - - - - - - 
Anciens Combattants - - - - - - - 7 - - - - 
 
 
 
Table 5.9 
Parties’ Affiliations in the Legislative Elections under the Fourth and Fifth Republics 
  
1945 
C 
1946 
C 
1946 
L 1951 1956 1958 1962 1967 1968 1973 1978 1981 1986 1988 1993 1997 2002 2007 
Parti Communiste Français  
(et apparentés) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Parti Communiste Internationaliste - 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Union Républicaine et Résistante - 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Extrême Gauche  
(et divers) 
- - - 1 1 - 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Union Progressiste - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Union des Forces Démocratiques  
(/Radicaux UFD) 
- - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Parti Socialiste Unifié - - - - - - 1 1 1 1 - - - - - - - - 
Lutte Ouvrière - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 
Autres Trotskistes - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 
Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 
Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Fédération de la Gauche Démocrate et Socialiste - - - - - - - 2 2 - - - - - - - - - 
Parti Socialiste - - - - - - - - - 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Radicaux- 
Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance 
3 - - 3 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Rassemblement des Gauches Républicaines - 3 3 3 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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Divers Gauche - 3 - 3 3 - - - - 3 3 3 3 - - 3 3 3 
Radicaux Socialistes - - - - - 3 3 3 3 - - - - - - - - - 
Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche - - - - - - - - - 3 3 - - - - - - - 
Radicaux de Gauche - - - - - - - - - - - 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Ecologistes  
(et divers) 
- - - - - - - - - - 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Les Verts - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 - 4 4 
Mouvement Républicain Populaire 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Radicaux Centristes - - - - - 5 5 5 5 - - - - - - - - - 
Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance  
(minoritaires) 
- - - - - 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Centre Démocrate - - - - - - - 5 5 - - - - - - - - - 
Centre Progrès et Démocratie Moderne - - - - - - - - 5 - - - - - - - - - 
Mouvement Réformateur - - - - - - - - - 5 - - - - - - - - 
Union pour la Démocratie Française - - - - - - - - - - 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 - 
Mouvement Démocrate - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5 
Divers Droite 6 6 6 - - - - - - 8 - 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Républicains Indépendants 6 6 6 - - - 6 6 6 6 - - - - - - - - 
Parti Paysan 6 6 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Parti Républicain de la Liberté 6 6 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Union Gaulliste - - 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Centre National des Indépendants (et paysans) - - - 6 6 6 6 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Républicains et Indépendants Français - - - 6 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Rassemblement du Peuple Français - - - 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Républicains Sociaux - - - - 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Modérés - - - - - 6 6 6 - - - - - - - - - - 
Centre de la Réforme  
Républicaine 
- - - - - 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Divers Gaullistes - - - - - 6 6 6 6 - - - - - - - - - 
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Union pour la Nouvelle République 
/Union Démocratique du Travail 
- - - - - 6 6 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Union des Démocrates pour la Ve République - - - - - - - 6 - - - - - - - - - - 
Union pour la Défense de la République  
(et alliance avec Républicains Indépendants) 
  - - - - - - - 6 6 - - - - - - - - 
Centre Démocrate et Progrès - - - - - - - - - 6 - - - - - - - - 
Rassemblement pour la République - - - - - - - - - - 6 6 6 6 6 6 - - 
Union pour un Mouvement Populaire - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 6 
Extrême Droite (et divers) - - - - 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 - 
Union et Fraternité Française (Poujadistes) - - - - 7 7 7 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Alliance Républicaine - - - - - - - 7 - - - - - - - - - - 
Front National - - - - - - - - - - 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Mouvement National Républicain - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 7 
Rassemblement Pour la France - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8 - 
Régionalistes - - - - - - - 8 - - 8 - 8 8 8 - 8 8 
Chasse Pèche Nature et Tradition - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8 8 
Divers 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 - - 8 8 - 8 - 8 8 8 8 
 
 
Table 5.10 
Parties’ Affiliations in the Cantonal Elections under the Fourth and Fifth Republics 
  1945 1949 1955 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1992 1994 1998 2001 2004 2008 2011 
Parti Communiste Français (et apparentés) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Extrême Gauche (et apparentés) - - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Parti Socialiste Unifié - - 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière 2 2 2 2 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Fédération de la Gauche Démocrate et Socialiste - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Parti Socialiste - - - - - - 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance- 
Mouvement de Libération Nationale 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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Radicaux Socialistes 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Républicains Socialistes 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Socialistes Indépendants 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Indépendants de Gauche 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Rassemblement des Gauches Républicaines - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Radicaux - - 3 3 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Centre Gauche - - 3 3 3 - - - 5 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Divers Gauche - - 3 - - 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Radicaux de Gauche - - - - - - - 3 3 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche - - - - - - - - - 3 3 3 3 3 3 - - - - - 
Parti Radical de Gauche - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 3 3 3 3 
Mouvement Des Citoyens - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 3 3 - - 
Ecologistes (et divers) - - - - - - - - - 4 4 4 4 - - 4 4 4 4 4 
Génération Ecolo - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 4 - - - - - 
Les Verts (et Europe Ecologie) - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Mouvement Républicain Populaire 5 5 5 5 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Républicains de Gauche et Alliance Démocrate 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Centre Démocratie - - - - - 5 5 - 5 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Centre Démocratie et Progrès - - - - - - 5 5 5 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Réformateurs - - - - - - - 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Union pour la Démocratie Française - - - - - - - - - 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 - - 
Mouvement Démocrate - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5 5 
Centre Droit - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5 - 
Indépendants de Droite 6 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Entente Républicaine 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Conservateurs 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Républicains Indépendants - 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Indépendants - 6 - - - - - - 6 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Parti Républicain de la Liberté - 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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Action Locale - - 6 6 6 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Centre National des Indépendants (et paysans) - - 6 6 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Modérés - - 6 - - 6 6 6 6 6 - - - - - - - - - - 
Divers Droite - - - - - - - - 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Radicaux Indépendants 7 - - - 7 7 7 7 7 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Fédération Républicaine et  
Union des Démocrates pour la République 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Rassemblement du Peuple Français - 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Union pour la Nouvelle République 
/Union Démocratique du Travail - - 7 7 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Union des Démocrates pour la Ve République - - - - - 7 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Union pour la Défense de la République  
(et alliance Républicains Indépendants) - - - - - - - 7 7 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Rassemblement pour la République - - - - - - - - - 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 - - - 
Rassemblement Pour la France - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 - - - 
Union pour un Mouvement Populaire - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 7 7 
Front National 8 - - - - - - - - - - - 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Extrême Droite (divers) - 8 8 8 8 8 8 - - - 8 8 8 8 8 8 - 8 8 8 
Mouvement National Républicain - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8 - - - 
Régionalistes - - - - - - - - - - - - 9 9 9 - 9 9 9 9 
Chasse Pèche  
Nature et Tradition - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9 9 - - 
Autres 9 - 9 9 - - - - - - - - - - 9 9 9 9 9 9 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
 
The purpose of this dissertation was to investigate the direct and indirect interactions 
between ideology and economic growth over the French democratic experience. 
Essay 1 provided a review of the economic literature on the topic of ideology. It allowed to 
position this dissertation in the existing literature and was also the opportunity to take stock of 
the theoretical and empirical treatment of ideology. This essay showed that the economic 
effects of the political ideology have given rise to a plethora of research. In this regard, this 
dissertation takes part in a prolific research question but with an original insight since only a 
few studies have tackled the issue of the effects of political ideology on the long-run 
economic growth. This first essay also showed that the works on ideology have increasingly 
studied the determinants of ideology and more generally of the emergence and persistence of 
beliefs.  
In this regard, this dissertation participates in another research over the shaping of the 
individuals’ beliefs. In this line, we provided with essays 4 and 5 an original perspective by 
investigating not only the effects of the economy on the votes along a right-left axis but also 
on the voters’ ideological instability. 
More precisely, the main purpose of this dissertation was to determine the growth effect of 
the individuals’ political ideology. For that, we investigated deeply the transmission 
mechanisms from ideology to economic growth. We focused our intention on the channel of 
the level of government intervention in the economy. We defined government intervention as 
the size of the government measured by the share of total public spending in output. To study 
properly the different steps of the transmission mechanism between ideology, government 
size and economic growth, essays 2 and 3 decomposed the study of the overall relationship. 
This decomposition allowed an accurate investigation of the possible changing relationship 
between ideology and government on the one hand, and between government size and 
economic growth on the other hand. Essay 2 focusing on the government size-economic 
output relationship in France in the 20th century provided the following findings. The effect of 
government size on the economic output is not straightforward but follows a nonlinear 
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pattern. In other words, an increase in the size of government has a positive effect on output 
only to a certain extent. We determined that the output-maximising government size was 30% 
of the GDP. This suggest that governments that increase the share of public expenditure 
experience in average an increase in output only if this share is below 30% of the GDP. 
Essay 3 focused on the transmission mechanism between voters’ ideology and the size of 
government in democratic countries all over the 20th century: France, the U.S. and the U.K.. 
This essay supplied us with several lessons for the purpose of this dissertation. First, a shift of 
the voters’ ideology towards the left increases in the long run the size of government in 
France in the post-second-world-war period but has no effect in the pre-war period. Moreover, 
this post-war effect of ideology is peculiar to France since we did not find such evidence for 
the U.S. and the U.K.. Furthermore, we provided a new framework based on Baumol (1967) 
to study the effect of the increasing public sector’s costs on the growth of government. This 
framework showed theoretically that the influence on government size of the public sector’s 
costs increase when a society becomes more leftwing. In fact, we provided some evidence for 
France supporting that the effect of the costs is conditional to the country’s ideology, defined 
as the country’s choice for the appropriate level of government intervention in the economy. 
Essays 2 ad 3 could suggest that, if the growth of government has negatively impacted the 
output in the post-war period and a move of the ideology to the left has increased the size of 
government size in this period, then a move of the ideology to the left could have a negative 
impact on output through the channel of government intervention. However, such an assertion 
needed an appropriate setting to be empirically supported. This was the purpose of essay 4 
that investigated more directly the ideology-growth relationship. This essay focused on the 
voters’ ideology on the long run economic growth and possible reverse causality. This essay 
empirically supported that a move to the left has had a negative effect of economic growth all 
over the French democratic experience since the end of the 19th century. More precisely, this 
effect is mediated by the voters’ preferences regarding the level of government intervention in 
the economy for the post-second-world-war period but not for the pre-war period. For the pre-
war period, the negative effect of a move of the voters’ ideology to the left can be explained 
by a direct of the voters’ norms regarding labor or saving behaviors. This essay showed that 
this relationship does not suffer from endogeneity bias. In other words, economic growth has 
not fostered the votes for leftwing or rightwing parties. 
In essay 5, we argued that, although economic growth has not influenced the votes along a 
right-left axis, it can have influenced voting patterns in general yet. In other words, economic 
events can have modified the voters’ worldview irrespective of their partisan affiliation. This 
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can be reflected in the volatility of the vote shares for all parties, i.e. the electoral volatility. 
We found robust evidence for this argument with data on 46 elections held in France since the 
late 19th century. This can interpreted as an impact of the economic environment on the 
voters’ ideological instability. This provides an original perspective for research over the 
influence of economic growth on individuals’ ideology. Further research could investigate if 
the economic environment has different effects on the vote shares for leftwing and rightwing 
parties. So far, this question has never been addressed by the previous literature and could 
valuable information on the individuals’ voting patterns by taking into account the diversity of 
the voters’ worldviews. 
More generally, this dissertation and the looming literature on the growth effect of 
ideology call for additional research on the transmission channels between ideology and 
economic growth. Indeed, the size of government does not appear an appropriate channel for 
the whole of the period studied in this dissertation. One potential limit of the present work is 
the focus on only one transmission mechanism. Therefore, additional studies could study the 
possibility for ideology to have worked on output through other channels such as the 
regulation of the labor market as suggested by Bjornskov and Potrafke (2012). This 
dissertation could also lead to similar studies on other countries for long periods of time. The 
database constructed for essay 3 allows similar investigations for the U.S. and the U.K..     
In spite of the several limits of our works and the unanswered questions, we believe that 
we provide interesting answers and also that the questions we raise are as many alleys for 
future researches in this exciting topic. 
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